(dissenting).
I dissent from the position of the majority requiring technical compliance with notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, I.C. §§ 6-901 to 938. Rather than demanding technical fulfillment of the requirements set forth in the above statutes, I continue to adhere to the doctrine of substantial compliance1 which has previously *64been the rule in Idaho and requires only that notice set forth with reasonable certainty the time, place, cause and nature of the accident along with the general nature and extent of injuries.
The purpose and intent of notice of claim statutes is to provide the party against whom an action has been filed time to investigate the claim, determine its merits, and prepare a defense if necessary. In Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 456 P.2d 766 (1969), a notice of claim statute contained within the Charter of the City of Lewiston was construed as follows:
“It is now well-established law in this jurisdiction that the purpose and intent of these notice statutes is two-fold:
(1) to save needless litigation and expense by providing an opportunity for amicable adjustment of the differences between the parties. Giffin (Giffen) v. City of Lewiston, 6 Idaho 231, 55 P. 545 (1898) ; and
(2) to provide ‘such information that the authorities may be able to make a full investigation of the cause of the injury and determine the city’s liability therefor.’ Dunn v. Boise City, 45 Idaho 362, 367, 262 P. 507, 509 (1927); Cox v. City of Pocatello, 77 Idaho 225, 234, 291 P.2d 282 (1955); McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 782, 430 P.2d 670 (1967); Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189, 439 P.2d 697, 700 (1968).
“In determining whether the purpose of the statute has been achieved, it must be borne in mind, that ‘a substantial compliance is all that is required in specifying the time, place, character and cause of said damage. * * * The object of the statute must be kept in mind, and it should not be given a construction which will defeat the ends of justice.’ Dunn v. Boise City, supra; Cox v. City of Pocatello, supra; McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, supra; Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, supra.” 93 Idaho 125, 126, 456 P.2d 769.
In the case at bar, the governmental entity involved was given sufficient actual notice to fall within the doctrine of substantial compliance as set forth in Jorstad. On the very date of the accident, numerous affidavits were filed with the school by students who observed the conduct in question. These affidavits contained circumstances of the accident and notice of probable injury. In addition, documents were later prepared at the request of officials and agents of Capital High School and the Independent School District of Boise City. One of these documents entitled “State Department of Education Accident Report Form” is directed to the “Independent School District of Boise City” and bears the date of November 24, 1971. Therein, the date of the accident is set forth as November 24, 1971. Thus, it is obvious that the district had actual knowledge, through a report made on its own form and signed and subscribed by a person bearing the title “District Supervisor of Safety Education” of the injury to Scott Patterson on the date of the injury itself. Looking at the requirements of I.C. § 6-907, relating to “contents of claims” and comparing the same to the accident report form and other documents, the district had actual written notice of “the conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage,” “the injury or damage,” “the time and place the injury or damage occurred,” and “the names of all persons involved,” “together with a statement of the actual residence of the claimant.” Further written information was supplied on December 15, 1971, only some three weeks thereafter. The only information the district did not have as a result of the above documents was “the amount of damages claimed” and information regarding the residence of the claimant “for a period of six (6) months immediately prior to the time the claim *65arose.” Since Scott Patterson was a student at Capital High at the time, the very records of said school would reveal his residence for the six month period prior to the accident. Further, damages claimed by the respondent had been fully ascertained by an insurance adjuster representing the insurance carrier for the School District well within the 120 day notice of claim period.
It is my belief the above facts fall squarely within the doctrine of substantial compliance, and the respondent should be granted relief under the holding of Jorstad.
. The doctrine of substantial compliance is adhered to by a majority of the states. See, e. g., Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 253 Ind. 472, 255 N.E.2d 225 (1970) ; Travis v. Kansas City, 491 S.W.2d 521 (Mo.1973) ; Zamel v. Port of New York Authority, 56 *64N.J. 1, 264 A.2d 201 (1970) ; Sandak v. Tuxedo Union School Dist. No. 8, 308 N.Y. 226, 124 N.E.2d 295 (1954) ; Heller v. City of Virginia Beach, 213 Va. 683, 194 S.E.2d 696 (1973) ; Higginbotham v. City of Charleston, 204 S.E.2d 1 (W.Va.1974).