(dissenting).
It is my view that the ruling on Bill of Exceptions No. 2 is going to open the door to compel disclosure of the identity of an informer every time defense counsel makes a statement that his client was framed, without offering any proof or circumstance in support of such statement, as counsel has done in this case. The statement in State v. Pagnotta, 253 La. 770, 220 So.2d 69, that “there is no allegation by the defendant through his counsel or through any testimony that the confidential agent had framed him * * ” was not intended to open the door for disclosure of an informer’s identity as the majority opinion has ruled. Nor do I believe that the facts in the case of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), arc apposite to the circumstances of the instant case. ' I find no merit in this bill.
As to the ruling of the majority opinion on Bill of Exceptions No. 3, it is clear to me that this ruling addresses itself to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. Evidence was heard, argument was made, and the jury was charged as to the law; the jury then returned its verdict, after having weighed the law and the evidence. The jury concluded that the evidence was sufficient. I find no merit in this bill.
The ruling of the majority opinion with respect to Bill of Exceptions No. 4 ap*497pears to be based upon the language used by the State rather than the real purpose of the evidence. It is admitted in the majority opinion that evidence of prior possession is admissible for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge or intent. The ruling herein is highly technical, and I do not think that the State should be penalized because of some thoughtless, erroneous, harmless, language employed by the District Attorney during the tenseness of trial. I find no merit in this bill.
Bill of Exceptions No. 5 has been disposed of by citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 467, 468, 470, 474, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965). The facts in Turner and in the instant case are not similar. As I read the majority opinion, the reason for the ruling on this bill was because “it strains propriety for the witnesses to eat at the same table with the triers of fact” in this small restaurant. In short, it is based upon an opinion as to what constitutes propriety. This is a reflection on the integrity of the parties seated at the table; their lack of integrity is not borne out by the record. On the contrary, it is presumed that the officers and jurors, who were under oath, would do their duty.
I am further of the opinion that the accused received a fair trial, and that the errors set forth in the majority opinion were not such as is provided for in Art. 921, C.Cr.P., which reads as follows:
"Art. 921. Matters not grounds for. reversal
“A judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court on any ground unless in the opinion of the court after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.”
There was no miscarriage of justice in this case; the substantial rights of the accused were not prejudiced, and there was no violation of a constitutional or statutory right.
I believe that herein the rights of the public have been put behind exaggerated judicial concern over the rights of the accused. It is difficult for people to understand why a defendant, found unchallengeably guilty by a jury, should be pampered because of some inconsequential error which did not diminish by any common standard the fairness of his trial.
The true test under Art. 921, C.Cr.P., supra, is and should be: Not the legal technicalities involved, but whether the rules have denied the defendant a fair trial. As above stated, I believe the defendant had a fair trial.
I am reluctant to adopt a technical ruling in favor of a guilty defendant unless -there *499is a previous ruling that fits the case under consideration like a glove. I do not find that such exists here; I do not desire to contribute to the devastating effect of technical decisions on the enforcement of criminal justice in this state and nation.
I believe that the United States Supreme Court is realizing the devastating effect of its recent decisions on the enforcement of criminal justice, because, in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213, decided by that Court on December 15, 1970, it had this to say:
“Almost 40 years ago, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote an opinion for this Court refusing to set aside a state criminal conviction because of the claimed denial of the right of confrontation. The closing words of that opinion are worth repeating here:
“ ‘There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt— that discredit will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth Amendment — if gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction in obedience to local law, and set the guilty free.’ 291 U.S. 122, 54 S.Ct. 338.”
In order to be sure about what Justice Cardozo meant by the use of the word “gossamer” I looked it up in the dictionary and found that it has two meanings, as follows :
1. A film of cobwebs floating in the air in calm clear weather.
2. Any gauzelike fabric.
I respectfully dissent.