I dissent. In Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal.3d 716 [94 Cal.Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578], and Camara v. Mellon, 4 Cal.3d 714 [94 Cal.Rptr. 601, 484 P.2d 577], this court struck down candidate residence requirement provisions of five years and three years duration respectively. Although I concurred in Zeilenga, I dissented in Camara (joined by Chief Justice Wright and Justice McComb) on the basis that although a five-year requirement appeared to be arbitrary and capricious, a three-year requirement probably fell within reasonable limits, given recognition to the constitutional home rule rights of charter cities to fashion their local governments as electors of such entities deem best and the legitimate interests underlying candidate residence requirements. In the instant case, obedient to our mandate in Camara, the voters of the City of Santa Cruz discarded the three-year requirement in its charter and adopted a two-year requirement. Now, the majority not only strike down this two-year provision, they also announce the invalidity of any candidate residence requirement in excess of 30 days. In my view, this extreme holding is totally unjustified. Residential qualifications for election to local public office perform legitimate and compelling public interests which would warrant our upholding the two-year residence requirement at issue as a valid exercise of the City’s own constitutional right to control its municipal affairs.
Initially, we must determine what standard governs in measuring the constitutionality of various restrictions imposed upon the right to run for public office. The latest pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court indicates that the traditional “rational basis” test may be sufficient in the absence of a discrimination based upon wealth or some other “suspect” classification. (See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-144 [31 L.Ed.2d 92, 99-100, 92 S.Ct. 849], applying a “close scrutiny” test to invalidate a Texas filing fee scheme which tended to exclude from the ballot candidates unable to afford the substantial fees at issue therein.) The residence requirement at issue may operate to restrict the field of candidates from which *111voters might choose, but, as stated in Bullock, “The existence of such barriers does not of itself compel close scrutiny.” (Id. at p. 143 [31 L.Ed.2d at p. 100].)
Even if we asume, arguendo, that a close scrutiny standard applies, that standard is one of reasonable necessity. Again, as stated in Bullock, the provision at issue “must be ‘closely scrutinized’ and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster.” (405 U.S. 134, 144 [31 L.Ed.2d 92, 100]; italics added.) The majority, I fear, wholly ignore this rule of reason in testing the validity of the charter provision under scrutiny herein. (See, e.g., p. 102, lines 24-28, ante.) As I will demonstrate, however, there do exist legitimate interests underlying the requirement that a candidate for public office be a resident of the municipality for a reasonable period of time prior to the election, and the residence requirement is indeed “reasonably necessary” to promote those interests. Accordingly, whether we apply the “rational basis” test or the “close scrutiny—reasonably necessary” standard, we should uphold the constitutionality of the provision at issue in this case.
First of all, it seems evident that a municipality has the constitutional authority in controlling municipal affairs and exercising its “home rule” powers (see Cal. Const., art. XI, §§ 5, 7), to designate the qualifications of candidates for public office, including the requirement that candidates have a minimum degree of familiarity with local conditions, problems and issues. As this court stated in Lindsey v. Dominguez, 217 Cal. 533, 535 [20 P.2d 327], “The City has the undoubted right and power to fix reasonable restrictions upon the right to hold office under its charter.” Certainly no one could contend with conviction that a municipality has no legitimate interest whatever in taking reasonable measures to assure that knowledgeable candidates appear on the ballot. In the light of the lack of feasible alternative provisions,1 a residence requirement appears reasonably necessary to promote that interest. True, a new resident/candidate conceivably could gain familiarity with local problems by intensive study and research of his new locale, and a long-time resident/candidate may lack such familiarity altogether, but the residence requirement is generally the most practical assurance of a candidate’s minimum qualifications in this regard. None of the cases cited by the majority requires absolute precision in this area; as explained above, only a “reasonable necessity” must be shown.
The majority state that “City has failed to demonstrate that the election process is inadequate to weed out incompetent, unknowledgeable candi*112dates . . . .”2 Yet, as the majority must know, the inadequacy of the election process is something wholly incapable of objective proof. Rather than require our municipalities to meet an impossible standard of proof, we should acknowledge their authority to take reasonable measures to enhance the value of the democratic process by affording additional protection to voters against unknowledgeable or fraudulent candidates.
Additionally, a municipality should be permitted to conclude that its voters are entitled, to a reasonable extent at least, to have some firm basis for judging the character and ability of the candidates appearing on the ballot. A residence requirement affords local voters some opportunity to familiarize themselves with, and either develop confidence in or reject, particular candidates. In fact, a candidate’s dealings with the public in prior business, civic, charitable, social, or other local affairs often provide the only opportunity for voter-candidate contact in a noncampaign atmosphere. Of course, it is conceivable that some new resident/candidates may, by intensive campaigning, obtain a degree of exposure to the voters, and some old resident/candidates may not, but these are exceptions which do not militate against the validity of the requirement in its general application. Perfect precision is not required—only “reasonable necessity.” The majority do not even acknowledge the existence of a legitimate interest of municipalities in promoting voter-candidate contact, much less do they reach the question whether a residence requirement is a reasonable means of promoting that interest.
