*703Dissenting Opinion by
WILNER, J.in which RAKER and HARRELL, JJ., join.
I have joined Judge Harrell’s dissent. I write separately because 1 am concerned not just about the decision that the Court reaches but also about the tenor of the majority Opinion. This case does not involve discrimination against disabled parents or poor parents. It does not involve any trampling upon the legitimate parental rights of Mr. F. It does not involve any fuzzy-headed social engineering designed simply to move children into a more affluent environment. It does not involve any legislative or executive transgression on basic Constitutional rights. It is simply a case in which (1) nearly six years ago, two children were found to be in need of assistance by the juvenile court, (2) no appeal from or attack on those decisions has ever been made, (3) efforts were made to reunify the children with their father, but (4) the conclusion was drawn, based on evidence that the trial court found persuasive, that Mr. F. was not in a position, and was not likely to be in a position in the foreseeable future, to be able to care properly for the children, who have special needs, and (5) there are prospective adoptive parents willing and able to care for the children on a permanent basis. Everyone seemed to agree that if an adoption proceeds, it should be an open one, in which Mr. F. may maintain contact with the children.
Although parents do have a Constitutional right to raise their children, if they are able to do so, the law allows a court to terminate parental rights, under specified circumstances, when the welfare of the children would best be served by that course of action. In order to justify such a decision, the court must make a series of findings on issues stated in the statute, and the court did so in this case. These are often very difficult and heart-rending cases, tears flowing on all sides, but it is the safety and welfare of the children that must govern. *704It is for the trial judge, not for us, to weigh and consider the evidence, and the mere fact that we might have judged the evidence differently than the trial judge or have arrived at a different conclusion altogether does not warrant reversing the judgment. These are simple and well-established principles of both substantive and procedural law that, in my view, have gotten lost in the Court’s opinion. The Court has thrown appellate restraint to the wind, and, in doing so, has not only subordinated the welfare of these two children to its incorrect view of how 'far the parent’s rights extend but has also injected considerable uncertainty into termination proceedings generally.
Judges RAKER and HARRELL have authorized me to state that they join in this dissent.