dissenting:
I dissent from the Court’s Order of Dismissal. In my opinion the petition in error was timely filed.
While appellate practice is never a practicing attorney’s dream, neither should it be a nightmare. Yet, oftentimes, when a trial judge takes a case under advisement and attempts to render the decision in ab-sentia outside the confines of a courtroom, the appealing attorney’s milieu is havoc and confusion.
This dilemma is ideally portrayed in facts of this case. An adversarial trial was heard by the trial judge who took the case under advisement on May 23, 1988. On June 21, 1988, a letter was mailed by the trial judge to the attorneys informing them of his decision. The appellee’s attorney was requested to prepare a journal entry of judgment and submit it to appellants’ attorney for approval. On August 16, 1988, the final judgment was signed by the judge and filed of record in the case.
The decisional letter of May 23 by the trial judge was not filed in the case, nor was there any minute or order of judgment filed before the filing of the Journal Entry of Judgment on August 16, 1988. On September 14, 1988, appellants timely filed their Petition in Error.
In McCullough v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 626 P.2d 1332 (Okla.1981), where a decision was taken under advisement, the trial court’s mailing of a letter announcing the decision to both sides was held to be the date which commenced the running of appeal time. In the present case, however, although the trial court took the matter under advisement, the letter was not, as it was in McCullough, filed by the trial court in the case.
Also, Rule 27 of the District Courts, 12 O.S. Ch. 2 App. (1985), provides that in any matter taken under advisement the decision must be entered and filed with the court clerk. It then is incumbent upon the judge to see that copies of the minute of order or *113judgment setting out such decision are delivered or mailed by the court clerk to counsel in the case. Only when the absen-tia decision is filed, entered, and mailed to the attorneys, does the commencement of the time to appeal begin.
Since the present record indicates this step was not taken, appeal time did not commence to run in this particular case until the journal entry of judgment was filed. The petition in error was filed within thirty days thereof and was thus timely.
I am authorized to state that Justice KAUGER and Justice SUMMERS join me in the views expressed herein.