(dissenting)—The majority errs in at least four respects: (1) It has reversed this case upon an issue that was not presented to the trial court; in fact, neither party raised it in this court. It was raised for the first time by the majority in its opinion. (2) There is no statutory requirement that a final custody determination be made at the time the marriage relation is dissolved. (3) Even if there were such a requirement, the majority should not convert the trial court's temporary order into a final order because the trial court might have made a different determination had it known that the order was to be final; and (4) There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in placing the custody of the two younger children with their mother because that determination is supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, I dissent.
It is axiomatic that an appellate court will not consider an issue that was not presented to the trial court. E.g., In *820re Marriage of Larango, 93 Wn.2d 460, 464, 610 P.2d 907 (1980); Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wn.2d 368, 385, 610 P.2d 857 (1980); Pearce v. G.R. Kirk Co., 92 Wn.2d 869, 875, 602 P.2d 357 (1979); Bradbury v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 91 Wn.2d 504, 512, 589 P.2d 785 (1979); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn.2d 230, 240, 588 P.2d 1308 (1979); Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wn.2d 402, 408, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); Davis v. Niagara Mach. Co., 90 Wn.2d 342, 345, 581 P.2d 1344 (1978); Martin v. Municipality of Metro Seattle, 90 Wn.2d 39, 578 P.2d 525 (1978). Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that either party objected to the trial court's entry of the dissolution decree and the deferral of a final custody hearing. This issue was never presented to the trial judge. Consequently, it cannot be raised on appeal. The majority's error is aggravated by the fact that neither party attempted to raise the issue in this appeal. It was raised by the court sua sponte. This is error. Nevertheless, I will discuss the merits of the issue raised, the disposition of which I consider to be further error.
RCW 26.09.050 provides:
In entering a decree of dissolution of marriage,. . . the court shall consider ... or make provision for child custody and visitation, the support of any child of the marriage entitled to support, the maintenance of either spouse, and the disposition of property and liabilities of the parties.
(Italics ours.) Under this statute the court is only required to consider or make provision for child custody and visitation at the time the decree of dissolution is entered. Usually a final custody determination is made at that time; however, the statute does not mandate that it be done. Indeed, the best interests of the children may require that the determination of custody be deferred to a later date. This decision should rest in the sound discretion of the trial court. There may be instances where the parties have agreed upon a property division and the decree of dissolution must be entered early in the proceeding to establish *821those interests of record to allow the parties to transact business unencumbered by the dissolution. At that point, the proceeding may not be ready for a custody determination. The majority decision would prohibit this type of bifurcation and could force a premature custody determination. Although that situation is not presented in this case, the court obviously believed the mother was about to remarry and the best interests of the younger children required that custody be with her. Rather than make this its final decision at the time the decree of dissolution was entered, it determined to leave the temporary custody with Mr. Little for an additional 6 months and then hold a final custody hearing. During this time, the court ordered home studies to be made and, as the court surely anticipated, the mother remarried and her home situation was stabilized. It was after these events occurred that the court finally determined the best interests of the two younger children required that custody be with the mother. The statute does not prohibit this procedure. Where the best interest and welfare of the children are paramount, as in this case, flexibility should be the hallmark of the law—not rigidity. Rigidity in this area of human relations does not promote the best interest of the children. Consequently, I find no abuse of discretion in the procedure adopted by the trial court.
Even if the majority position finally prevails, it errs in converting a temporary custody order into a final order. Had the court known it was making a final determination of custody, it may have given the children to the mother as recommended by the Lutheran Family and Child Services. Instead, the court proceeded cautiously and left the children temporarily with Mr. Little and deferred that determination for 6 months. At that time, following other home studies and the remarriage of Mrs. Little, the final determination was made to place custody of the two younger children with the mother. While I disagree with the majority position that a final determination must be made at the time the decree of dissolution is entered, if that position *822becomes law, then the relief that should be granted is a remand to the trial court to reconsider its temporary order and enter a permanent order effective on the date the decree of dissolution was entered.
Finally, in my view, the only issue presented is the question of whether there is substantial evidence to support the court's award of custody of the two younger children to the mother. I find more than ample evidence to support the trial court's determination. Three home studies support the award of custody. Only one study recommended that the children be kept together with the father. Additionally, a highly qualified psychologist, who conducted several psychological tests with the two younger children and later their mother, and who had the opportunity of visiting the mother in her new home situation, concluded that the placement of the younger children with the mother would put them in a positive environment. She testified that because of the age differential between the two older children and the two younger children their relationship was not so much a sibling relationship as one of a parent relationship. Consequently, in her opinion the separation of the children was not of great moment in the context of the overall situation.7
The home study reports indicate that the marriage between these parties was at times stormy. Mr. Little apparently had a drinking problem and at times he became abusive to his wife and to his children. He claims to be over this problem although the wife contends otherwise. This was an item given consideration in the home study reports recommending that the younger children be placed with their mother.
The trial judge saw and heard the parties and their witnesses and considered the evidence. He is in a better posi*823tion than this court to determine what is in the best interests of the children. In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, we should be slow to overturn a trial judge's decision in a custody case even if we might have made a different decision. The wisdom of his decision is not at issue in this court. As the court observed in In re Marriage of Croley, 91 Wn.2d 288, 292, 588 P.2d 738 (1978):
Respondent argues that . . . the trial court's award of custody was not supported by substantial evidence. Respondent's contention is not well taken. Whether we would have reached the same conclusion is not the question before us. Similarly, the wisdom of the trial court's decision is not at issue. The sole question is whether there is substantial evidence to support the court's award of custody.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the determination of the trial court. Therefore, I dissent.
Reconsideration denied September 3, 1980.
Review granted by Supreme Court November 7, 1980.
The age differential in the cases cited by the majority was slight as compared to this case and is therefore not apposite. Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. App. 1938) (children age 3 and younger); Fisher v. Fisher, 207 S.W. 261 (Mo. App. 1918) (children ages 12, 10, 9 and 4).