dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, joins.
The majority opinion addresses and finds error in four of the eight issues presented by appellant on appeal. It finds no one of these errors to be sufficient for reversal, but that
“ * * * several errors occurring during the course of trial, when considered together, created sufficient prejudice to deprive appellant of a fair trial. * * * ”
I believe this to be a dangerous precedent, particularly in recognition that an objection was not made to that upon which most of the issues in this case are based. The trial court was thus not given an opportunity to consider the alleged errors. We should not expect the trial court to assume the role of presenting the case for the parties by correcting errors not brought to its attention by the parties, and also not expect the trial court to keep score of possible errors in an effort to gauge when they have accumulated to the point of becoming unfairly prejudicial.
We start with Rule 103, W.R.E., which provides in pertinent part:
“(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. — Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
“(1) Objection. — In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; * * *
******
“(d) Plain error. — Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
The rule does not address error as arising from an accumulation of nonerrors.
Plain error is again addressed in Rule 49(b), W.R.Cr.P.:
“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although *746they were not brought to the attention of the court.”
We have said that the plain error rule is to be exercised cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. Ketcham v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356 (1980); Leeper v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 379 (1979); Downs v. State, Wyo., 581 P.2d 610 (1978). The defendant has the burden to show plain error. Campbell v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 358 (1979). It must do so more than in an arguable way, and a mere allegation of prejudice is not sufficient to meet such burden. Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981).
The Wyoming case cited by the majority opinion to validate cumulative errors as a basis for reversal concerns the cumulation of the same activity, and not a cumulation of separate activities. In that case, Brow-der v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889 (1982), the cumulation was repeated acts and conduct of the prosecutor.
In any event, I cannot agree that reversible error exists with reference to the issues on appeal. Addressing these issues:
I. TESTIMONY CONCERNING MRS. SCHMUNK’S STATEMENTS AS HEARSAY
On April 25, 1984, notice was given pursuant to Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E.,1 that deceased’s mother, sister and brother would testify to separate statements made to each of them by deceased in April and June 1983 concerning her intention to leave appellant. A similar notice was given on April 30, 1984, with reference to testimony to be given by deceased’s mother to similar statements made to her by deceased in October 1982, February 1983, and June 1983.
Appellant does not contend that the April 25, 1984, notice was not timely; no objection was made to it. But, he contends that the April 30, 1984, notice was not timely. The purpose of the notice, as reflected in the rule, is to give “the adverse party * * * a fair opportunity to prepare to meet” the evidence. There is no contention that appellant did not here have sufficient time to meet the evidence referred to in the April 25, 1984, notice, and in fact he did meet it at trial. The evidence noticed on April 30, 1984, was similar to that noticed on April 25, 1984, and it too was met at trial. Adequate notice was thereby evidenced, and there was no error in admission of the evidence on this ground.
But, the majority opinion finds the statements to be irrelevant, in any event, since they pertain to the deceased’s state of mind, not that of appellant; and since there was no evidence to reflect that the deceased’s intention to leave was communicated to appellant, the testimony was irrelevant. However, the majority opinion overlooks the relevancy of the statements in another context; i.e., to meet the defense theory that the marriage of the deceased and appellant was a happy one and that the death was an accident.2 The appellant, through his testimony regarding a happy marriage, sought to prove the death accidental and not intentional. Evidence to disprove such and to attack appellant’s credibility — to impeach him — ought to be equally .available to the prosecution. Of *747note is the fact that the testimony of William (Billy) Duncan (see ante) concerning the same matter (public appearance of a happy marriage but privately otherwise) was admitted without objection.
The notice regarding this testimony was obviously sufficient, and the testimony was relevant for the purpose indicated. The admission of it was not error.
II. CHILD’S TESTIMONY THAT HE LEFT DOUGLAS “BECAUSE OF THE SUSPICIONS OF MY FATHER KILLING MY MOTHER”
Again, the majority opinion forgot to hit the ball before starting to run around the bases. That opinion improperly considers the answer to the question, “Why did you leave Douglas, Wyoming?” to have been “Because I had suspicions that my father had killed my mother.” However, the answer given by William (Billy) Duncan, the child of appellant and deceased, was “Because of the suspicions of my father killing my mother.” The answer was plain. His father had been accused of the crime of killing his mother. The atmosphere in Douglas reflected such “suspicions.” The venue of the action was changed because of them. It isn’t surprising that the child was uncomfortable in Douglas with them. His activity in Douglas must have been affected because of the “suspicions.” He left Douglas because of these suspicions in the community, and he so answered the question. He did not say “I left because I thought my father killed my mother.” He said he left “Because of the suspicions of my father killing my mother.” (Emphasis added.) This being so, the discussion of this issue in the majority opinion is not pertinent.
