Opinion
GEORGE, J.We granted review in this case to resolve a conflict in decisions of the Courts of Appeal regarding whether, under Penal Code section 22,1 evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible in a prosecution for second degree murder when the prosecution seeks to establish the existence of malice aforethought on an implied malice theory, i.e., seeks to prove that the defendant acted with knowledge of the danger to human life and in conscious disregard of human life. For the reasons that follow, we hold that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible under section 22 with regard to the question whether the defendant harbored malice aforethought, whether such malice is express or implied.
*442We further hold that the trial court in this case correctly instructed the jury as to the proper use of evidence of voluntary intoxication in determining whether defendant was guilty of second degree murder or, instead, of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5), and did not err in refusing to provide an additional instruction, requested by defendant, concerning whether defendant was unconscious at the time of the killing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal upholding defendant’s conviction of second degree murder.
I
Defendant was charged by amended information with murder (§ 187), driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) within seven years of having suffered three previous convictions for a similar offense (Veh. Code, § 23175), driving with a blood-alcohol content of .08 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)) within ¡seven years of having suffered three previous convictions for a similar offense (Veh. Code, § 23175), and driving while his privilege to drive was suspended or revoked for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)).
The evidence admitted at trial included the following. In 1989, pursuant to the sentence imposed upon his being convicted a second time for driving under the influence of alcohol, defendant attended several sessions of a program for repeat offenders and viewed a film that graphically depicted the carnage caused by intoxicated drivers, including footage of scenes of accidents caused by such drivers and interviews with relatives of persons who had been killed in this manner. On March 5, 1990, defendant suffered his third conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Shortly after 1 p.m. on Saturday, November 17, 1990, defendant was driving on Van Burén Boulevard in Riverside County. Frank Diaz III, who was driving behind defendant, observed defendant’s vehicle swerve in and out of the left lane and over the double yellow line dividing the road.
Frank Falbo was driving in the opposite direction on Van Burén Boulevard when defendant’s vehicle swerved over the double yellow line, almost colliding with Falbo’s automobile, then continued straddling the double yellow line, occupying three-quarters of the oncoming lane, and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by 21-year-old Ronald Lawrence Kinsey. Kinsey was killed.
Defendant was found unconscious on the front seat of his vehicle. He smelled strongly of an alcoholic beverage. Several empty 16-ounce cans of *443malt liquor were on the floor of the vehicle. He was taken to a hospital for treatment of his injuries, the most serious of which was a collapsed lung. A hospital employee informed defendant he had killed someone.
At approximately 3 p.m., a sample of defendant’s blood was withdrawn at the request of the police. The technician who extracted the blood heard defendant exclaim: “Take me straight to the gas chamber, [I] killed somebody.” Analysis of the blood sample revealed a blood-alcohol content of .24 percent.
Defendant did not dispute the prosecution’s evidence establishing that he was under the influence of alcohol. To the contrary, defendant sought to prove that he did not harbor implied malice aforethought because he was so intoxicated that he was unconscious at the time the accident occurred. Accordingly, defense counsel elicited testimony demonstrating that, because the amount of alcohol in a person’s system dissipates over time, defendant’s blood-alcohol content would have been .27 percent about the time of the collision, and that individuals with blood-alcohol levels above .25 percent may become stuporous and lose consciousness. Defendant also introduced evidence indicating that an independent laboratory’s analysis of the blood sample withdrawn at the request of the police, and an analysis by the hospital of a separate blood sample, revealed even higher blood-alcohol levels.
Lorena Lee testified for the defense that she drove past defendant’s vehicle immediately prior to the accident and observed that defendant’s head was nodding “like he was fighting sleep."
Defendant offered the testimony of a paramedic who arrived at the scene of the accident and found defendant unconscious. When defendant regained consciousness a short time later, he was incoherent, his speech was incomprehensible, and his breath smelled strongly of an alcoholic beverage. The paramedic acknowledged that defendant’s apparent lack of comprehension and mumbled speech might have resulted from the accident, but he believed they were due to defendant’s consumption of alcohol.
