(concurring in part, dissent*503ing in part). To some, I am sure, the theories expressed in the majority opinion have a kind of internal logic which might be appealing; but it is clear that when examined outside the limited context in which they are offered, these theories plummet of their own weight. Accordingly, I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which dismisses defendant’s appeal.
Because no elaborate refutation of the theories proffered in the majority opinion is necessary, I will briefly list, in no particular order of importance, some of the factors which entered into my decision:
(1) the plain meaning of the constitutional provision presently at issue;
(2) the discussion at the constitutional convention regarding this provision, wherein the terms prosecution, conviction and case were used interchangeably. 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 562-568. See also, Committee Comment to this Section, 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 469;
(3) the definitions of criminal prosecution offered in the majority opinion;
(4) GCR 1963, 785.11;
(5) GCR 1963, 806.1;
(6) MCLA 600.309; MSA 27A.309;
(7) People v McMiller, 389 Mich 425; 208 NW2d 451 (1973);
(8) People v Taylor, 387 Mich 209; 195 NW2d 856 (1972);
(9) People v Harrison, 386 Mich 269; 191 NW2d 371 (1971);
(10) People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973);
(11) People v Pickett, 391 Mich 305; 215 NW2d 695 (1974);
*504(12) Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96; 235 NW2d 132 (1975);
(13) People v Butler, 43 Mich App 270; 204 NW2d 325 (1972);
(14) People v Ledrow, 53 Mich App 511; 220 NW2d 336 (1974);
(15) the untold Court of Appeals cases reciting the familiar refrain "Defendant appeals his plea-based conviction as of right”.
In light of this hitherto consistent interpretation by the courts of this state, I confess bafflement at how it can be seriously argued that a defendant does not have an appeal as of right from a guilty plea. Obviously, I cannot subscribe to an opinion which reaches such a result.
Because the majority has chosen to write a constitutional repealer, rewrite the court rules, amend a legislative enactment and ignore stare decisis, I must urge the Supreme Court to sua sponte grant leave in this case to avoid the confusion which this case will inevitably engender. See People v Taylor, 383 Mich 338; 175 NW2d 715 (1970).
This is particularly important because this defendant will reap no benefit from a further appeal, as his conviction must be affirmed. His appellate contention is that the trial judge erred in not advising him of the possible defense of coercion which could be raised at trial. This was not error. People v Burton, 396 Mich 238; 240 NW2d 239 (1976).
Because, as I noted above, I feel bound by the pronouncements of the people, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, I dissent from dismissing defendant’s case. However, I do vote to affirm his conviction.