Additionally, the trial objection to the question was not to its relevancy. The late objection made to this issue was that the question was “leading and suggestive.” Error cannot be predicated on the trial court’s ruling if the specific objection is not brought to its attention. Lee v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 217 (1976); Martinez v. State, Wyo., 511 P.2d 105 (1973). Any error alleged to be founded on relevancy would have to be plain error to be reversible. Reversible error does not exist with reference to this issue.
III. PROSECUTOR’S CLOSING ARGUMENT
The majority opinion is critical of the prosecution’s reference to the potential of appellant having two characters or appearances — a double attitude, one, that given to the public relative to his happy marriage; and two, the dark side being that given privately at home as testified by witness Duncan and by the testimony referred to supra in the section entitled “Testimony Concerning Mrs. Schmunk’s Statements as Hearsay.” There was no objection to the closing argument.
The majority opinion recognizes the propriety of the prosecution presenting its theory of the case to the jury, reviewing the evidence with the jury, and suggesting inferences based thereon. It also recognizes reversal can be predicated only if there is plain error when no objection was made to the closing argument. But it does not find the elements of plain error in the closing argument except as cumulated with other alleged errors, again citing and quoting from Browder v. State in support thereof. As already noted supra, the situation in Browder was entirely different and distinguishable from that in this case.
The elements for plain error do not exist for this issue.3 The record' is clear as to the incident, but the appellant has not proven a violation of a clear and unequivocal *748rule of law. The prosecutor was presenting his theory of the case and the facts in support thereof. In any event, there was no denial of a substantial right and no material prejudice. Such is the reason the majority opinion attempts to cumulate other alleged errors to arrive at reversible error.
IV. ADMISSION AND USE OF VIDEO TAPE
There are three potential problems with the video tape: (1) reference to the Michi- ■ gan incident; (2) reference to a previous polygraph test; and (3) reference to refusal to take a current polygraph test.
Michigan Incident
The motion in limine was to preclude reference in the video tape to prior bad acts of appellant in Michigan in the presentation of the prosecution’s case in chief. The motion was granted, but the video tape was not edited to delete the reference before it was shown to the jury. It was shown without objection. In fact, appellant stipulated to its admission into evidence. When the objecting motion was made the next day, the tape was edited before it went to the jury, and a limiting instruction was given to the jury:
“You are instructed that a certain portion of State’s Exhibit 21, the same being a video tape recording, admitted into evidence has been deleted. You are therefore instructed that the deleted portion must not be considered by you as evidence.”
In view of the passing reference to the Michigan charges, viz. “I had a polygraph taken in reference to my daughter’s charges against me, which were totally erroneous,” and inasmuch as juries are presumed to follow the instructions given to them, Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., Wyo., 664 P.2d 27 (1983); State Highway Commission v. Peters, Wyo., 416 P.2d 390 (1966), there was no error — particularly plain error — in the court’s ruling on admission based on this aspect of the video tape.
The cases cited in the majority opinion to support a holding that a limiting instruction is insufficient in such situation concern factual situations far more aggravated than here.
In United States v. Brevard, 739 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.1984), one of those cited in the majority opinion, repeated warnings were given to the witness to not refer to polygraph tests. At least three references were made to it after objections and warnings by the trial court. In exasperation, the trial court instructed the jury that the polygraph references had nothing to do with the case, and they were to draw no inferences from them. In reversing the conviction, the Fourth Circuit recited the general rule to be:
“ * * * Where an impermissible reference to a polygraph has been interjected, the court usually may cure the error by striking the evidence and instructing the jury to disregard it. * * *” 739 F.2dat 182.
However, the repetition and aggravated nature of the references in the case were held to be sufficient to overcome the presumption. Objections were properly and promptly made, and the references were repeated and aggravated in United States v. Brevard, contrary to that in this case.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), another of the cases cited in the majority opinion, the problem was the admissibility of a co-defendant’s statement which implicated the defendant. The co-defendant was not available for cross-examination; it was a joint trial and there was a substantial threat to defendant’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court recognized the general rule thus:
“ * * * Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently. * * * ” 88 S.Ct. at 1627.
