DISSENTING OPINION OF
NAKAMURA, J.When the Supreme Court of Hawaii divests the people of the City and County of Honolulu of a right granted under the City’s charter, it owes them a logical explanation for the action.1 The opinion of the majority, however, does not tell us exactly why the employment of a process designed to give the people a voice on important questions of policy is per se incompatible with a statutory requirement that zoning “shall be accomplished [by ordinance] within the framework of a long-range, comprehensive general plan prepared... to guide the overall future development of the county.” HRS § 46-4. Rather than a reasoned exegesis of the relevant provisions of HRS § 46-4, the opinion offers the fears of the majority that the objectives of planning would be jeopardized if the people were given the opportunity to effect zoning changes through the process. Because I neither share the majority’s distrust of democracy nor subscribe to the notion that political decisions rendered directly by the electorate invariably are devoid of civic virtue, a fair reading of HRS § 46^4 reveals it does not forbid zoning amendments by initiative, and zoning amendments are subject to judicial review for consistency with general plans, I dissent.
*491I.
In the majority’s view, “[t]he issue before this court is whether the initiative proposals adopted by the electorate of the City on November 8, 1988 validly amended the land use development plan and zoning maps of the City.” The orders of the circuit court from which appeals were taken, however, are dated April 15, 1988, August 9, 1988, and September 2, 1988. The primary order on appeal is entitled Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Denying Save Sandy Beach Initiative Coalition’s Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment and dated April 15,1988. The issue, therefore, is whether the trial court erred or not in deciding on the basis of the pleadings that HRS § 46-4 “vests zoning power within the City and County of Honolulu exclusively in the City Council. .. , which is required to accomplish zoning changes within the framework of a long-range comprehensive general plan,” and awarding judgment to the appellees.
A.
The majority begins its discussion of the issue on appeal by reiterating the precept that “[t]he duty of this court in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.” This is followed immediately by the conclusion that “[i]n view of legislative history, it is abundantly clear that the legislature in its wisdom established a public policy of not effectuating land use zoning through the initiative process.” (Emphasis added). Having read what is proffered thereafter as proof of abundant clarity of intent I cannot, even after viewing HRS § 46-4 and its legislative history in a light most favorable to the cause of legislative wisdom, ascribe such prescience to the legislature. For HRS § 46-4 does not even mention “initiative” or “referendum,” there is nothing therein from which it may be inferred that zoning amendments by initiative are interdicted, and the history only confirms that the plain wording of the section accurately reflects legislative intention, which simply is to have zoning “accomplished [by ordinance] within the framework of a long range comprehensive general plan.”
*492B.
The opinion then cites two decisions issued by the Superior Court of New Jersey and one issued by the Supreme Court of Washington, proclaiming these cases support the reasoning of the majority and quoting dicta selectively to buttress its theme that “initiative is inconsistent with the goal of long range comprehensive planning.” But even a cursory read-. ing discloses they cannot serve as precedent or case law to guide the resolution of the issue at hand.
The New Jersey cases arose from the employment of initiative and referendum by the townships of Sparta and Spillane respectively in amending their zoning ordinances. Although a statute permitted municipalities to adopt either process as a means to encourage public participation in municipal affairs, the Superior Court ruled neither could be employed in effecting zoning changes because the State Zoning Act was “specific in detailing the manner in which zoning ordinances may be amended.” Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. 519, 524, 312 A.2d 154, 156-57 (1973); see also Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444, 449, 256 A.2d 85, 88 (1969). The decisions turned of course on “the exclusivity and uniqueness of the Zoning Act itself (and the related Planning Act) and the Legislature’s evident intention of providing uniformity of procedure for all municipalities in the State in zoning matters.” Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. at 526, 312 A.2d at 157 (emphasis added).
The issue in the Washington case, Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976), was whether the appellants could obtain a referendum on a rezoning ordinance adopted by the city council. The Supreme Court of Washington ruled they could not; the ordinance, the court said, was not “a legislative policy-making decision, and thus it [was] not subject to a referendum election.” 87 Wash. 2d at 581, 557 P.2d at 1309. In the court’s view “[t]he legislative body essentially [was] then performing its administrative function.” And the court further noted it had “characterized rezone decisions as quasi-judicial acts by the municipal legislative body.” 87 Wash. 2d at 850, 557 P.2d at 1309 (citations omitted).
Our task here, as the majority emphasized at the outset, “is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature [of the State]. Reefshare, Ltd. v. Nagata, 70 Haw. 93, 100, 762 P.2d 169, 174 (1988).” *493The citation of decisions rendered by courts elsewhere in giving effect to dissimilar statutory language or in applying a rule of law we do not follow impedes rather than furthers the task.
