dissenting in part and concurring in part.
In my view, the novel question raised by the plaintiff-appellant, and debated in the majority opinion and Judge *141Harrell’s dissenting opinion, is not presented by the record in this case. The issue of whether a one-year or a three-year period of limitations is applicable in defamation actions under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Maryland Code (1984, 2009 RepLVol.), § 12-101 et seq. of the State Government Article, is properly presented only if this case is actually an action under that statute. Although the plaintiff labeled Count I of his corrected amended complaint as an action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, the body of the complaint makes it clear that this is not an action under the Act.1 Instead, the action against the Public Service Commission was barred by sovereign immunity. Moreover, no additional documents filed by the plaintiff, including those filed in response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, changed the nature of the plaintiff’s action as set forth in the complaint.
The only cause of action which the plaintiff possibly had was Count II of the complaint, titled “Individual Liability for Defamation.” I agree with Judges Harrell and Murphy that this alleged cause of action against Kenneth D. Schisler was prohibited by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to defamation actions. See Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 5-105 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
I.
The Maryland Tort Claims Act is codified in §§ 12-101 through 12-110 of the State Government Article of the Maryland Code and § 5-522 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code. Section 12-104 of the State Government Article waives the sovereign immunity of the State and state agencies in tort actions, subject to several exclusions and limitations. When an action falls within one of those exclusions or limitations, “[ijmmunity is not waived” *142(§ 12—104(b) of the State Government Article). Section 12-104(a) and (b) thus provides as follows:
“ § 12-104. Waiver of immunity.
(a) In general.—(1) Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of the State, to the extent provided under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
, (2) The liability of the State and its units may not exceed $200,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence.
(а) Exclusions and limitations.—Immunity is not waived under this section as described under § 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.”
Section 5-522(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article states as follows (emphasis added):
“ § 5-522. Immunity—State and its personnel and units.
(a) Tort liability—Exclusions from waiver under §12-101 of the State Government Article.—Immunity of the State is not waived under § 12-104 of the State Government Article for:
(1) Punitive damages;
(2) Interest before judgment;
(3) A claim that arises from the combatant activities of the State Militia during a state of emergency;
(4) Any tortious act or omission of State personnel that:
(i) Is not within the scope of the public duties of the State personnel; or
(ii) Is made with malice or gross negligence;
(5) A claim by an individual arising from a single incident or occurrence that exceeds $200,000; or
(б) A cause of action that law specifically prohibits.”
*143Consequently, as the statutory language clearly states, a purported action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, based on a tortious act or omission of State personnel that “[i]s made with malice,” is excluded from the Tort Claims Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity and is not covered by the statute. The principle, that no action can be maintained against the State or its agencies under the Maryland Tort Claims Act when the action is based on State personnel conduct falling within an exclusion set forth in the Act, has been recognized by this Court in numerous cases. See, e.g., Newell v. Runnels, 407 Md. 578, 635-639, 967 A.2d 729, 762-765 (2009); Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173-175, 935 A.2d 699, 709-710 (2007); Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 255-258, 863 A.2d 297, 303-305 (2004); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 157-158, 725 A.2d 549, 557 (1999); Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 374-375 n. 14, 597 A.2d 432, 446-447 n. 14 (1991); Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 261-262, 587 A.2d 467, 474 (1991).
Furthermore such an action, against the State or its agencies, is barred by sovereign immunity unless some other enactment by the General Assembly has waived that immunity. See Barbre v. Pope, supra, 402 Md. at 175, 935 A.2d at 710 (“[T]he State does not waive its sovereign immunity for any tortious acts ... when a ‘state personnel’ acts with malice”); Johnson v. Maryland State Police, 331 Md. 285, 296, 628 A.2d 162, 167 (1993) (The Tort Claims Act provides for only a “partial or conditional waiver of sovereign immunity”).