The court found the facts of the case to provide an exception wherein the risk is *749great that the jury cannot or will not follow the limiting instructions, and the consequences are vital to the defendant. The facts in this case do not start to match those in Bruton so as to warrant an exception to the general rule.
In the other case cited in the majority opinion, Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 21 S.Ct. 474, 45 L.Ed. 663 (1901), the essential holding was that the instruction was not clear on what part of the evidence was not to be considered by the jury, and that the uncertainty did not result in a clear direction to not consider the evidence; i.e., the result was that there was no withdrawal of evidence from jury consideration, not that the withdrawal itself was insufficient to cure the error. The court did note the general rule that withdrawal of evidence cures any error in its admission, but that there may be instances where such a strong impression is made by the evidence that withdrawal will not erase it. In Throckmorton, there were several witnesses involved in the questioned evidence and long argument concerning its admissibility. Such aggravations do not exist in this case.
The limiting instruction in this case was well within the general rule with reference to the Michigan incident.
Previous Polygraph Test
That said in the previous subsection of this dissent with reference to a limiting or curing instruction relative to the Michigan incident is equally applicable to that relative to the previous polygraph test. The portion of the tape was deleted and the jury was instructed to disregard the deleted part.
The majority opinion discusses making the results of the test known to the jury, and it cites cases relative thereto. Certainly there is no suggestion that the results of the Michigan polygraph case were made known to the jury, and discussion concerning such is misplaced. If such discussion is founded upon the statement of appellant that “I had a polygraph taken in reference to my daughter’s charges against me, which was totally erroneous” (emphasis added), not only are the words “which was totally erroneous” improperly taken to modify and apply to the results of the polygraph test instead of modifying and applying to the more recent words in the sentence, “charges against me,” but such interpretation would make the comment to be gratuitous, and any error of the type here alleged would be invited error.
“The doctrine of ‘invited error’ embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. * * * ” 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962).
The doctrine has long been recognized in Wyoming:
“It is a general rule that an error to be available on appeal must have occurred without the express or implied consent of the appellant. * * * ” Schloredt v. Boyden, 9 Wyo. 392, 403-404, 64 P. 225 (1901).
Refusal to Take a Current Polygraph Test
The motion in limine was not based upon the refusal to take a current polygraph test. Nor was an objection made at trial. After the tape was played to the jury and when appellant finally objected, and although the refusal to take a current test was mentioned, the thrust of the objection was to the inclusion therein of the Michigan incident and, perhaps, with the polygraph taken in connection therewith. The objection was:
“ * * * I think that the implication is very clear by virtue of the video tape and the particular portion which had to do with a polygraph where, number one, the Doctor indicated on that video that he would not take a polygraph, and the reason for him not taking a polygraph was as a result of a matter that had occurred with respect to his daughter, or charge by his daughter, which gave a clear indication that he had previously been charged with some criminal activity; that *750he had been offered a polygraph and had presumably taken a polygraph.”
“ * * * Error may not be assigned unless objection has been made thereto with a distinct statement of the matter to which objection is made and the grounds for this objection, and indicating with definiteness and particularity the error asserted * * Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, Wyo., 511 P.2d 963, 968 (1973).
Accordingly, there can be no question but that reversal on this ground can be only for plain error. The elements for plain error are set forth in note 3, supra.
It must be emphasized in this connection that not only was no objection made with reference to admission of the refusal to take the current test, but its admission was actually stipulated to by appellant. The motion in limine had to do only with the Michigan incident and perhaps the Michigan polygraph.
Accordingly, the application of the plain error rule requires even more caution in this instance wherein the evidence was admitted on stipulation. Again, the potential for invited error is exceedingly great.
Although I believe the foregoing is dis-positive of this issue, I comment on two considerations relative thereto. First, the question relative to the existence of error in admission of testimony concerning the willingness of a defendant to take a polygraph test is not only presented in cases in which he refused to do so, but often the defendant seeks to evidence the fact that he was willing to do so. Second, cases can be cited to reflect instances in which it was held to be reversible error to admit the testimony, and cases can be cited to the contrary. Cases can be cited wherein any such error was cured by an instruction, and cases can be cited wherein it was not. See Annotation: Propriety and prejudicial effect of comment or evidence as to accused’s willingness to take lie detector test. 95 A.L.R.2d 819 (1964).
