dissenting, with whom RAPER, Justice, Retired, joins.
In this case, the majority opinion contends two separate grounds exist for finding liability on the part of appellees for injury to person or property which was occasioned by one to whom appellees furnished alcoholic liquor or malt beverages: (1) based on statutorily imposed liability under §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), W.S.1977,1 and (2) based on common law pursuant to § 8-1-101, W.S.1977.2
I disagree.
STATUTORILY IMPOSED LIABILITY
The majority opinion contends that the legislature intended the provisions of §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a) to operate for the protection of the general public and not only for the protection of the minor or intoxicated person to whom the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage was sold. Thus, the majority opinion finds a duty to appellants. This contention is completely refuted by the exception placed in § 12-6-101(a) by the legislature. The general public is not protected at all if the minor can legally receive the alcoholic liquor or malt beverage from his guardian or from a member of his immediate family. The minor is protected from that which could result to him if someone gives him alcoholic liquor or malt beverages, but the ability is legislated for a guardian, etc., to forego the protection for his ward, etc. If the protection were intended to be for the general public, a child’s guardian, etc., could not logically forego such protection on behalf of the general public. In other words, the duty to not furnish alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to a minor is legislatively imposed upon all but legal guardians, medical doctors and members of the minor’s immediate family. Because certain classes of persons do not have a duty to refrain from furnishing such alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to minors, it cannot be said that the duty imposed on those not in such classes is one owed to the public. It would be discriminatory and irrational to impose a duty owed to the public by John Doe not to furnish alcoholic liquor *417or malt beverages to a minor but to exempt Richard Roe from the same duty. If the duty is imposed for the benefit of the minor, the exempt classification is rational inasmuch as the guardian or member of the immediate family responsible for the minor — or the medical doctor in treatment beneficial to the minor — is in a position to waive the benefit on behalf of the minor.
None of the cases cited in the majority opinion as establishing a duty to the general public refer to a legislative exemption similar to that contained in § 12-6-101(a). The Annotation: “Common-law right of action for damage sustained by plaintiff in consequence of sale or gift of intoxicating liquor or habit-forming drug to another,” 97 A.L. R.3d 528, collects cases in which liability has, and has not, been established both (1) based on violation of liquor laws, and (2) based on tort apart from violation of liquor laws. None of the cases there referred to concern attachment of liability for violations of liquor laws where the legislative intention was manifest, as here, to impose the duty for the benefit of the minor and not for the benefit of the general public.3 The Wyoming legislature has addressed the issue of liability for sale of alcoholic liquor and malt beverages to minors, setting forth the scope of duty with reference thereto. In doing so, the liability of the seller was not extended to that here contended for by appellants.
This court interpreted the antecedents of §§ 12-5-301 and 12-6-101 in Parsons v. Jow, Wyo., 480 P.2d 396 (1971), and denied recovery in favor of third party against one who furnished alcoholic liquor and malt beverages to a minor who subsequently injured the third party. Subsequent to the date of that opinion, the statutes there involved were amended and re-enacted by the legislature more than once without material change in the provisions thereof which are here involved. Accordingly, the legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the construction placed thereon by the court in Parsons v. Jow, supra, and to have adopted it as part of the law. Such is true unless a contrary intent clearly appears. Harvey v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 53 Wyo. 495, 84 P.2d 755 (1938), reh. denied 53 Wyo. 495, 86 P.2d 735 (1939); Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham, 56 Wyo. 314, 109 P.2d 463, reh. denied 56 Wyo. 314, 110 P.2d 824 (1941); and In Re Contas, 42 Wyo. 94, 291 P. 314 (1930).
There is no statutory liability imposed upon appellees in favor of appellants.
The majority opinion refers to Distad v. Gubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 (1981) as authority for the court to establish the requirements of a legislative enactment as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man. The majority opinion neglects to note that, in Distad, we adopted the language of the Restatement, Torts 2d, to this end. Following is part of that quoted from the Restatement (§ 286) in Distad at page 175:
“ ‘The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
“ ‘(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
“ ‘(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
“ ‘(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
“ ‘(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
As demonstrated, supra, these conditions cannot exist for the purposes of this case in light of the exception contained in § 12-6-101(a). The statutes cannot be said to set a standard for evidence of negligence (including the element of duty).
