concurring.
I agree with the lead opinion’s analysis distinguishing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968), rejecting a per se rule invalidating consents to search obtained during custodial interrogations, and applying a totality-ol'-the-circumstances approach in assessing the voluntariness of Appellant’s consent to search in the present case. With regard to the totality assessment, however, although certainly the lead opinion aptly summarizes the range of non-coercive factors, I write because I believe that the coercive factors involved should be afforded substantial weight in these paradigms.
While an arrest does not per se render consent involuntary, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976), it nevertheless militates against a finding of consent, making the Commonwealth’s burden more difficult. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 470 Pa. 220, 228, 368 A.2d 272, 277 (1977) (explaining that “custody, while not determinative in itself, places a heavy burden in showing that consent was voluntarily given” and noting that “custody when coupled with other coercive factors, will normally necessitate the conclusion that the consent is not effective”). In this regard, numerous factors have been identified as bearing upon the voluntariness of consent,1 and where an individual is in custody at the time he purportedly consents to a search, the environment attending the detention should also be considered *338as integral to the totality assessment. See generally United States v. Smith, 260 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir.2001); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 8.2(b), at 646-47 (3d ed.1996) [hereinafter “La-Fave, Search and Seizure”]. The environmental considerations include, inter alia, whether the arrest was made with a display of weaponry or required the use of force against the defendant; whether the defendant was physically restrained; the, time and length of the detention; the location of the detention; and whether the custody was used as leverage in obtaining consent. See id. Additionally, a coercive dynamic has been discerned from the airport setting, see, e.g., United States v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 387 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 596 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc)), albeit of a lesser degree than involved in stationhouse interrogation.
As with the circumstance of custody, a statement by police that they will obtain a search warrant if the defendant refuses to consent does not per se render the consent involuntary; See generally LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(c), at 651 n. 77 (collecting cases); Note, Consent. to Search in Response to Police Threats to Seek or to Obtain a Search Warrant: Some Alternatives, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 163, 165 n. 21 (1980) (same). The officer’s statement should nevertheless be treated as a significant factor within the totality assessment, see generally Stephenson v. State, 494 S.W.2d 900, 904-05 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) (describing a police assertion that they would obtain a warrant as an important factor in the totality assessment), the weight of which may vary depending upon the language used by the officer. For instance, advising an individual that the police will seek or apply for a search warrant should be distinguished from a statement indicating that the officer will obtain a warrant. See United States v. Boukater, 409 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir.1969); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Utah 1996).2 In the latter circumstance, *339the officer may be overstating his authority by suggesting that a search is inevitable and that the withholding of consent will be futile.3 Of additional consequence, the existence of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant impacts upon the assessment of the statements made by the police. See generally LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(c), at 653 nn. 83-84 (collecting cases and explaining that “[t]his proposition rests upon the conclusion that the ‘threat’ in such circumstances does not involve any deceit or trickery, but instead accurately informs the individual of his precise legal situation”).
Here, although the police indicated that they “would” obtain a search warrant if Appellant declined to give her consent, I believe that probable cause existed to conduct a search based upon their corroboration of the information provided by the Houston Police Department and, significantly, the alert by the canine to the suitcase claimed by Appellant. See United States v. Williams, 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that “[a] drug-sniffing canine alert is sufficient, standing alone, to support probable cause to search”).4 More important is the effect of Miranda warnings upon the voluntariness of consent, as the police advised Appellant of her constitutional rights. Having been warned that anything she said could be used against her, Appellant’s decision to sign the consent to search form, permitting the officers to inspect her suitcase and discover the incriminating evidence, is indicative of an absence of coercion. Cf. United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 730 (5th Cir.1973); Commonwealth v. Pytak, 278 Pa.Super. 476, 488, 420 A.2d 640, 646 (1980) (citing United States v. Menke, 468 F.2d 20 (3d Cir.1972), for the proposition that “the provision of *340a Miranda warning alone, followed by a consent to search is not only persuasive but controlling on the question of voluntariness”).
In summary, although affording substantial weight to the coercive dynamics involved, in light of the entire circumstances presented, I am able to join the disposition directed by the lead opinion.
. These circumsl anees inelude, among others, the existence of custody, duress, or coercive tactics by police; the defendant's education, sophistication, intelligence, and knowledge of his right to refuse consent; whether the defendant believed that no incriminating evidence would be discovered; and the extent and level of the defendant’s cooperation with police. See Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 527 n. 7, 738 A.2d 427, 433 n. 7 (1999).
. While undue weight should not attach to distinctions based upon differences in semantics, the nature of the communication is a proper *339consideration within the totality assessment. See United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117, 122 (5th Cir.1997).
. In my view, such a statement more closely parallels the situation in' Bumper.
. Other jurisdictions have been more circumspect, requiring the suppression court to consider the reliability of the canine in the probable cause analysis. See State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762, 768 (Tenn.2000). Notably, the Houston Police Department supplied information concerning the background, training, and experience of the canine that was used in this case.