The majority opinion cites and quotes from three cases to support the contention that any admission or reference to refusal to take a polygraph test is prejudicial and, thus, reversible error. The precedent is not that clear-cut, as reflected in the A.L. R.2d annotation, supra.
In State v. Emory, 190 Kan. 406, 375 P.2d 585 (1962), one of the cases referred to in the majority opinion, the court found that admission of a refusal to take the test was reversible error, distinguishing the facts of the case from those in State v. Smith, 187 Kan. 42, 353 P.2d 510 (1960), in which the jury was admonished, and reversible error was not found. In a later case, State v. Roach, 223 Kan. 732, 576 P.2d 1082 (1978), the Kansas court held that not only the admission of evidence that defendant submitted to a polygraph test was not reversible error, but the results thereof admitted into evidence were not reversible error in view of a stipulation of the parties to admit the same.
In State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962), cited in the majority opinion to hold that “reference by the prosecutor to a refusal of the accused to take a lie detector test required reversal,” there was much more than a mere “reference by the prosecutor.” In his opening statement, the prosecutor made a number of references to the refusal to take the test. Portions of defendant’s mother’s taped statement were played to the defendant, and after each segment, defendant was asked to take a polygraph test. The prosecution emphasized the refusal to do so saying “ ‘every time he refused.’ ” At least four witnesses testified to interrogation of defendant, and when it came time for them to testify that he was asked to take a polygraph test and refused, they testified that “ ‘I am not supposed to mention that’ ” or a similar response. During the trial the prosecutor made “numerous” references to the question and answer which could not be mentioned. The court concluded that “[t]he entire handling of the lie detector test aspect of the case clearly reveals prejudicial overzealousness on the part of the prosecution, and leaves an appellate court with no recourse but vacation of the conviction.” The case does not stand for the proposition *751that “reference by the prosecutor” requires reversal.
In Mills v. People, 139 Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998 (1959), the refusal to take the test was offered over objection as evidence “ ‘of guilt similar to evidence of flight.’ ” Obviously, such was not the purpose of the comment made by appellant on the video tape which was accepted into evidence pursuant to a stipulation and without objection.
In summary, then, I believe that whether or not a reference to the refusal or to the willingness to take a polygraph test is reversible error will depend on the circumstances of each case, with factors such as the emphasis given to it, the manner in which the reference occurred — intentionally or inadvertently — nonresponsive to a question, invited error, through stipulation, etc., whether or not the other evidence of guilt is exceedingly strong or exceedingly weak, and similar considerations. The same approach should be used in each case to determine if a limiting instruction, if one was given, was sufficient to cure the error, if error there was.
In this case, the stipulation for admission, the manner in which the reference occurred, and the strength of other evidence should not make reversible error.
Finally, with reference to the comment in the majority opinion concerning the unfairness which results from a jury viewing a video tape in the jury room and, thus, giving undue emphasis to a portion of the testimony, I agree. I believe that this Court should, by rule, direct that any verbatim record of question-and-answer testimony, video tape or deposition, or otherwise, whether admitted as an exhibit or otherwise, shall not be subject to jury inspection other than as permitted to be read or shown during that part of the trial in which evidence is being received.
However, such a rule was not in effect in this case. There is not even an allegation that the jury viewed the video tape in the jury room, let alone evidence that such was done. There was no objection to the video tape being available for jury inspection. In fact, it was stipulated that it be an exhibit. And the appellant does not make viewing in the jury room an issue on appeal.
I do not believe there is reversible error in the admission and use of the video tape in this case.
V. THE FOUR ISSUES ON APPEAL NOT REACHED IN THE MAJORITY OPINION
I agree that the other four errors alleged by appellant will not warrant reversal.
Dr. Graber’s Testimony
Appellant contends that it was error to allow the emergency room physician who attended Mrs. Schmunk’s death to testify that he would not prescribe narcotic drugs for his own family “[bjecause I don’t trust myself making therapeutic decisions about family members, and also it’s too hard to get into an abusive matter.”
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be reversed absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982); Apodaca v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1023 (1981); Sanville v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340 (1979).
“A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. * * * ” Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).
Simply stated, appellant has not made any showing of a clear abuse of discretion in this instance. His allegation in this respect is not supported by any authority.
