concurring.
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but I respectfully disagree with both the majority’s and Madame Justice Greenspan’s interpretation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). I agree with Madame Justice Greenspan that under § 3802(a)(1), the Commonwealth need not prove the driver’s condition at the moment of driving, but I reach that conclusion through different reasoning.
“When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). The statute at issue is not free from all ambiguity. When a statute is ambiguous, our object in interpreting it “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” Id., § 1921(a). In furtherance of that effort, we may consider, among other things:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
Id., § 1921(c). We may also presume “[t]hat the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” Id., § 1922(1).
Section 3802(a)(1) states, “An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). This statute is ambiguous because the word “after” can be defined in more than one way, *125and does not express a clear requirement of temporal concurrence of driving and incapability. One could read this statute to mean that once one imbibes to the requisite level, one may never drive again, for any subsequent driving would literally be “after” the imbibing. Such an interpretation, however, would be absurd. Clearly, this is not what “after” means here.
“After” can mean literally any time following the event. See Webster’s New Universal Abridged Dictionary 34 (2d deluxe ed. 1983). This definition is appropriate when interpreting statements such as “After the Civil War, slavery was abolished.” But “after” can also require proximity, meaning “next to.” See id. If a baseball fan asks, “Who bats after Rollins?,” the answer is Victorino. In one sense, everyone in the lineup bats after Rollins — indeed, Rollins eventually bats after himself — but in this context, “after” means “next,” and that is clearly the meaning of the word “after” in this statute. The driving must be temporally proximate to imbibing to the requisite degree; once the requisite inability to drive safely passes as sobriety returns, driving is no longer proximate and one may drive without offending the statute.
However, under § 3802(a)(1), there is no need for proof that inability coexisted with the time of driving. There is only need for proof of imbibing to the requisite degree and the temporally proximate “after” event of driving. Unlike under the prior statute, the two events need not intersect; the proof required is that driving occurred after drinking.
The statutory changes eliminated proof of condition at time of driving, previously an element of the offense. Rather than effectuating the legislature’s clear purpose of condemning driving after too many drinks, the prior element was too often dependent on almost whimsical expert opinion testimony. Cases such as the present one show the salient purpose of the modification to the law that eliminated that element. The officer found a one-car accident but could not tell precisely when it happened; he could make an educated guess about the time of driving, but he could not be specific. He knew the driver had been imbibing before the accident — he had physical *126evidence, an admission, and eventually blood alcohol content test results. The officer could clearly opine the driver was incapable of safely driving at the time the officer arrived, which was after the imbibing. However, to opine that the driver was likewise incapacitated at the time of driving would require some degree of speculation, as the officer did not see the driver while he was driving. Common sense would force the conclusion that incapacity and driving coexisted, but proving the obvious was often problematic, if not impossible. The legislature eliminated this loophole by making it illegal to drink to this extent and drive thereafter; no proof the two coexisted is needed.
This does not mean the prosecution’s burden is absolved. There still must be proof of incapacity, that drinking preceded the driving, and that the pre-driving imbibing caused the incapacity. All that is removed from § 3802 is the need to “relate back” to a precise time of driving. This was the very concept behind the language modification in the DUI statutes, and I respectfully dissent from the contrary interpretation espoused by my colleagues.