(dissenting):
I dissent.
This ease presents two legal issues: (1) Can a state constitutionally impose a 1 year residence requirement on recipients of welfare benefits? (2) If not, is the state or the county responsible for payment of such benefits to persons residing in the state less than 1 year?
The United States Supreme Court has previously decided the first issue contrary to the majority holding herein. Shapiro, cited in the majority opinion, holds that state laws or administrative regulations imposing residence requirements as a qualification for receiving welfare benefits are unconstitutional under the “equal protection” and “commerce” clauses of the United States Constitution. The majority of my colleagues deny effect to Shapiro in the instant case because in that ease federally funded welfare benefits were involved while here the benefits are wholly state and county funded. While this difference does exist, Shapiro is not based thereon nor limited thereby, such difference being entirely irrelevant' to that decision. Must a United States Supreme Court decision be denied effect as controlling precedent because it involves a brown cow rather than a white one?
Other federal courts have directly held the source of welfare funds irrelevant, striking down as unconstitutional state laws imposing residence requirements on wholly state funded welfare programs, e. g. Barnett v. Lindsay, 319 F.Supp. 610, and *105state and city funded public housing programs, e. g. King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, D.C., 314 F.Supp. 427.
Finally, logic compels the same result. Is the constitutional guarantee of “equal protection of the laws” applicable only to those state laws involving federal funding? Of course not! There is no such limitation in the plain language of the “equal protection” clause; and to judicially engraft such limitation thereon destroys its basic purpose, impedes its intended effect, and permits a state to deny “equal protection of the laws” to its citizens in any situation where federal funding is absent.
The same reasoning applies to the constitutional guarantees in the “commerce” clause of the United States Constitution. Federal funding simply has nothing to do with the guarantees contained therein.
As the majority opinion never reaches the second issue in this case, no useful purpose would be served by including a discussion of such issue in this dissent.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court entered by Judge Hatfield on the constitutional issue.