Clinical psychologist Dr. Craig Rath testified for the defense that blood-alcohol levels from .09 percent to .25 percent impair a person’s memory and ability to make critical judgments and to predict the effects of one’s actions. At blood-alcohol levels from .25 percent to .40 percent, a majority of individuals will become stuporous and lose consciousness, although their eyes may remain open and they may continue to function physically and even be able to operate a motor vehicle. Dr. Rath opined that a person could *444be capable of operating a motor vehicle even though he or she was incapable of conscious decisionmaking due to alcohol consumption.
On rebuttal, the prosecution introduced evidence establishing that, when questioned by police officers two days after the collision, defendant stated that during the morning of the day of the collision, he consumed the contents of two 16-ounce cans of malt liquor at his home and then drove his children to his mother’s house. He purchased two more cans of malt liquor near his mother’s house and consumed their contents as well. Defendant subsequently left his children with his mother and was driving home when the accident occurred. He did not remember the collision. The prosecution offered expert testimony establishing that the amount of alcohol defendant admitted having consumed was insufficient to produce a blood-alcohol level of .24 percent.
The trial court’s instructions to the jury included the following. For the crime of murder “there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator.” (CALJIC No. 3.31.) “If the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged crime, you should consider the fact of intoxication, including the degree of intoxication, in determining whether defendant had such specific intent or mental state.” (See CALJIC No. 4.21.) “Every person who unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought is guilty of the crime of murder . . . .” (CALJIC No. 8.10.) “ ‘Malice’ may be either express or implied. Malice is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being, [ft] Malice is implied when: [ft] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [ft] 2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [ft] 3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to and with conscious disregard for human life.” (CALJIC No. 8.11.)
“The intentional act required for ‘implied malice’ underlying vehicle murder is not the traffic violation which may precede a collision, but whether the defendant was driving under the influence with a conscious disregard for human life.” (Special instruction requested by the prosecution.) “In order to convict defendant of second-degree murder you must examine defendant’s state of mind at the time of the act. This is referred to as a subjective test. Second-degree murder based on implied malice requires that defendant acted deliberately, that defendant acted with knowledge of the danger to human life, and that defendant acted in conscious disregard for human life.” (Special instruction requested by defendant.) “If a person causes another’s death by doing a dangerous act in an unlawful or criminally negligent manner, without realizing the risk involved, he is guilty of manslaughter. If, on the other hand, the person realized the risk and acted in *445conscious disregard of the danger to human life, malice is implied and the crime is murder.” (See CALJIC No. 8.51.) In addition, the trial court carefully distinguished the mental state required for murder (implied malice) from the mental state required for the lesser offense of gross vehicular manslaughter (gross negligence). (§ 191.5.)2
The trial court refused defendant’s request that the jury be instructed, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.47, that “[i]f you find that a defendant, while unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication, killed another human being without intent to kill and without malice aforethought, the crime is involuntary manslaughter.”
The jury found defendant guilty as charged on all counts, fixing the degree of the murder as second degree, and the trial court sentenced defendant to prison for a term of 18 years to life.
On appeal, defendant asserted, among other contentions, that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.47 concerning unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication. The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, observing that, pursuant to section 22, only when a specific intent crime is charged is evidence of voluntary intoxication admissible to demonstrate that a defendant did not harbor malice aforethought, and holding that second degree murder based upon implied malice is not a specific intent crime. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing defendant’s requested jury instruction regarding unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication. In the view of the Court of Appeal, the trial court erred in defendant’s favor by instructing *446the jury that it could consider defendant’s degree of intoxication in deciding whether he harbored implied malice. In so holding, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the contrary holdings in People v. Alvarado (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 501 [283 Cal.Rptr. 479] and People v. Ricardi (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 249 [270 Cal.Rptr. 425]. We granted review to resolve this conflict.
II
Section 22, subdivision (b), provides: “Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged.” Focusing upon the final phrase of this statute—“when a specific intent crime is charged”—the Court of Appeal held that evidence of voluntary intoxication cannot establish the absence of implied malice, because second degree murder based upon implied malice is not a specific intent crime. We conclude the Court of Appeal misinterpreted section 22.
The admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication to demonstrate whether a defendant charged with murder harbored malice aforethought does not depend upon whether the prosecution seeks a conviction for first or second degree murder, or attempts to prove that the defendant harbored express or implied malice. Section 22 specifies that such evidence is admissible to establish whether a defendant “harbored malice aforethought”; the statute does not distinguish between the two types of malice aforethought—express malice and implied malice—that always have been embodied in California law. As discussed below, prior to the amendment of section 22 in 1981 and 1982, it long had been established that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible with regard to the issue of whether a defendant harbored either express or implied malice. It is unreasonable to conclude that section 22, as amended in 1981 and 1982, presently creates such a distinction simply by including the qualifying phrase “when a specific intent crime is charged.”
Prior to 1981, section 22 provided: “No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the act.” (Enacted as § 22 of 1872 Pen. Code.) At that time, it was well established that, under section 22, evidence *447of voluntary intoxication was admissible with regard to the question whether the defendant acted with malice aforethought, on either an express or an implied malice theory. (See, e.g., People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 27-32, & fn. 9 [120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017]; People v. Poddar (1974) 10 Cal.3d 750, 758 [111 Cal.Rptr. 910, 518 P.2d 342].)
In 1981, the Legislature amended section 22 as part of a broader legislative enactment whose general purpose was to abolish the doctrine of “diminished capacity.” A significant provision of the 1981 statute was the enactment of section 28, stating: “Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder is admissible on the issue as to whether the criminal defendant actually formed any such mental state.” (Stats. 1981, ch. 404, § 4, p. 1592.) The Legislature thus prohibited the admission of evidence to negate the capacity of the defendant to form any mental state, but retained the existing rule that evidence was admissible with regard to whether the defendant actually formed a specific mental state.
Pursuant to this same legislative enactment, section 22 was divided into subdivisions and amended to read as follows: “(a) No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. Evidence of voluntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, with which the accused committed the act. [][] (b) Whenever the actual existence of any mental state, including but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, evidence that the accused was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime is admissible on the issue as to whether the defendant actually formed any such mental state.” (Stats. 1981, ch. 404, § 2, p. 1592, italics added.) Thus, while the Legislature, in conformity with its abolition of the concept of diminished capacity, rendered evidence of voluntary intoxication inadmissible to negate the defendant’s capacity to form any mental state, including malice aforethought, it at the same time explicitly retained the existing rule that evidence of voluntary intoxication was admissible with regard to whether a defendant actually harbored malice aforethought. Further, the 1981 amendment made no distinction between express and implied malice, an approach consistent with the well-established rule, recognized by this court in cases such as People v. Ray, supra, 14 Cal.3d 20, 27-32, and footnote 9, and People v. Poddar, supra, 10 Cal.3d 750, 758, that evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible with regard to whether a defendant harbored either express or implied malice.
*448The broad references in subdivision (b) of section 22, as amended in 1981, to “any mental state” and to “intent” raised concerns, however, that the statute could be construed, contrary to the Legislature’s intent, to alter the well-settled rule that evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible to negate the existence of general criminal intent. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2035 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 3, 1982; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 455-457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370] [statement of general rule].) To eliminate the possibility that the 1981 amendment would be misconstrued to permit the admission of evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate general criminal intent, the Legislature, in 1982, promptly revised section 22, subdivision (b), to its present form, replacing the term “intent” with the phrase “a required specific intent” and adding the concluding phrase “when a specific intent crime is charged.” (Stats. 1982, ch. 893, § 2, p. 3318.) The Legislature stated that this amendment was “declaratory of existing law,” thus making clear that it was seeking simply to clarify the scope of the 1981 amendments. (Stats. 1982, ch. 893, § 5, p. 3318; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1111, fn. 5 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588], describing as “minor” this and other contemporary amendments to a number of sections affected by the 1981 legislation.)
