(dissenting). Plaintiff, Willie Moore, was born on November 14, 1923. He began working for defendant foundry in 1946 and continued on the payroll through September of 1968 although many of the pleadings allege a last day worked of May 8, 1967. Plaintiff says compensation benefits were paid at the rate of $81 per week until the parties agreed to redeem the case on May 7, 1973. Defendants say the compensation benefits were paid at the rate of $69 a week. The rate of compensation is significant because the redemption settlement was an actuarial type settlement and mathematically would redeem either 5.7 years at the higher rate or 6.7 years at the lower rate. In either event, however, the redemption occurred when plaintiff was 49 years old and the reasons the parties gave for urging approval by the hearing officer were first and foremost the *369plaintiffs desire to go back to work and second that the defendant employer couldn’t or wouldn’t allow him back in the plant.
It was the plaintiffs testimony that he first experienced breathing difficulties which resulted in hospitalization in February of 1977. This was almost nine years after his employment with defendant foundry had terminated. This is not to be confused with the actuarial redemption periods referred to above because the redemption took place about five years after the last day worked. The point I make is that it is not incredible to find as a matter of fact that the parties contemplated redeeming only the general disability from the back injury and did not contemplate a disabling pulmonary condition such as silicosis. In other words, I conclude that the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reviewed the redemption agreement and administrative record and made “findings of fact as to the parties’ intent. The appeal board said:
"We are not convinced that plaintiff and defendant reached the kind of meeting of minds that would include all possible conditions (including yet-unknown ones) [citations omitted]. We reject preclusive effect of the redemption on further proceedings for a newly-discovered and dissociated (with back problems) condition * * *. The true intent of the redeeming parties, particularly in light of the previously-adjudicated work-related back condition, is fairly seen to have been a settlement of back conditions.”
Given our limited review of decisions of the appeal board, Const 1963, art 6, § 28, I would affirm the finding of fact in this case that the redemption did not contemplate the unknown silicosis condition. But I would order remand for a determination of credit to be granted defendants *370for the period of time commencing April 25, 1975, which would have been covered by the $24,000 redemption settlement of May 7, 1973. This in accord with the proposition that workers’ compensation law does not favor double recovery. See Thick v Lapeer Metal Products, 419 Mich 342, 347; 353 NW2d 464 (1984).
It is not without trepidation that I cast this vote. I think the majority opinion is logical and coherent and it may be that my rejection of its result is impelled more by conjecture than by precedent. However, I have the uncomfortable foreboding that the rule of the majority would impose barriers against workers’ claims not contemplated in the industry by workers, employers, insurance companies or attorneys. My brethren may say this plucks a surmise out of the shadows and I have no ringing response to that. The appeal board cited two of its own opinions, Arnett v Cadillac Asphalt Co, 1976 WCABO 770, and Mosher v Willman Asbestos Co, 1975 WCABO 213, and plaintiff cites another one, Smith v Laro Coal & Iron, 1980 WCABO 2169. A reading of these cases set against the briefs of the parties and the opinion of the appeal board repeatedly brings up the phrase which I suspect has become talismanic in these multifaceted cases. The phrase is "preclusive effect” and appears to test later claims by the separability of the physical injury (disease) or condition. Smith v Laro Coal & Iron, supra, is indistinguishable on its facts from this case: The back injury was redeemed and three years later a claim for benefits was filed based on a lung condition. The redemption was held to have no "preclusive effect at all on plaintiff’s lung claim”. The impact of the majority opinion on the board’s use of this "preclusive effect” shibboleth will, I presume, have to be addressed by the board in subsequent opinions.
*371Defendants also argue on appeal that if we were to affirm the board, benefits payable on the silicosis claim should be limited under the one-year-back rule. MCL 418.833(1); MSA 17.237(833)(1). I would agree with the board on this issue and hold that the one-year-back rule does not apply since the second claim is for an entirely separate and unrelated injury (disease). Plaintiff does not seek "further compensation” under the terms of the statute. See Martin v Somberg-Berlin Metals Co, 407 Mich 737; 288 NW2d 574 (1980).
Finally, there is no doubt that a redemption agreement may be rescinded or set aside on the basis of fraud or mutual mistake and that the power to do so is equitable in nature, Solo v Chrysler Corp (On Rehearing), 408 Mich 345; 292 NW2d 438 (1980), and is thus outside the jurisdiction of the board, which does not possess equitable powers. Sieman v Postorino Sandblasting & Painting Co, 111 Mich App 710, 716; 314 NW2d 736 (1981). I note that the proper forum in which to attack a redemption agreement on this basis is in circuit court as was done in MacDonald v Zinn Drywall, 134 Mich App 270; 350 NW2d 864 (1984), and in Solo, supra. But see Prater v Game Time, Inc, 134 Mich App 669; 351 NW2d 882 (1984). It seems to me that in the absence of a legislative grant of jurisdiction the WCAB lacks the ability to set aside a redemption agreement based upon fraud or mutual mistake. I would rely upon MCL 400.821(2); MSA 17.237(821)(2) and the general grant of jurisdiction contained within MCL 418.841; MSA 17.237(841), and hold that the WCAB has jurisdiction over this claim to determine whether there has been a meeting of the minds in a redemption agreement which had been approved at a duly conducted hearing.
I would affirm.