Thus, despite the majority’s assertion that a residence requirement is too “crude and imprecise” to serve as a proper means of promoting legitimate municipal goals, the majority wholly fail to suggest any conceivable alternative procedures to accomplish the twin purposes described above. In my view, the City’s two-year residence requirement seems reasonably suited to assure that local candidates are familiar with local problems and have had some exposure to local voters; and frankly, I cannot imagine a more objective, precise, less intrusive means of accomplishing those purposes.
Indeed, a recent federal case has upheld a three-year durational residence requirement for candidates for election to the general assembly in Delaware. The court determined that the “rational basis” test applied and acknowledged not only the state’s interest in promoting knowledgeable *113candidates but also the additional interest in familiarizing the voters with those candidates. (Walker v. Yucht (D.Del. 1972) 352 F.Supp. 85 [three-judge court]; see also Draper v. Phelps (W.D.Okla. 1972) 351 F.Supp. 677 [three-judge court, acknowledging both interests to uphold a six-month residence requirement]; State ex rel. Gralike v. Walsh (Mo. 1972) 483 S.W.2d 70 [upholding one-year residence requirement].)
The majority’s reliance upon Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 [31 L.Ed.2d 274, 92 S.Ct. 995], seems wholly misplaced. That case involved the validity of residence requirements for voters, not candidates, and reached the conclusion that municipalities cannot require voters to be long-time residents to promote some vague purpose to achieve a more intelligent electorate. Unquestionably, the court was greatly troubled in Dunn by the fact that the voter residence requirement tended to exclude many voters who were wholly qualified to exercise their franchise. But although a residence requirement may be ill-suited as a voter-qualification device, its value as applied to candidates seems unquestioned. Any person with rudimentary awareness of issues and candidates can cast his ballot, and an uninformed vote is easily cancelled by an intelligent one. But voters are not responsible for managing civic affairs and making the day-to-day decisions which municipal officials must face. Surely a significant distinction exists between the law under attack here, and the provision held invalid in Dunn. As this court pointed out many years ago in Lindsey v. Dominguez, supra, 217 Cal. 533, 535, in upholding a similar two-year residence requirement in the Los Angeles City Charter, “The right to vote and the right to hold office are independent matters. This is evidenced in Constitutions and statutes, both national and state.”
Indeed, residence requirements for candidates for public office play an important role in our state and federal constitutional schemes. For example, the President of the United States must have been a fourteen-year resident in this country (U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, cl. 5), a United States Senator a nine-year resident (id., art. I, § 3, cl. 3), a United States Representative a seven-year resident (id., art. I, § 2, cl. 2). The Governor of California must have been a resident of California for five years (Cal. Const., art. V, § 2), the Lieutenant Governor a resident for five years (id., art. V, § 9), and a member of the state Legislature a resident for three years (id., art. IV, § 2, subd. (c)). Are these various constitutional provisions themselves unconstitutional because too “crude and imprecise”?
I should also point out that for general law cities there exists a one-year residence requirement for persons seeking to hold office as city councilman, *114clerk or treasurer. (Gov. Code, § 36502.) An identical provision exists with respect to candidates for county boards of supervisors. (Gov. Code, § 25041.) We referred to this latter provision with implicit approval when we struck down the five-year requirement in Butte County. (Zeilenga v. Nelson, supra, 4 Cal.3d 716, 722 [“The difficulty of making such a showing (of compelling necessity for a five-year requirement) seems self-evident when one realizes that as to general law counties the residence requirement is only one year.”].) Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature has weighed the various competing considerations and has determined that, on balance, a one-year requirement is reasonable in the absence of contrary charter provision. Under the majority’s holding, however, these statutory provisions likewise are declared too “crude and imprecise” to withstand constitutional scrutiny, even though they represent the careful judgment of the Legislature.
Counsel for respondent lists 32 chartered cities and their respective residence requirements of which:
Three require five years.
Two require four years.
Twelve require three years.
Four require two years.
Eight require one year.
One (Berkeley) requires qualification as an elector.
One (San Jose) requires qualification as a resident elector.-
One (Monterey) has no residence requirement.
Out of this list (which is only a sampling but includes at least all the larger cities) 21 require two or more years, eight require one year, and only three less than one year. This sampling clearly establishes the belief of the voters of these cities that some substantial residential requirement is essential to qualify as a nominee for membership on the local governing board. Yet our court majority evidently refuses to acknowledge that these provisions perform valuable functions in promoting legitimate interests of these municipalities and their voters.
I would uphold the City’s two-year provision as reasonably necessary to promote legitimate municipal objectives. A fortiori I would uphold the one-year requirement chosen by the Legislature. Certainly a lesser period *115would be wholly inadequate to protect and promote the interests discussed above.
McComb, J., concurred.
Neither the municipality, its taxpayers nor the candidates themselves should be put to the inconvenience and expense of undertaking a pre-election test of the candidate’s local knowledge.
The majority perhaps overlook the fact that if was thé “election process” itself which created the residence requirement in City’s charter. Are not the voters entitled to enact seif-protective measures to obtain a qualified slate of candidates? In the very words of the majority, “The hallowed belief in the wisdom and power of the electorate must not be sold short . , .