Copeland Lumber Co. v. Wilkins

Hill, J.

(dissenting)—I dissent. As indicated in the majority opinion, chapter 278 and chapter 279 of the Laws of 1959 both amended RCW 60.04.020, which is part of our ma-terialmen’s lien law. They were filed in the office of the Secretary of State on the same day in the order indicated by their numbers. The majority accurately states the purpose of each amendment.

Chapter 279 was made up of a series of 12 amendments to the mechanics’ and materialmen’s lien laws1 and was intended as a comprehensive overhaul of those laws. Section 2 thereof stated that RCW 60.04.020 was “amended to read as follows.” It repeated the existing RCW 60.04.020 and added the second proviso found on page 941 of the majority opinion. It, however, omitted the underscored proviso from chapter 278 found on page 942 of the majority opinion.

It seems to me that as between chapter 278 and chapter 279, the act last filed in the office of the Secretary of State should control (RCW 1.12.025). There is no question of implied repeal; the proviso added by chapter 278 was repealed by deletion. The language is clear, RCW 60.04.020 was “amended to read as follows: . . .” and, as so amended, there was no provision for a lien unless filed within 10 days after the first delivery of the material. (The omitted proviso gave a lien for material furnished after the notice was given, even if the notice was not filed within the 10-day period.)

That chapter 279 deleted the proviso contained in chapter 278 was apparently the construction placed on the situation by the legislature, for it again amended RCW 60.04.020 by *947chapter 98 of the Laws of 1965 to include the identical proviso contained in chapter 278 of the Laws of 1959.

The majority now says that the legislature did a useless thing in enacting chapter 98 of the Laws of 1965, because chapters 278 and 279 of the Laws of 1959 have both been in effect since their normally effective date of midnight June 10,1959.1 do not agree.

No one is affected by this particular judicial determination of legislative intent except the immediate parties; the legislature having itself reenacted the deleted proviso. To achieve what it regards as justice for the late filing materi-alman in this particular case, the majority places a question mark on every legislative attempt to repeal by deletion. Each such attempt now becomes a matter of intention to be determined by the Supreme Court. I am not sure we magnify our stature as a court of justice; clearly we minimize it as a court of law.

Rosellini and Neill, JJ., and Donworth, J. Pro Tem., concur with Hill, J.

It amended RCW 60.04.010, 60.04.020, 60.04.040, 60.04.050, 60.04.060, 60.04.064, 60.04.067, 60.04.090, 60.04.110, '60.04.130, 60.04.140, and 60.04.180.