There is nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended its 1982 amendment to section 22 to create an unprecedented distinction between express and implied malice with regard to the admissibility of evidence of voluntary intoxication. To the contrary, an analysis by the Senate Committee on Judiciary of the proposed amendment stated, “The purpose of this bill is to make modest changes” to section 22 as amended in 1981. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2035 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 3, 1982.)3 Further, the Legislature, expressly disclaiming any intent to create a new rule, stated that the addition of the phrase “when a specific intent crime is charged” simply was “declaratory of existing law.” (Stats. 1982, ch. 893, § 5, p. 3318.) The history of section 22 thus establishes that the 1982 amendment was not intended to alter the existing rule that voluntary intoxication is admissible with regard to whether a defendant harbored malice aforethought, either express or implied.
A critical examination of the language and purpose of section 22, subdivision (b), also compels this conclusion.
As we have seen, in drafting the revision of section 22, subdivision (b), the Legislature did not state, as it easily could have done, that evidence of *449voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue whether a defendant harbored express (but not implied) malice. Instead, the Legislature stated that such evidence is admissible to establish whether the defendant “harbored malice aforethought.” The term “malice aforethought” includes both express and implied malice. (§ 188 [“Such malice may be express or implied.”].) Thus, the language of the statute clearly appears to permit the admission of evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue whether a defendant harbored either express or implied malice, unless a different conclusion is compelled by the concluding qualification that such evidence is admissible only “when a specific intent crime is charged.”
The Attorney General proffers just such an argument, maintaining that although second degree murder is a specific intent crime when the prosecution relies upon a theory of express malice, second degree murder is not a specific intent crime when the prosecution proceeds upon a theory of implied malice. As explained below, however, it is clear that the Legislature considered murder a “specific intent crime” within the meaning of the language of section 22 whether the prosecution’s theory is that malice is express or implied.
As this court recognized in People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d 444, 456, “[s]pecific and general intent have been notoriously difficult terms to define and apply . . . .” Hood addressed the question whether the defendant’s voluntary intoxication could be considered in determining whether he or she committed the crime of assault. Observing that “[t]he distinction between specific and general intent crimes evolved as a judicial response to the problem of the intoxicated offender” (id. at p. 455), this court formulated the following general rule: “When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. When the definition refers to defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific intent.” (Id. at pp. 456-457.)
Having stated the general rule, however, the court in Hood concluded that this definition should not be applied mechanically and was insufficient to resolve the question before the court, because the crime of assault could equally well be characterized as either a specific or a general intent crime. (Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d 444, 457-458.) The court thus concluded that “the decision whether or not to give effect to evidence of intoxication [in a prosecution for assault] must rest on other considerations.” (Id. at p. 458.)
It would be equally futile to attempt to rely solely upon Hood's general definition of a specific intent crime in determining, in the present *450case, the effect of section 22 where the prosecution relies exclusively upon the theory that malice was implied, rather than express.
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice is express when the defendant harbored an intent unlawfully to kill. (§ 188.) It can be argued that such intent to kill does not “refer[] to defendant’s intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence” (Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 457, italics added) beyond the act proscribed by the murder statute, i.e., the killing of a human being, yet we recently reaffirmed that murder is a specific intent crime and that, pursuant to section 22, “voluntary intoxication . . . may be considered in deciding whether there was malice as defined in section 188.” (People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1116-1117.) The decision in People v. Saille arose from a conviction of first degree murder in which malice was express. But there is no reason to reach a different conclusion when, as in the present case, malice is implied.
