dissenting:
I join the dissent of Justice Erickson. I write separately, however, to make clear that the deference the majority grants to the Public Utilities Commission not only falls short of being compelled, it is not due.
An agency decision interpreting a statute which it regulates is entitled to consideration and, in many instances, deference by courts. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227 (Colo.1984). However, an agency’s decision should only be given controlling weight, unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to law, when it relates to policy matters peculiar to its administrative competence. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941). Moreover, deference is only appropriate *415where, unlike the decision before us, it is consistent with earlier and later pronouncements, it is the result of a body of recognized experience, and it has developed over time. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). The Public Utilities Commission decision here, one in which there was significant vacillation and confusion within the agency prior to reaching the ruling under review, does not, therefore, carry the hallmarks of a settled and time-tested decision which by its nature has the power to persuade.
Furthermore, the plain wording of section 40-6-120 provides no basis for the majority’s proposition that temporary authority automatically is to be extended past the date of its expiration where a motion for extension has been filed prior to the expiration date. In fact, the majority decision actually impugns the PUC’s own Rules of Practice and Procedure in that it is now to a temporary carrier’s advantage, assuming its business is profitable, to wait until the last possible moment . to file its request for an extension because the later the filing the longer the carrier is insured of continued operation, including, without action by the PUC, a de facto extension of temporary authority beyond express statutory limits.1
Under our form of government, the control the electorate exercises over the PUC is through the General Assembly by legislative enactments. If we fail to require the PUC to follow the plain language of the statutes that address its administrative responsibilities and authority, we grant to the PUC a power not confined to its authority and not contemplated by the legislature.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON joins in this dissent.
. Public Utility Commission Rule of Practice and Procedure 50(j)(4) provides that motions for extension of temporary authority should be filed at least twenty days prior to expiration of that authority.