concurring specially.
If we were reviewing these issues for the first time, I might well agree with Justice Paulson’s dissent in Lanterman v. Dorgan, 255 N.W.2d 891, 895 (N.D.1977). However, as the opinion by the Chief Justice notes, this court has previously reviewed these issues in Lanterman and Hardy v. State Tax Commissioner, 258 N.W.2d 249 (N.D.1977). Those opinions concluded that the North Dakota statutes require the Federal taxable income as the starting point for the preparation of the State income tax return and only those adjustments expressly provided by statute may be made to increase or decrease Federal taxable income on the State tax return.
We were told at oral argument by counsel for the Tax Commissioner that Lanter-man and Hardy were incorrect decisions, that some legislators agreed those decisions were incorrect interpretations of the statute, and that it was the conclusion of the legislators and the tax department that no further legislation was necessary because the decisions were incorrect. These statements are not, of course, part of the record. However, such a conclusion is not a correct reflection of the law. The construction of a statute by the courts, supported by long acquiescence on the part of the Legislature, or by continued use of the same language, or failure to amend the statute, is evidence that such construction is in accordance with the legislative intent. See, e. g., Skinner v. American State Bank, 189 N.W.2d 665 (N.D.1971). Thus, if the interpretation placed upon statutes by this court is incorrect, the Legislature presumably would take action by the amendment of the statutes to correct that interpretation. Although the interpretation in Lanterman and Hardy may not be indicative of “long acquiescence on the part of the Legislature,” we were also informed at oral argument that no bills addressing these issues were introduced into the 46th Legislative Assembly which convened in 1979 — after the decisions in those cases had been announced for some time. If the argument of counsel for the Tax Commissioner that no legislative amendments were necessary is accepted, it appears that even if this case had not arisen for some period of years after Lanterman there still would have been no legislative proposals made to address these issues.
Because this court has previously determined these issues and because there was no legislative action to alter those decisions, I concur in the opinion written by the Chief Justice.