Malice is implied “ ‘when a person does an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life. . . . [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 104 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969].) Although it can be argued that implied malice does not constitute a specific intent as described in Hood because it does not involve an “intent to do some further act or achieve some additional consequence,” it is quite clear that implied malice does not fit Hood’s description of general intent, which is “an intent merely to do a violent act.” (Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 457, 458.) Although implied malice may not fall literally within the Hood formulation of specific intent, the element of implied malice that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of the danger to, and in conscious disregard of, human life, is closely akin to Hood’s definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state. Thus, read in context, the phrase “when a specific intent crime is charged” in section 22 includes murder, even where the prosecution relies exclusively upon the theory that malice is implied, rather than express.4
Furthermore, as will be demonstrated, this interpretation of the statutory language is confirmed by an examination of the purpose of section *45122, subdivision (b), which specifies when evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible with regard to the question whether a defendant formed a required mental state. (People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1116.) Among the different approaches to this issue adopted in various jurisdictions (1 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (1984) § 65, pp. 288-294 [Robinson]), section 22 exemplifies “the common law approach of permitting voluntary intoxication as a defense to ‘specific intent offenses’ and barring it as a defense to ‘general intent offenses.’ ” (Robinson, supra, § 65, at pp. 291-292, fn. omitted.) This distinction between specific and general intent crimes “is a device to ‘permit evidence of intoxication to reduce the crime to a lower degree, but not to admit evidence of self-induced intoxication if it would result in total acquittal.’ ” (Id. at p. 298, fn. omitted, quoting Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) p. 848 [Fletcher].)5
Allowing a defendant charged with murder to introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication to demonstrate the absence of either express or implied malice would not result in an acquittal, but in reduction of the offense to involuntary or vehicular manslaughter, which involve the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. (§ 192; see People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1114.) Thus, we conclude that section 22 was not intended, in murder prosecutions, to preclude consideration of evidence of voluntary intoxication on the issue whether a defendant harbored malice aforethought, whether the prosecution proceeds on a theory that malice was express or implied.
The circumstances of the present case demonstrate the logic of this conclusion. Defendant was charged with murder and was prosecuted on the theory that malice could be implied because, in light of defendant’s experiences stemming from his prior convictions for driving under the influence and his resulting knowledge of the danger to others posed by such conduct, *452he performed an act dangerous to life and acted with conscious disregard for human life by driving while intoxicated. Defendant also was charged with the lesser offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, which does not require that the defendant harbor malice.6
It was undisputed that defendant drove a vehicle while having a blood-alcohol level at least three times the legal limit, that the natural consequences of this act were dangerous to human life, and that this act resulted in the death of a human being. The sole disputed issue was whether defendant knew that his conduct endangered the life of another and acted with conscious disregard for human life. If so, malice would be implied and defendant would be guilty of second degree murder. If not, defendant would be guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The most important factor bearing upon defendant’s awareness of the dangerousness of his conduct and conscious disregard of that danger was his degree of intoxication when he undertook his dangerous course of conduct. It appears obviously appropriate to permit the jury to consider defendant’s degree of intoxication in determining whether he formed the mental state that distinguishes the greater offense of murder from the lesser offense of manslaughter.
The Attorney General contends it is anomalous to allow a defendant who kills another while driving under the influence to rely upon the fact of self-induced intoxication to demonstrate that he or she did not harbor malice and, therefore, is guilty only of manslaughter rather than murder. But a defendant who kills another by firing a gun may defend against a charge of murder by establishing that, due to voluntary intoxication, he or she did not harbor malice and is guilty instead of manslaughter. (People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1116-1117.) The laws governing prosecutions for murder must apply equally whether the defendant kills the victim by means of a firearm or an automobile.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical situation in which a defendant, with no prior history of driving under the influence, consumes alcohol at a social gathering after having arranged to be driven home by his or her spouse. The defendant’s spouse unexpectedly becomes ill and the defendant, who is *453intoxicated, decides to drive, and causes a fatal accident. Under such circumstances, it would not be anomalous to permit the defendant to defend against a charge of murder on the ground that, due to voluntary intoxication, he or she did not appreciate the dangerousness of his or her conduct, hence did not harbor malice, and should be convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter.
For the same reason, it was proper for defendant in the present case to attempt to establish that, due to voluntary intoxication, he did not harbor malice, but the jury, as it was entitled to do, rejected this proffered defense, impliedly finding that defendant acted with knowledge, and conscious disregard, of the danger to human life in undertaking to drive while intoxicated.
