DISSENTING OPINION OP
LEVINSON, J.I dissent for the following two reasons, each of which is sufficient, in my opinion, to grant the petitioner the relief she seeks: (1) HRS § 12-3 (6) is repugnant to article III, section 13 of the Hawaii constitution and is therefore unconstitutional; (2) The three-year residency requirement to serve in the Hawaii house of representatives *262prescribed by article III, section 7 of the Hawaii constitution violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and is therefore void.
I. THE HAWAII CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
The Power of the Legislature to Judge the Qualifications of Its Own Members.
Article III, section 13 of the Hawaii constitution states: “Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members....” I believe that HRS § 12-3(6) usurps this power and is, therefore, unconstitutional under the Hawaii constitution.
The majority opinion construes HRS § 12-3(6) as merely clarifying the qualifications set forth in article III, section 7 of the State constitution rather than as adding a new qualification. This may be the purpose of HRS § 12-3(6) but its enactment by the fifth Hawaii legislature does, under the majority opinion, take away from the sixth Hawaii legislature the power to sit in judgment on the “qualifications of its own membersAs the briefs of the petitioner and the respondent point out, the neces: sary date for the fulfillment of the residency requirement set forth in article III, section 7 of the State constitution1 is open to conflicting interpretations. In the light of the clear language of article III, section 13 I think it is apparent that the State constitution has delegated to the house of representatives the right to make a final determination as to when the residency requirement set forth in article III, section 7 must be met by its members. The *263residency requirement is one of the constitutionally listed qualifications for membership in the house of representatives, and the constitution plainly states that each house shall judge the qualifications of its own members. To sit in judgment necessarily implies the power to interpret the law affecting the case, in this instance, article III, section 7. However, the majority opinion by validating HRS § 12-3(6) clearly deprives the sixth Hawaii legislature of this power of interpretation.
HRS § 12-3(6) requires the chief election officer to refuse to place on the ballot the name of any candidate who will not certify that he will have met the residency requirement “by the date of the next election.” This is one interpretation of article III, section 7. However, the fifth Hawaii legislature when enacting HRS § 12-3(6) could have interpreted section 7 as not requiring that the residency qualification be met until the day when the newly elected legislature first convened, or, alternatively until the elected representative presented himself for membership in the house of representatives. The Hawaii constitution does not empower any one session of the legislature to make a final interpretation of the residency requirement binding upon all future legislatures. Each legislature is given the power to decide this issue for itself. HRS § 12-3(6) is unconstitutional because it precludes the petitioner from being a candidate for office and, if elected, having the opportunity to present her arguments as to when the residency requirement must be met before the constitutionally proper forum — the house of representatives of the sixth Hawaii legislature.
The United States Senate has on at least four occasions been confronted with situations where it determined the constitutional qualifications of persons who presented themselves for membership. In the case of Rush D. Holt the Senate was confronted with the question as to when a *264member must meet the requirement of article I, section 3 of the United States Constitution that he be thirty years of age. Holt was elected as a senator from West Virginia for a six-year term beginning January 3, 1935. He did not attain the age of 30 years until June 19, 1935. Thereafter he presented himself to the Senate for membership. After extensive debate as to when the Constitution required that a senator satisfy the age requirement the Senate passed the following resolution by a vote of 62 to 17, with 16 not voting:
Resolved, That Rush D. Holt is entitled to his seat in the Senate of the United States as a Senator from the State of West Virginia, it appearing that he was 30 years of age at the time when he presented himself to the Senate to take the oath and to assume the duties of the office. S. Res. 155, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 79 CONG. REC. 9841 (1935).
During the course of the two-day debate it was never doubted by any of the senators present that it was to the Senate alone that the power to interpret the age requirement belonged. Senator George of Georgia, chairman of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, in presenting the report recommending that Holt be seated reminded the Senate that “it is, of course, well known that each House of the Congress — or, in this instance, the Senate— is the sole judge of the elections, the returns, and the qualifications of its own members.” 79 CONG. REC. 9753 (1935).2
In early decisions of the United States Senate it decided not to seat Albert Gallatin (the vote being 14 to 12) and James Shields who at the times they presented themselves for membership had not been citizens of the United States *265for the period of time required by the Constitution. In Rush Holt’s case he attained the requisite age of 30 years after the commencement of the term for which he was elected and before he presented himself. In the circumstances there is no inconsistency between the Gallatin-Shields cases and the Holt case. Even if there were an inconsistency, certainly the Holt case overruled the earlier cases and demonstrates conclusively that one session of the Senate cannot bind a later session in these matters.
