concurring.
I concur in the result. However, I write separately because, in my view, respectfully, the Majority ignores the plain language of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) which, by its terms, punishes driving after drinking an amount of alcohol rendering a person incapable of safe driving and not, as the Majority holds, merely driving while intoxicated.
Appellee Paul A. Segida was charged with and convicted of two counts of driving under the influence (DUI) pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c), and one count of careless driving pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714. Section 3802 provides in relevant part:
(a) General impairment.—
(1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
(2) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is at least 0.08% but less than 0.10% within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
(b) High rate of alcohol. — An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is at least 0.10% but less than 0.16% within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
(c) Highest rate of alcohol. — An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood -or breath is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the individ*120ual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 (emphasis added).1
On October 24, 2006, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court held in a published opinion that the evidence was insufficient to support both DUI charges and it arrested judgment with respect thereto. Commonwealth v. Segida, 912 A.2d 841 (Pa.Super.2006). This Court granted the Commonwealth’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal to review only that part of the Superior Court’s decision holding that the evidence was insufficient to support Appellee’s conviction under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) because the Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellee was incapable of safe driving at the time he was driving. Segida, 912 A.2d at 850.2
As the Majority notes, the resolution of this matter requires employment of the provisions of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. The object of statutory construction is to determine and apply the intent of the Legislature. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); Martin v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Tramp., 588 Pa. 429, 905 A.2d 438, 443 (2006). The most efficacious and statutorily mandated way to achieve this goal is by scrutinizing the language comprising the statute under review. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903 (“Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage”). When, however, the intent of the Legislature cannot be ascertained from the words of the statute alone, the Act provides the intention of the *121General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).
In construing a penal statute we must be mindful of the following caveats:
“[WJhere ambiguity exists in the language of a penal statute, such language should be interpreted in the light most favorable to the accused.... [A] court may not achieve an acceptable construction of a pénal statute by reading into the statute terms that broaden its scope.” [Commonwealth v. Booth, 564 Pa. 228, 766 A.2d 843, 846 (2001)]. Moreover, words and phrases may be added in construing a statute only when the added words are necessary to a proper interpretation, and so long as they do not in any way affect the statute’s scope and operation. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1923(c).
Commonwealth v. Hoke, 599 Pa. 587, 962 A.2d 664, 667 (2009). However, and most importantly for our purposes, “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
In addition, when construing one section of a statute, courts may not read that section separately, but must read it together with and in light of the other sections comprising the statute. Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 536 Pa. 271, 639 A.2d 421, 439 (1994). Finally, a court may presume that the Legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible *122of execution, or unreasonable, and that the Legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1); Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 574 Pa. 620, 832 A.2d 1042, 1050 (2003).
An application of these precepts to the instant matter leads me to conclude that the Majority has erred in interpreting 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) as requiring proof of intoxication while driving. A review of the entire statute and the Legislature’s incorporation of the word after into the statute indicates that, in enacting Section 3802(a)(1), the Legislature intended to prohibit driving, operating, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle following the drinking of an amount of alcohol such that one is rendered incapable of safe driving, and not merely driving while intoxicated. The Legislature’s use of the word “after” in Subsection (a)(1) and in the other parts of Section 3802 cannot be ignored or overlooked. The fact that the other parts of the statute also contain the word “after” demonstrates that the Legislature clearly and plainly intended in Section 3802(a)(1) to punish driving after drinking. Given that the Legislature chose to include this language in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), it is my opinion that the Legislature intended that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) criminalize the consumption of an amount of alcohol such that it renders a person incapable of driving safely within a reasonable time after the consumption of alcohol and not merely driving while intoxicated.
That the Legislature intended Section 3802(a)(1) to punish driving after drinking and not merely driving while intoxicated is evidenced by the legislative history of Act 24. The Commonwealth points out that Act 24 was enacted in place of the prior DUI law to end the need for a battle of experts to determine whether a person was inebriated while actually driving, which arose out of the absorption and dissipation rates of alcohol in the body. Commonwealth’s Brief, 31-32. See also COM. OF PENN. LEGIS. JOURNAL-HOUSE, Sept. 29, 2003, at 1889; Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 561 Pa. 571, 752 A.2d 384, 387 n. 3 (2000). Moreover, the intent of the Legislature to punish driving after drinking is evidenced by the Legislature’s amendment of the DUI statute itself. *123The law provides that a change in the language of a statute ordinarily indicates a change in the legislative intent, Masland v. Bachman, 473 Pa. 280, 374 A.2d 517, 521 (1977), and that the Legislature must be presumed to have intended every word of a statute to have effect. Commonwealth v. Driscoll, 485 Pa. 99, 401 A.2d 312, 315 (1979). Thus, under the law it must be presumed that by amending the statute, the Legislature intended to punish more than driving while intoxicated. Had it been the intent of the Legislature to keep the status quo, it easily could have left Section 3802(a)(1) unchanged from its predecessor statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1) (repealed).3 The fact that the Legislature discarded the “while driving” language utilized in 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1) and replaced it with the current “after imbibing” version of Section 3802(a)(1) manifests that the Legislature intended to punish driving after drinking and not merely driving while intoxicated as the prior statute did.
Accordingly, I would hold that in order to convict a person of violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), the Commonwealth need only prove: 1) imbibing an amount of alcohol sufficient to render a person incapable of safe driving; and 2) proof of driving, operating, or being in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle within a reasonable amount of time after the ingestion of a requisite amount of alcohol sufficient to render a person incapable of safe driving.4 I otherwise join the result reached by the Majority as I agree that the Commonwealth has proved guilt under either interpretation of the statute.5
. Section 3802 was enacted as part of the Act of Sept. 30, 2003, P.L. 120, No. 24, effective Feb. 1, 2004 (“Act 24”). It repealed and replaced the prior DUI statute set forth at Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code.
. The Superior Court arrested judgment with respect to Appellee's conviction under 75 Pa.C.S § 3802(c) because the evidence failed to establish the time at which blood was drawn from Appellee, as required by the wording of this section of the statute. The Commonwealth conceded that the evidence was insufficient to support this charge. Segida, 912 A.2d at 846. In addition, the Superior Court held that Appellee waived constitutionally based challenges to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802 because they had not been raised with sufficient precision in Appellee's Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement. Segida, 912 A.2d at 845. Neither issue is currently before this Court.
. The former statute at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1) and (a)(4) proscribed driving "while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders a person incapable of safe driving,” or driving “while the amount of alcohol by weight in the blood of the person is 0.10% or greater.”
. Although the Legislature did not include a temporal component in Section 3802(a)(1), it is necessary that there be a temporal nexus between the drinking and the driving or else our interpretation of the statute could lead to the absurd result that a person would be in violation of Section 3802(a)(1) if that person ever consumed an amount of alcohol rendering that individual incapable of safe driving.
. I agree with the Majority that in order to obtain a conviction under Section 3802(a)(1), the Commonwealth is not required to present evidence establishing when a person last consumed alcohol.