It is beyond dispute that drinking drivers exact an enormous toll on society. (Michigan State Police Dept. v. Sitz (1990) 496 U.S. 444, 451 [110 L.Ed.2d 412, 420-421,110 S.Ct. 2481]; Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1338-1339 [241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299].) When a defendant drives while under the influence and thereby causes the death of another, serious punishment is warranted, but such serious punishment may be imposed without altering the long-settled requirement that a defendant not be convicted of murder unless he or she actually harbored malice. The Legislature specifically has addressed the situation in which a defendant drives under the influence and thereby causes the death of another, but does not harbor malice, by enacting section 191.5, which provides a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.
If, in a case like the present one, voluntary intoxication actually prevented a defendant from forming implied malice, he or she is guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter rather than murder. (See People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296 [179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279].) Prohibiting the trier of fact from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication in determining whether a defendant harbored implied malice would blur this distinction between second degree murder with implied malice and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. As we observed in People v. Watson, supra, in distinguishing vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)) from second degree murder: “A finding of gross negligence [required for the offense of vehicular manslaughter] is made by applying an objective test: if a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have been aware of the risk involved, then defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness. [Citation.] However, a finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard. [Citation.]” (People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290, 296-297, italics in original.)
*454As the present case demonstrates, allowing the trier of fact to consider the effect of the defendant’s intoxication will not preclude murder convictions when warranted. The jury in the present case considered the effect of defendant’s intoxication but concluded nonetheless that he acted with implied malice. The result in the present case belies the concurring and dissenting opinion’s lament that, under our holding, “drunk drivers could almost never be prosecuted for murder no matter how wanton their acts.” (Conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J., post, p. 465.)
Ill
Having concluded that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury to consider defendant’s degree of intoxication in determining whether he harbored malice, we turn to defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in refusing his request that the jury be instructed, in accordance with CALJIC No. 8.47, that if “defendant, while unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication, killed another human being without intent to kill and without malice aforethought, the crime is involuntary manslaughter.” Although this instruction is a correct statement of law in the abstract, the trial court properly refused the instruction because, in the context of the present case, it erroneously implied that, if defendant was unconscious when the collision occurred, he could not be convicted of murder.
The circumstance that a defendant, when a fatal traffic collision occurs, is unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication, does not preclude a finding that the defendant harbored malice, because malice may have been formed prior to that time. In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 [157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854], this court considered whether an intoxicated driver harbored malice sufficient to support an award of punitive damages in a personal injury action.7 The complaint alleged that the defendant was an alcoholic with a history of convictions for driving under the influence, who previously had caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol. Despite his alcoholism, defendant had accepted employment delivering alcoholic beverages. When the accident occurred, the defendant was engaged in his employment and was consuming alcoholic beverages while driving. In holding that these allegations, if proved, were sufficient to demonstrate the malice required for an award of punitive damages, this court focused upon the defendant’s decision to begin drinking, rather than his mental state when the collision occurred: “[0]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages *455to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, ‘such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 899.)
Similarly, in People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290, this court held there was probable cause to charge a defendant with murder, based upon evidence that he consumed alcoholic beverages at a bar, raising his blood-alcohol level to .23 percent, drove through a red traffic light, narrowly avoiding a collision, then accelerated to more than 80 miles per hour and collided with a vehicle at another intersection, killing 2 persons. Relying upon the above quoted holding in Taylor that one who drinks to the point of intoxication, knowing he or she thereafter must drive, exhibits a conscious disregard of the safety of others, this court observed: “Defendant had consumed enough alcohol to raise his blood alcohol content to a level which would support a finding that he was legally intoxicated. He had driven his car to the establishment where he had been drinking, and he must have known that he would have to drive it later. It also may be presumed that defendant was aware of the hazards of driving while intoxicated.” (Id. at p. 300.) After describing the defendant’s extremely dangerous driving, this court held: “In combination, these facts reasonably and readily support a conclusion that defendant acted wantonly and with a conscious disregard for human life.” (Id. at p. 301.)