The Holt, Gallatin and Shields cases support my interpretation of the Hawaii constitution that each house of the legisla ture is the sole judge in determining when the residency qualification of its own members must be met. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) does not in any way alter this conclusion.
The Powell case involved an effort by the House of Representatives to add qualifications to the three standing qualifications laid down in article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution.3 The House excluded Powell not because he failed to meet any of the age, citizenship or inhabitancy qualifications but because he had in the past allegedly made false reports on his expenditures to the House. The Supreme Court struck down this action by the House not because the House of Representatives has no power to render a constitutional interpretation as to the three standing requirements set forth in article I, section 2 of the Constitution, but because the House had clearly exceeded its authority and excluded Powell on grounds which found no constitutional sanction. As Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated, speaking for the majority: “Further, analysis of the Textual commitment’ under Art. I, | 5 ... has demonstrated that in judging the qualifica*266tions of its members Congress is limited to tlie standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution.” Powell v. McCormack, supra at 550.4 I believe this statement is an affirmation of the power of the legislature to judge the qualifications of its own members and that the Powell case really stands for the proposition that such a judgment by the legislature is subject to judicial review only when the basis for the legislative judgment goes beyond the power granted to the legislature by the Constitution. Even if the Powell case could be interpreted as holding that the Court has power to review the determination of the House relating to the standing constitutional qualifications, such review would not take place until after the proper session of the House passes on the disputed qualifications of its own members.
If there is any ambiguity in this constitutional provision, I feel constrained to resolve such ambiguity in a manner which least impinges upon the petitioner’s constitutionally protected right to be a candidate for elective office and which provides the greatest scope to the voters in selecting their representatives. Therefore, I would hold that in the instant case the fifth State legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority in attempting to pass judgment on the qualifications of the members of future legislatures, a power expressly denied it by article III, section 13 of the State constitution. HRS § 12-3(6) violates the Hawaii constitution.
*267II. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
A. The Compelling State Interest Test.
This case involves the right to be considered for public service, a right which is fundamental to the concept of democracy and which has been afforded constitutional protection. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1970). The right to run for elective office and right to vote for candidates running for such office uphold a fundamental principle of our representative democracy which is, in Alexander Hamilton’s words, quoted by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, “that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969).5 As Madison pointed out at the Constitutional Convention, “this principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself.” Powell v. McCormack, supra at 547.
The respondent acknowledges the fundamental nature of the right to run for elective office and that such right enjoys constitutional protection equal in scope to that afforded the exercise of the right to vote. Furthermore, the respondent contends that the power given the states to impose restrictions upon the right of suffrage, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965), is co-extensive with the power of the states to regulate the right to run for office. I do not quarrel with this contention. However, I do take issue with the majority opinion which holds that when the implementation of this power takes the form of a dura-tional residency requirement for running for elective office and such implementation is challenged as a denial of equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, the state is only *268required to meet the traditional test of rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose in justifying its residency requirement. A careful scrutiny of recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of voting rights leads me to conclude that the Supreme Court has departed from the permissive traditional yardstick6 and has adopted a stricter standard which requires the state to demonstrate a compelling state interest in order to sustain its restrictive classification in the area of the exercise of the franchise. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). Because the right to run for elective office cannot be said to be less fundamental than the right to vote, I believe this stricter standard must be applied in this case.
In the area of voting lights the Supreme Court departed from the traditional standard when judging legislative classification in the apportionment case, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Court held that the equal protection clause demanded that a statutory restriction on the exercise of the franchise receive special examination.
Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. 377 U.S. at 562.
The Court extended the use of this stricter test to a non-apportionment voting rights case in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), invalidat*269ing a poll tax requirement in an election of state representatives. The Court in applying the stricter test stated:
We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. 383 U.S. at 670.7
In Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), the Court again held that where a right as fundamental as the right to vote is at issue the state is required to do more than merely show a rational basis for a restrictive classification. The Kramer case struck down a New York property ownership requirement as a condition for voting in a local school board election.8 The Court reasoned:
This careful examination is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government. 395 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added).