In stark contrast to the New Jersey Zoning Act’s specific provisions “detailing the manner in which zoning ordinances may be amended,” Township of Sparta v. Spillane, 125 N.J. Super. at 524, 312 A.2d at 157, HRS § 46-4 contains nothing in the way of a procedural requirement relating to the exercise of zoning power by the counties other than the directive that it “shall be exercised by ordinance.” And in contrast to the Supreme Court of Washington, we regard a zoning amendment as “legislative action” rather than an administrative or quasi-judicial act of a municipal legislative body. Kailua Community Council v. City & County, 60 Haw. 428, 432, 591 P.2d 602, 605 (1979).
It is not “our practice to decide important questions of law by dicta from unrelated cases.” In re Hawaiian Tel. Co., 67 Haw. 370, 379, 689 P.2d 741, 747 (1984) (citation omitted). To say “we agree with the reasoning and statements made by the respective courts as applied to the process of zoning by initiative[,]” when their decisions are manifestly inapt only underscores the deficit in this court’s reasoning. The same may be said of the attempt to pass off “the Nukolii case [as] inapposite.”
The majority skips lightly over this court’s decision in County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766 (1982), appeal dismissed sub nom. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Committee to Save Nukolii, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983), by rationalizing that we were “not faced [there] with the issue of whether zoning by referendum is permissible in light of HRS § 46-4.” But the holding here is premised on a conclusion that “it is abundantly clear that the legislature ... established a public policy of not effectuating land use zoning through the initiative process.” (Emphasis added). In practical effect there is, of course, no difference between initiative and referendum; the former is no less an instrument of direct democracy than the latter. And if it is so clear now that the use of such an instrument is interdicted by HRS § 46-4, it would have been clear too in 1982, if not to this court, to the litigants and the attorneys adversely affected by the referendum vole repealing a zoning ordinance.
Something as abundantly clear as the majority would have us believe could hardly have escaped the attention of persons whose stake in the development there probably was as great as that of the developer and *494landowner here. Zoning by referendum was no less a matter of great public import then than zoning by initiative is now. This court thus had the power, sua sponte, to notice plain error and correct it if justice so required. State v. Fox, 70 Haw. 46, 56 n.2, 760 P.2d 670, 676 n.2 (1988). That neither the litigants nor the court noticed the established policy against zoning by referendum belies the claim of clarity of legislative intent.
C.
This intent, the opinion declares, may also be gleaned from the fact that “[i]n 1957, when the Zoning Enabling Act was enacted in substantially the same form that it exists today, initiative was not available at either the state or local government levels.” The majority thus deems it reasonable “to conclude that the legislature did not contemplate zoning through the initiative process in enacting the Zoning Enabling Act.” “If the legislature intended otherwise,” the opinion asserts, “it would have so legislated.” This, of course, is nothing more than unfounded conjecture.
Inasmuch as the voters of the City and County of Honolulu are being divested of a right granted by the City’s charter to decide directly what serves the public interest in zoning, it behooves the court to rest the decision on a firmer foundation. If intent is to be inferred at all from legislative inaction, a more logical premise from which to proceed would be the inaction following the referendum on Nukolii and our decision in County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., supra.
The majority’s attempt to find support for its decision in the enactment of the State General Plan, HRS chapter 226, and in the rejection of proposals for legislation through initiative by the Constitutional Conventions of 1950,1968, and 1978 also suffers from similar infirmities. Nothing related to these events serves as a logical premise from which an intent to establish “a public policy of not effectuating land use zoning through the initiative process” may be inferred.
II.
The issue on appeal being one of statutory interpretation, my analysis begins as it must with the statute in question, HRS § 46^4.
*495The genesis of HRS § 46-4 is traceable to 1957 when the Territorial Legislature found “[t]he pressure of a rapidly increasing population... require[d] an orderly economic growth within the various counties, and the conservation and development of all natural resources.” Session Laws of Hawaii (Haw. Sess. Laws) 1957, c 234, § 1. “Adequate controls,” it said, “must be established, maintained and enforced by responsible agencies of government to reduce waste and put all of our limited land area, and the resources found thereon, to their most beneficial use.” Id. The legislature therefore passed an act designed, “by means of zoning ordinances and regulations enacted by and under [the] act, and in accord with a long range, comprehensive general plan, to promote the health, safety, convenience, order, welfare and prosperity of the present and future inhabitants of [Hawaii].” Id.