As this court recognized in Taylor (supra, 24 Cal.3d 890) and Watson (supra, 30 Cal.3d 290), the determination whether a defendant who drives under the influence of alcohol exhibits a conscious disregard of human life does not depend exclusively upon the defendant’s state of mind at the time the accident occurs. “A high level of intoxication sets the stage for tragedy long before the driver turns the ignition key.” (People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1038 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 8, 819 P.2d 849].) In the present case, for example, it can be inferred from the presence of empty malt liquor cans in his vehicle that defendant continued to drink while he was driving. Under such circumstances, and in light of defendant’s past exposure to the extreme danger posed by driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the jury reasonably could conclude that defendant, in undertaking this course of conduct, acted with knowledge of the dangerousness of his conduct and with conscious disregard of that danger. Because defendant knowingly embarked upon such an extremely dangerous course of conduct with conscious disregard of the danger, his malice aforethought would not be negated simply by reason of his having succeeded in rendering himself unconscious prior to the fatal collision. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing defendant’s proffered instruction regarding unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication.
*456Moreover, even if the trial court had erred in this regard, reversal of the resulting conviction would not be required. The jury adequately was instructed that it could consider defendant’s degree of intoxication in determining whether he acted with malice. By finding defendant guilty of second degree murder, rather than gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, the jury necessarily concluded that, despite his intoxication, defendant actually appreciated the risk posed by his conduct and acted with conscious disregard of life. It is clear, therefore, that instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.47 would not have affected its verdict.
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
Kennard, J., Arabian, J., and Panelli, J.,* concurred.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The trial court instructed the jury as follows. “Gross negligence has been defined as the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences. On the other hand, malice may be implied when a person knowing that his conduct endangers the life of another nonetheless acts deliberately with conscious disregard for life. Though these definitions bear a general similarity, they are not identical. Implied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of risk than does gross negligence and involves an element of wantonness which is absent in gross negligence.” (Special instruction requested by defendant.)
“A finding of gross negligence is made by applying an objective test: if a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have been aware of the risk involved, then defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness. However, a finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.” (Special instruction requested by defendant.)
“The distinction between ‘conscious disregard for life’ and ‘conscious indifference to the consequences’ is subtle but nevertheless logical. Phrased in everyday language, the state of mind of a person who acts with conscious disregard for life is, ‘I know my conduct is dangerous to others, but I don’t care if someone is hurt or killed.’ The state of mind of the person who acts with conscious indifference to the consequences is simply, ‘I don’t care what happens.’ ” (Special instruction requested by the prosecution.)
We grant defendant’s unopposed request that we take judicial notice of this document. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).)
Justice Mosk’s concurring and dissenting opinion states that in People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 58 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388], People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 138 [255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32], and People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 670 [238 Cal.Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752] this court held “that specific intent and implied malice are mutually exclusive.” (Conc, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J., post, p. 464.) Those cases do not so hold, instead observing that the crime of attempted murder requires a specific intent to kill, and concluding that, in the context of an attempted murder, “ ‘[i]mplied malice . . . cannot *451coexist with a specific intent to kill.’ ” (People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1, 58, italics added.) Nothing in those cases suggests that evidence of voluntary intoxication is inadmissible in a murder case in which the prosecution proceeds on an implied malice theory.
Fletcher aptly observes: “This distinction [between specific and general intent] glides well through the sea of crimes defined by the pattern ‘assault with intent to. . . .’ Yet the distinction scrapes bottom as soon as we consider more compactly defined offenses, such as murder and larceny. Though malice does not represent an unrealized goal that goes beyond the act of killing, the courts treat it as a form of specific rather than general intent. [Fn. omitted.] This view facilitates a compromise between the rigors of denying the relevance of intoxication and allowing it to undercut all liability; in this respect, the classification is functionally sound.” (Fletcher, supra, at p. 849.)
Fletcher further notes: “The distinction between general and specific intent is frequently litigated, for the simple reason that the courts tend to employ these terms as though they had a meaning beyond their function as devices for seeking a compromise verdict.” (Fletcher, supra, at p. 850.)
Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a), defines gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated as “the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle, where the driving was in violation of Section 23152 or 23153 of the Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.” (See People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 103].)
Punitive damages may be awarded only upon proof “that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “[A] conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code.” (Taylor v. Superior Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d 890, 895.)
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.