(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s conclusion that the word “throw” as used in the statute refers to propelling only by “the forward motion of the arm.”
The statute provides that “[a]ny prisoner who throws fecal material or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (Supp.1993). As applied to the present case, the issue is whether the trial court erred in concluding that appellant Nick Paul’s act of spitting on a correctional officer did not violate the statute.
The majority relies on the “first definitions” of several dictionaries to determine the definition that is “the most commonly accepted.”1 However, a coordinate sub-sense of the primary definition is the following: “to propel through the air in any manner.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) 2385 (1986). See also Webster’s Explanatory Note 12.2 and 12.4 at 17a (explaining that the various subsenses do not represent “an enduring hierarchy,” and that the “best sense is the one that most aptly fits the context”).
Elsewhere, the legislature has used the word “throw” in its broader sense, which is unrelated to the forward movement of the hand and arm. For instance, motor vehicle wheels that “may throw dirt” must have mud guards. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-150.-10(2)(a) (Supp.1992). Students' participating in activities involving “the operation of equipment that could throw particles” must wear eye protection. Utah Code Ann. § 53A-13-103(l)(a)(ii) (1992).
Here, I would conclude that the sense of the word “throw” that most aptly fits the statutory context is “to propel in any manner.” Webster’s at 2385. The statutory language prohibits a prisoner from throwing substances on a correctional officer. To my mind, spitting on a correctional officer falls within the purview of the statute, and the manner of bodily propulsion is inconsequential so long as the criminal intent remains the same.
. In a recent decision, the majority relied in part on a secondary sense of a primary definition to support its conclusion that the word "manipulate" has a defamatory meaning. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835 P.2d 179, 190 (Utah App.), cert. granted, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). In contrast, the dissent questioned the appropriateness of relying on only one of many possible senses of a primary definition to make that determination. Id. at 192.