COMMON LAW IMPOSED LIABILITY
The foregoing, in effect, makes improper any application of common law liability. *418Inasmuch as the legislature has set the perimeters for liability — perimeters which do not include liability to appellants — any application of common law would be precluded by the proviso in § 8-1-101 to the effect that common law is not effective “when inconsistent with the laws” of this state. When the legislature has dealt with the questions, as it has in §§ 12-5-301(a)(v) and 12-6-101(a), common law cannot be resorted to pursuant to § 8-1-101.
Although such should be dispositive of the question of common law imposed liability, I note that § 8-1-10Í adopts the common law of England “as modified by judicial decisions.” Our decision in Parsons v. Jow, supra, refused to modify the common law, but approved and judicially adopted it in Wyoming. It established the common law on this issue pursuant to § 8-1-101. To overrule that decision under the guise of amplifying common law pursuant to § 8-1-101 sets the stage whereby the bar, bench and populace cannot know what the law is and what it is not in a given circumstance until that circumstance reaches this court. The end result is a state which is not one of law but is one at the whim of this court. Certainly, at the time the transaction took place in this case, appellees believed they were operating under the law as set forth in the Parsons case (statutory directions aside). Suddenly, they find that the whim of the supreme court says otherwise.4 This state and nation cannot successfully operate under such circumstances.
I authored the opinion in Choman v. Epperley, Wyo., 592 P.2d 714 (1979), which is heavily relied upon in the majority opinion for ability of the court to declare new common law at the whim of the court. The case does not support that position. After noting applicable law in common law as modified by judicial decisions, we pointed out that the proposition which we ultimately determined to be the law was probably the common law as of the fourth year of James I (1607), but that even if it were not, it was almost universally established law, and we cited and discussed several Wyoming cases which had established the proposition as the law in Wyoming. We did not, at our whim, overrule a case which held to the contrary, nor did we adopt the proposition at our whim. Rather, we recognized an already existing status of the law.
It is not the court’s business to make laws. That is the function of the legislature. After reviewing the general status of the law relative to liability for furnishing alcoholic liquor or malt beverages to a minor — from the common law position through the approach taken by the various states to the issue, we said in Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d at 397-398:
“The legislature Of Wyoming has not seen fit to change the common law rule as it applies in this case. Whether legislation in the nature of a dramshop act or civil damage statute should be included as a part of our liquor control code is within the province of the legislature." (Emphasis added.)
Since the date of that opinion, February 4, 1971, the legislature has not acted in the premises, reflecting satisfaction with the decision. The courts do not take kindly to intrusion by the legislature into court business, and such is improper. We should not intrude into the legislative business. To do so is also improper. Yet the majority opinion is doing just that in this case.
I would affirm.
. Section 12-5-301(a) provides in part pertinent to delivery of alcoholic liquor or malt beverages in a drive-up area by a holder of a retail liquor license:
“(v) No order shall be received nor delivery made to a minor or intoxicated person in the area.”
Section 12-6-101(a) provides:
“(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished or given away any alcoholic liquor or malt beverage to any person under the age of nineteen (19), who is not his legal ward, medical patient or member of his own immediate family, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” (Emphasis added.)
. Section 8-1-101 provides:
“The common law of England as modified by judicial decisions, so far as the same is of a general nature and not inapplicable, and all declaratory or remedial acts or statutes made in aid of, or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the fourth year of James the First (excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth and ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry Eighth) and which are of a general nature and not local to England, are the rule of decision in this state when not inconsistent with the laws thereof, and are considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.” (Emphasis added.)
. Of course, many of the cases in such collection do not impose statutory liability or change the common-law rule that the seller of intoxi-eating liquor was not liable for injuries to those persons. The holdings being similar to that in Parsons v. Jow, Wyo., 480 P.2d 396 (1971).
. The majority opinion notes the binding effect of Parsons v. Jow, supra, on the trial court, but refuses to accord the same consideration to appellees.