Solo v. Chrysler Corp.

M. J. Kelly, J.

(dissenting). After the parties to this action entered into the "Agreement to Redeem Liability” on June 9, 1970, a hearing was held on June 15, 1970, before a referee at which testimony was taken on a record. The agreement was subject to the approval of the referee, MCLA 418.835; MSA 17.237(835), and once approved, the order of the referee became final since no review was ordered or requested within 15 days, MCLA 418.837; MSA 17.237(837). On November 1, 1971, plaintiff filed a claim for benefits in the workmen’s compensation bureau presumably after discovering the true extent of her injuries. The referee dismissed the claim on the ground that the injuries alleged in plaintiff’s petition were redeemed by the prior agreement. The appeal board affirmed. It held that the 15-day appeal period had run, that the order approving the agreement had become final and that payment had been made according to the agreement. The appeal board concluded:

"If plaintiff was the victim of fraud as alleged then her remedy lies in a Court of equity vested with judicial power to grant the relief she seeks. The referee properly dismissed the application filed with the Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation for want of jurisdiction.”

It seems to me that plaintiffs complaint in *70essence charges negligence on the part of the examining and treating physicians. Plaintiffs own attorney had expressed some reservation about the medical management and had arranged for plaintiff to be seen and examined by expert medical specialists of good reputation and of his own choosing. If the medical information was incomplete or inaccurate it must be considered to be a hazard of the redemption proceeding. There is absolutely no doubt from a reading of the record, the plaintiffs complaint and the briefs of the parties that no allegation of fraud is made or inferable. I would hold that the trial court correctly relied on Johnston’s Administrator v United Airlines, 23 Mich App 279, 285; 178 NW2d 536 (1970), and properly granted defendant summary judgment.

I would prefer that the law in this area were otherwise. Redemption settlements are very often a gamble and if the odds are tipped against the parties by false medical information there ought to be a remedy. It is my belief that a remedy should be fashioned in the workmen’s compensation bureau and not in the courts. The administrative law judges and the appeal board are better suited to work out conflicting claims as to whether a worker’s disability has worsened, a hazard which is assumed in a redemption settlement, or, if the parties were led astray by inaccurate, incomplete, misleading or even false medical information. Minnesota appears to provide statutory machinery for setting aside a redemption agreement for cause. See Mattson v Abate, 279 Minn 287; 156 NW2d 738 (1968). I would recommend that the Legislature consider granting the bureau statutory authority to set aside a redemption agreement for cause under circumstances such as those framed by plaintiffs complaint.

I would affirm.