dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The skeleton record which supports this original proceeding consists of the plaintiff’s complaint, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and quash service of process (which is supported by an affidavit and brief), and a court order denying the motion to dismiss and quash service of process. See C.R.C.P. 12.
The motion to dismiss asserts that Alliance is not qualified to do business in Colorado; has sold no products in the State of Colorado; has no agents, employees, servants, telephone listings, advertisements, distributors, or other contacts with or in the State of Colorado. The majority opinion accepts the bald allegations of negligence and other tortious conduct in the complaint as a basis for interpreting our long-arm statute so as to cause in personam *408jurisdiction to attach to Alliance. Section 13-l-124(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973. Alliance Clothing Ltd., a Hong Kong corporation, manufactured certain clothing in accordance with specifications supplied by Archer Enterprises Ltd., another Hong Kong corporation. From the limited record, it is impossible to determine that Alliance did anything else. Foreseeability by Alliance of the use of the garment in issue in the United States or in Colorado is supported by broad allegations in the complaint and nothing else. The mere manufacture of a garment, such as pants, by one Hong Kong corporation for another does not require that the use and location of the final purchaser must be predicted with certainty on the penalty of suffering liability in a distant country.
I do not read Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973), as authority for the extension of jurisdiction under our long-arm statute to the acceptance of a mere allegation of negligence, or other tortious conduct, as a basis for finding that in personam jurisdiction exists on a world-wide basis. Alliance alleges that our decisions in Ferrari S.p.A. Sefca v. District Court, 185 Colo. 136, 522 P.2d 105 (1974); Granite States Volkswagen Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972); and Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968), require an opposite conclusion. I agree.
In my view, due process and the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice set out in International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), are violated by the result reached in this case.