The section of the act relating to county zoning provided in part that “[z]oning in all counties shall be accomplished within the framework of a long range, comprehensive, general plan prepared or being prepared to guide the overall future development of the county [,]” and “[z]oning shall be one of the tools available to the county to put the general plan into effect in an orderly manner.” 1957 Haw. Sess. Laws, c 234, § 9. “The zoning power granted [under the act was to] be exercised by .. . ordinance ....” Id. And the granted powers, which included the power of enforcement, were to “be liberally construed in favor of the county or city and county exercising them, and in such a manner as to promote the orderly development of each county or city and county in accord with a long range, comprehensive general plan, and to insure the greatest benefit for [Hawaii] as a whole.” The provisions of the section, furthermore, were not to “be construed to limit or repeal any powers [then] possessed by any county to achieve such ends through zoning and building regulations except insofar as forest and water reserve zones are concerned.” Id.
As the majority notes, the Zoning Enabling Act “was enacted in substantially the same form it exists today.” A fair reading of its relevant language ineluctably leads to a conclusion that the legislature recognized zoning was primarily a matter of county concern and imposed a modicum of restraints on the exercise of the power by the counties. For the plain language of HRS § A6-A only compels a county to accomplish zoning by ordinance within the framework of a long range, comprehensive general plan designed to guide its overall future development.
*496“The intention of the legislature,” we have said, “is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” In re Hawaiian Tel. Co., 61 Haw. 572, 577, 608 P.2d 383, 387 (1980). And “where the language of the law in question is plain and unambiguous, construction by this court is inappropriate and our duty is only to give effect to the law according to its plain and obvious meaning.” Id. at 577-78, 608 P.2d at 387. The circuit court erred by engaging in construction where none was required and concluding that zoning is a power to be exercised exclusively by the county’s legislative body. This court also subjects the plain language of HRS § 46-4 to construction and concludes the statute “established a public policy of not effectuating land use zoning through the initiative process.” I have searched the statute in vain for anything that even intimates either conclusion is justified. Reading the language of the statute as written by the legislature and construing the powers granted therein “liberally... in favor of the county ... exercising them” as directed by HRS § 46-4(a), I conclude the statute does not divest the people of the City and County of Honolulu of a political right granted them by the City’s charter.
The holding of the majority in essence is that its notion of what constitutes good planning, which is nowhere stated in the statute, must prevail over a decision made by the people of the City and County of Honolulu when they adopted the City charter that a zoning ordinance could be passed by'the direct vote of the people. But “[cjharter provisions with respect to a political subdivision’s executive, legislative and administrative structure and organization [are] superior to statutory provisions, subject to the authority of the legislature to enact general laws allocating and reallocating powers and functions.” Haw. Const, art. VIII, § 2. Because the City’s legislative structure includes the people and their power to enact legislation through popular vote and the legislature has not exercised its authority to pass a general law reallocating this power where zoning amendments are concerned, I conclude too that the Home Rule provisions of the State Constitution dictate a reversal of the trial court.
Unlike the majority, I am not deterred by the possibility thata zoning amendment effected by initiative may be inconsistent with the City’s long range, comprehensive general plan. There is, of course, no certainty that a popular vote will reflect the objectives and policies of the plan. Yet, there is no certainty too that the City Council’s zoning amendments will always reflect these objectives and policies. “[T]here is no more advance assur*497anee that a legislative body will act by conscientiously applying consistent standards than there is with respect to voters.” Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 675 n.10 (1976).2
A zoning amendment enacted by the City Council is subject to judicial review for conformity with standards enunciated in the general plan, and so is a zoning amendment enacted by initiative. That the amendment was adopted by popular vote does not immunize it from judicial review. Cf. Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964) (“the fact that an apportionment plan is adopted in a popular referendum is insufficient to sustain its constitutionality or to induce a court of equity to refuse to act.”).
Thus, I would vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case. If the plaintiffs then amend their pleadings to seek a review for consistency between zoning amendment and plan, the trial court could compare the two and invalidate the ordinance if the circumstances demand.3
One of the major functions of any system of law is to assure its own acceptance in the society it governs, and this is part of the job of each judicial opinion. Law that is rejected by the people it undertakes to control, or that is received by them with doubts and misgivings, is not good law, and may not even be accepted as law at all. To a great extent the validity of law for a people depends on their confidence in it.
Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 810, 812 (1961).
Note 10, in its entirety, reads:
The Ohio Supreme Court’s analysis of the requirements for standards flowing from the Fourteenth Amendment also sweeps too broadly. Except as a legislative history informs an analysis of legislative action, there is no more advance assurance that a legislative body will act by conscientiously applying consistent standards than there is with respect to voters. For example, there is no certainty that the City Council in this case would act on the basis of “standards” explicit or otherwise in Eastlake’s comprehensive zoning ordinance. Nor is there any assurance that townspeople assembling in a town meeting, as the people of Eastlake could do, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969), will act according to consistent standards. The critical constitutional inquiry, rather, is whether the zoning restriction produces arbitrary or capricious results.
But a familiarity with the plan and with Sandy Beach and its environs tells me the plaintiffs’ burden would be a heavy one.