dissenting.
I.
I agree with the majority’s suggestion that the conflict in constitutional provisions in this case is properly resolved by allowing the legislature to adopt a system of limited entry, but only through the means which are least restrictive upon other rights guaranteed in the constitution. Beyond the statement of this principle, however, I can•not agree with the application given the less restrictive alternative test to the “free transferability” system implemented by AS 16.43.170(b) and 16.43.150(h).
Free transferability impairs rights.guaranteed by three separate clauses of the Alaska Constitution. The “common use” clause in Article VIII, section 3 provides:
Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.
The first sentence of Article VIII, section 15 states:
No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State.
*1196Finally, Article I, section 1 provides that “all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law.”1
In the absence of legislation pursuant to the second sentence of Article VIII, section 15,2 the “resource” of the gear fisheries is reserved to the people for common use. The common use clause necessarily contemplates that resources will remain in the public domain, and will not be ceded to private ownership. Since the right of common use is guaranteed expressly by the constitution, it must be viewed as a highly important interest running to each person within the state.3
The enabling language of Article VIII, section 15 makes some inroads upon the application of the common use clause to the gear fisheries. Any system of limited entry, no matter how it is effectuated, will at any one time exclude a portion of the population from the resource. This observation, however, does not warrant the further conclusion that the common use clause is rendered a nullity with respect to entry legislation. In my view, Article VIII, section 3 still mandates that limited entry be achieved through the least possible “privatization” of the common resource.
Examined in these terms, free transferability makes the Limited Entry Act the most restrictive scheme possible under the common use clause. The ability to use and derive value from the gear fishery resource is dependent upon possession of a gear license, and these licenses are designed to operate as private property. The initial “grantees” enjoy the ability to sell, assign, or pass on to their heirs their share of the gear fishery resource. Most importantly, the holder’s right to the license never expires; the holder’s heirs may hold it forever. Alternatively, they may sell it and realize a return based upon its value as an asset held in perpetuity. Under the free transferability system, none of the value of the resource is retained or ever returns to the state and the people.
In addition, I conclude that AS 16.43.-170(b) and 16.43.150(h) create an “exclusive” right or “special privilege” within the meaning of Article VIII, section 15. Initial grantees were presented with a windfall at the expense of all other persons in the state. Public rights were extinguished in order to create exclusive private interests of sometimes enormous value. Under the equal protection clause, the populace was divided into two categories: those who would receive this great boon from the state, and those who would forever lose their share in the resource unless they someday “bought it back” through the purchase of a gear license.
Given the infringements upon the constitutional interests which I have described, free transferability would still be permissible under Article VIII, section 15 if it were necessary to a feasible system of limited entry. I believe, however, that the Ostro-skys have presented a substantially less restrictive alternative that furthers all of the purposes which underlie free transferability.
The Ostroskys’ principal objection to free transferability is that licenses never expire. *1197One alternative they suggest is that licenses should be issued only for a term of years, reverting to the state for redistribution upon expiration. In this way, the state would recapture control of the resource periodically and reassign it to the legislatively-determined appropriate recipients. Thus, the common resource would not be transferred forever to a discrete private class. The state and the people would have the recurring ability to allocate use rights.4
Under the proposed alternative, the length of the license term would be a matter for the discretion of the legislature, within constitutional limits. Article VIII, section 15 authorizes the state to create a limited entry scheme designed “to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood.” This authorizes the state to define licenses in a way that makes it economically practical for license holders to fish. Given this authorization, the constitution recognizes that licenses may be granted for a sufficiently long period that the holder may be expected to recoup his investment in gear and vessel, and realize a reasonable return. Any license which goes beyond the level of reasonable economic attractiveness, and does so at the expense of the constitutional rights of others, is prohibited.
Similarly, the method of redistribution following expiration is also a matter of legislative choice, to be exercised within constitutional bounds. One proposal made by the Ostroskys is that reissuance should be made by lottery. This would prevent any danger of the licenses remaining in the hands of a closed class. Any plan which effectively guaranteed renewal would be subject to the same criticisms leveled at the current free transferability plan.