This rationale would, of course, apply with equal force to state restrictions on the right to run for elective office, for the right to vote and the right to run for public office are equal in their fundamental importance, as the respondent acknowledges. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that a restriction upon the voter’s choice of candidates is as much of an infringement upon his rights as a restriction upon the franchise itself. Powell v. McCor-*270mack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
A recent Michigan federal district court decision, Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 (E.D. Mich. 1970), after an examination and analysis of the Kramer case and some of the other authorities cited above, expresses the same conclusion I have reached that in testing state qualifications on the right to run for public office the state must demonstrate a compelling state interest in order to justify the qualification.9
Finally, any doubts that the compelling state interest test must be applied in determining the validity of residence requirements as well as property10 and monetary restrictions11 should be laid to rest by Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). In Evans, the Court struck down the decision of a Maryland County Registry Board that persons living on a federal enclave located within the geographical boundaries of Maryland were not to be considered Maryland residents for voting purposes. In commenting on the test to be used in judging the rationale put forward by the state for this restriction the Court said:
The sole interest or purpose asserted by appellants to justify the limitation on the vote in the present case is essentially to insure that only those citizens who are primarily or substantially interested in or affected by electoral decisions have a voice in making them. Without deciding the question, we have assumed that such an interest could be sufficiently compelling to justify limitations on the suffrage, at least with regard to some *271elections_However, it is clear that such a claim cannot lightly he accepted. 398 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).12
A three-judge district court in Massachusetts has within the last two months filed a decision, citing Evans, which strikes down a Massachusetts durational residency requirement, placed on the right to vote, as failing to promote any compelling state interest. Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (Mass. 1970).
On the basis of the authorities discussed above I believe that this court has no alternative except to use the compelling state interest test in determining the validity of the Hawaii three-year residency requirement under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
B. The Lack of a Compelling State Interest.
The sole state interest put forth by the respondent and the majority opinion in support of the three-year residency requirement is the desire to ensure that a legislator representing the people is “familiar with them and their needs.” To achieve this result the Hawaii state constitution creates an unrebuttable presumption that all persons residing in this state for less than three years are wanting in sufficient familiarity with local issues to represent their constituents properly. The state has made no attempt to demonstrate that there are not means available to achieve its ends more “finely tailored” than a three-year residency restriction. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970). *272In fact, the three-year state residency requirement does not on its face appear to be a particularly effective means of assuring that a legislator will be familiar with the local needs and issues of the particular district he represents. For although a candidate must reside somewhere in the state of Hawaii for a period of three years prior to his being eligible to serve as a member of the House, he is only required to reside for a period of three months in the district from which he seeks to be elected.13 Thus, a person could live for a period of two years and nine months on the island of Niihau and then move to Honolulu and be free to run as a representative to the House from a Honolulu district after being in Honolulu for only three months prior to the election. Such a person may or may not be familiar with local problems after having lived in Honolulu for three months, but I do not think it can be said that the additional two years and nine months or even a lifetime spent on Niihau would assure such familiarity.
Indeed, it would seem that the electoral process itself provides a more finely tuned method for filtering out unqualified candidates. It is, after all, a competitive process and thus the state may be assured that the qualifications of the various candidates will be forcefully presented to the people, who may then exercise their franchise in order to reject those who they feel will not effectively represent their interests. I am not impressed by the schedule appearing in the majority opinion showing residency requirements for representatives in the various states. A similar schedule could have been prepared at the time of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), showing the extent of malapportionment in the various state legislatures. It merely indicates the extent to which the Constitution is being violated.
*273Based on the record before us I believe that the state has failed to demonstrate that the three-year durational residency requirement serves a compelling state interest and therefore I would hold that it is in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. I would allow the petitioner to be a candidate for the office she seeks and let the people decide whether they want her to represent them.
Article III, section 7 states: “No person shall be eligible to serve as a member of the honse of representatives unless he shall have been a resident of the State for not less than three years, have attained the age of majority and be a qualified voter of the representative district from which he seeks to be elected.”
The pertinent portions of article I, section 5 of the United States Constitution and article III, section 13 of the Hawaii constitution are identical in wording.
Those qualifications are: “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not. when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”
It is also enlightening that the Court, in discussing instances when the Congress had excluded men who presented themselves for membership concentrated only on those cases where exclusion had been based on grounds other than the three standing requirements of the Constitution. At no point did the Court mention or question the propriety of the Gallatin, Shields or Holt eases.
Article I, section 1 of the Hawaii constitution affirms this principle, stating: “All political power of this State is inherent in the people; and the responsibility for the exercise thereof rests with the people. All government is founded on this authority.”
For an illustration of the application of the traditional standard see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
See dissent of Harlan, J., 383 U.S. 680, for a discussion of the differences between the traditional test and the stricter standard expounded in Bar per.
See also, Cipriano v. City of Houma, 305 U.S. 701 (1969) and City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
In Stapleton the city required as a qualification for the oflice of city councilman that the officeholder be an owner of real property for a period of two years prior to the last day for filing the nominating petitions for such office.
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
In support of their use of the reasonableness test the majority relies upon Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). In that case and in Evans persons were deemed by the state not to be residents for voting purposes because of their federal ties. In my opinion the Evans decision overrules the use of mere reasonableness test found in Carrington.
Article III, section 7 Hawaii Constitution; HRS §§ 11-4, 11-8.