*752 Refreshing Recollection of Appellant From Deceased’s Medical Records
Appellant contends the court erred by refusing to allow appellant to refresh his recollection of deceased’s medical history by reference to her medical records. The refusal was because the records had not been produced by appellant prior to trial in response to a discovery order which specifically included the records as items to be produced by appellant.
That said supra relative to the discretion of the court in ruling on an admission of evidence is applicable to the ruling of the court on this issue. The sanction here imposed is within the court’s discretion. Simms v. State, Wyo., 492 P.2d 516, cert. denied 409 U.S. 886, 93 S.Ct. 104, 34 L.Ed.2d 142 (1972); Rule 18(h), W.R.Cr.P.
In any event, the entire medical history of the deceased was before the jury. Appellant testified as to deceased’s complete medical history. Not only does appellant fail to show a clear abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling, but he also does not demonstrate any prejudice from the ruling.
Admission of Prosecution Evidence (1) Concerning Result Of Toxicologist Test As Found by Appellant’s Expert, (2) From Witnesses Concerning Perceived “Personality Changes” Observed In Deceased, and (3) From Investigator Concerning His Reasons For the Investigative Procedures Used by Him
On cross-examination, appellant was asked if he had employed a toxicologist to review the findings of the prosecution’s toxicologist. Appellant said that he did, and, on further. examination, he acknowledged that his expert agreed with the findings and toxicology of the prosecution’s toxicologist.
The testimony of some of the witnesses contained perceptions of “personality changes” observed by them in deceased. The pathologist testified as to the “theories” under which the autopsy was undertaken.
The investigator testified as to his reasons for interviewing various individuals and for taking certain actions, and as to that which he believed his investigation reflected when deceased died.
There was no objection to any of this testimony, and the issues relative thereto were first raised on appeal. As noted supra, even if error existed in the admission of such evidence, it can be considered on appeal only if it amounts to plain error. Since the admission of such testimony does not amount to plain error, the existence or nonexistence of error in its admission need not be considered.
The elements of plain error are set forth in note 3, supra. Certainly, appellant has not established the violation of a substantial right resulting in material prejudice. As noted in the cases cited supra, the plain error doctrine is to be exercised cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances. Appellant has the burden of showing plain error. The exceptional circumstances do not here exist, and appellant has fallen far short of establishing plain error.
The results of the toxicology tests were before the jury through the testimony of the State’s toxicologist. The tests were conclusive. The fact that appellant’s own toxicologist agreed with them is of no real importance, let alone being of material prejudice. If anything, the testimony simply went to the credibility of appellant’s own testimony concerning the tests.
Likewise, the comments of witnesses concerning observed “personality changes” on the part of deceased were of little weight in context of that placed before the jury in this many-day trial. The pathologist’s testimony concerning his “theories” was in truth a factual recitation of the manner and purpose of the autopsy. Again, appellant falls far short of his burden to establish plain error.
The investigator “walked through” the procedure taken by him in investigation of the matter. In doing so, appellant could possibly have objected to the words used. If such had been done, the meat of the testimony would undoubtedly have been *753placed before the jury in a more precise and proper manner. The failure to object may have been with intent that the testimony not be emphasized or “cleaned up.” In any event, considering the extensive testimony presented to the jury, I see no material prejudice from this piece of testimony. Applying the plain error rule cautiously, the decision that there was no plain error in this testimony is more than proper.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant bases his allegation that he had ineffective assistance of counsel on the assumption that counsel did not properly object to certain evidence. Since I do not find any error with reference to the other issues on appeal, this allegation has no substance.
Counsel is presumed competent, and the standard upon which to gauge competency is “that which would reasonably be rendered by a reasonably competent attorney under the facts and circumstances of the case.” Hoskovek v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 1366, 1367 (1981). The decision whether or not to object in any particular instance is a matter of trial strategy resting with the lawyer. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983). Applying the following test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh. denied. — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d 864 (1984), there is no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel in this case.
“The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s unsuccessful defense. Counsel’s performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.
“Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.”
Also see Murry v. State, Wyo., 713 P.2d 202 (1986).
I would affirm.
. Rule 804(b)(6), W.R.E., provides as an exception to the hearsay rule:
"A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general pruposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant."
See Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888 (1983).
. First-degree murder would not be established in the absence of intent or malice. The jury was also instructed on the elements of voluntary manslaughter.
. The elements for plain error as quoted in the majority opinion from Bradley v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1981), are:
“* * * First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he has been materially prejudiced. * * * »»
See Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 (1977).