The Ostroskys’ suggestion does not actually require any change in the existing transferability scheme. Licenses may still be sold and inherited. The crucial difference is in the nature of the thing transferred. Licenses would resemble a lease interest in the resource as opposed to an outright ownership interest. They would still have value — -possibly considerable value — and that value would be privately held. The distinguishing feature of free transferability with expiration is that something of the people’s common use rights are still held by the state. Privatization of the common use interest is not effected to a degree well beyond what is necessary to implement an economically feasible limited entry system.
Because the Ostroskys have proposed an alternative for a feasible entry system which is less restrictive of the public’s rights in the gear fishery resource, I would hold that the present statute is invalid under Alaska’s Constitution.5
II.
I further disagree with the majority’s discussion of the state’s interest in the goals furthered by AS 16.43.170(b) and 16.43.-150(h). The court’s opinion appears to dismiss the importance of the overall objectives of the limited entry statute to the equal protection scrutiny of transferability *1198provisions. It is true that specific sections within a complex statute will be designed to serve narrow purposes subsidiary to the statute’s larger goals. It is also true that these narrow purposes may properly be asserted by the state in attempting to meet its burden under the state equal protection clause. The legitimacy of these subsidiary purposes, however, is seriously undermined if they are found to conflict with the greater goals of the statutory scheme as a whole.
Under AS 16.43.010, the legislature has declared that “[i]t is the purpose of this chapter to promote the conservation and the sustained yield management of Alaska’s fishery resource and the economic health and stability of commercial fishing in Alaska by regulating and controlling entry into the commercial fisheries in the public interest and without unjust discrimination.” This statement of legislative intent does more than provide that one goal of the Limited Entry Act is to comport with the constitution. Decisions of this court have made it clear that the statute’s policy of avoiding unjust discrimination extends further than to classifications forbidden by the constitution. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1268 (Alaska 1980).
In evaluating the strength of the state’s interest in the goals behind the system of free transferability, it is incumbent upon this court to weigh the Ostroskys’ argument that the legislatively-created “free market” for gear licenses discriminates on the basis of wealth.6 I would hold that the broad statutory anti-discrimination purpose of the Limited Entry Act militates against any system of transferability which makes gear licenses available only to the extremely wealthy. Certainly the state’s interest in the current transferability provisions is diminished by the provisions’ tendency to create such a classification.
. See also the “natural resources equal protection clause” in Article VIII, section 17.
. Article VIII, section 15, provides in relevant part:
This section does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State.
As noted by the majority, without this enabling language the entire limited entry'statute would likely be unconstitutional.
. I would hold that the state bears a high burden of showing the substantiality of its interests throughout our equal protection examination. Thus, I specifically disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “[t] he individual interest asserted in appellants’ challenge to the transferability provisions of the Act is not of a high order.” In addition to the common use clause, see Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1266 (Alaska 1980) (“important right to engage in economic endeavor”); see also Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31, 40 (Alaska 1980).
. The Ostroskys’ “free transferability plus expiration” alternative serves all of the purposes advanced in support of the existing scheme. The alternative “prevents economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them” by protecting the family’s source of income during the life of the permit even if the original holder dies or is disabled. It retains the “traditional mobility” of fishermen by allowing for the sale of limited-term permits. It encourages conservation of the fisheries by license-holders, who still have a direct economic stake in the health of their fishery. It discourages the creation of a closed class of fishermen by making this impossible; transfers of permits are still encouraged by the possibility of sale for money. It allows for planning and prudent investment by making the acquisition of a permit certain by the payment of the purchase price. It does not unduly complicate the transfer scheme. It retains the feature of limited involvement in transfers on the part of the CFEC. The commission’s burden is increased only in that it must periodically reissue the licenses. In my opinion, free transferability plus expiration advances all of the above state goals equally as well as does the existing scheme of free transferability minus expiration.
. Alternatively, I would order supplemental briefing in the case to allow the state to address the alternative of free transferability plus expiration.
. I am also in disagreement with the court’s observations that the Limited Entry Act discriminates on the basis of wealth only in the manner that any price does, and I further disagree that liquor licenses and utility franchises furnish appropriate analogues. These assumptions overlook the constitutional status of the right allocated by the Limited Entry Act and the fact that here the relevant “free market” is one which was created legislatively and one which perpetuates and aggravates economic disparities.