In addition, the Public Service Commission’s reliance upon the statute of limitations argument, rather than upon the coverage of the Tort Claims Act and sovereign immunity, is not a pertinent factor. The “law is well established that counsel for the State or one of its agencies may not either by affirmative action or by failure to plead the defense, waive the defense of [sovereign] immunity,” Board of Education v. Alcrymat Corp., 258 Md. 508, 516, 266 A.2d 349, 353 (1970). Moreover, as Judge Orth stated for this Court in Board v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 583, 366 A.2d 360, 362 (1976), “[w]e must consider whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable in [a] case even though it was not previously *144raised by the parties.” See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland State Police, supra, 331 Md. at 299, 628 A.2d at 169 (Sovereign “ ‘immunity is a non-waivable defense’ ”); Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 460, 545 A.2d 1312, 1320 (1988); Calvert Associates v. Department, 277 Md. 372, 378, 357 A.2d 839, 842 (1976); Chas. E. Brohawn & Bros. v. Board, 269 Md. 164, 166, 304 A.2d 819, 820 (1973).
II.
Under Maryland law, a defamation action cannot be maintained unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that the defamatory statement is false and that the defendant, in making the statement, was guilty of actual malice or negligence. There can “be no recovery without fault in any defamation action.” Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 593, 702 A.2d 230, 246 (1997). See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 175, 352 A.2d 810, 817 (1976); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 594-597, 350 A.2d 688, 696-698 (1976).
Moreover, as a matter of Federal and Maryland constitutional law, if the plaintiff in a defamation action is a public official or public figure, the plaintiff may recover only if the defamatory statement was made with “actual malice.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); Le Marc’s Management Corp. v. Valentin, 349 Md. 645, 650, 709 A.2d 1222, 1225 (1998); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, supra, 347 Md. at 590-591, 702 A.2d at 244-245; Chesapeake Pub. v. Williams, 339 Md. 285, 295, 661 A.2d 1169 (1995); Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 722, 602 A.2d 1191, 1210 (1992); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, supra, 276 Md. at 584-585, 350 A.2d at 691.
Turning to the present case, the complaint discloses that the plaintiff Higginbotham “was employed by Defendant Public Service Commission of the State of Maryland as a Special Assistant, Contract Manager and Public Information Officer Administrator III.... ” If, in light of his position, the plaintiff qualifies as a “public official” or “public figure,” he may not, as *145a matter of law, bring a defamation action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. As pointed out above, a public official or public figure can maintain a defamation action only if the defamatory statement or statements were made with actual malice. Nevertheless, no tort action will lie under the Maryland Tort Claims Act when the state personnel acted with actual malice. Consequently, as a matter of logic, a public official or public figure may not bring a defamation action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. The State and the pertinent state agency will be clothed with sovereign immunity.
If we assume, however, that the plaintiff Higginbotham was not a public official or public figure when the alleged defamation occurred, the result would be the same. The plaintiffs action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act was based entirely upon the conduct of the defendant Kenneth D. Schisler, who was Chairman of the Public Service Commission and the person who allegedly “fired [the plaintiff] without warning and without cause or reason.” The complaint throughout charges that Schisler acted maliciously. The complaint states:
“12. Defendant Schisler made or directed false statements and accusations to be made about Plaintiff to cover up for his illegal acts in terminating the employment of Plaintiff, knowing such statements to be false, or, alternatively, made such statements with reckless disregard for the truth, which said statements impugned Plaintiffs professional reputation, thereby harming the character and reputation of Plaintiff....”
The complaint goes on to state that Schisler “caused Plaintiffs photograph to be posted in the lobby of the Schaefer Office Tower in public view, thereby impugning Plaintiffs business reputation and suggesting criminal and other wrongful conduct on his part.” The complaint continued by asserting
“that Defendant Schisler acted with malice or was grossly negligent. Defendant Schisler committed conscious and deliberate wrongs and also acted with an evil motive, as well as ill will and spite.... ”
*146According to the plaintiff, “Schisler was aware of and knew that the discharges in question ... were illegal under clearly-established law ...,” and that “Schisler concealed his intent to terminate Plaintiff ... and did so without the knowledge of the other Commission members.” The plaintiff claimed that “Schisler participated in an artifice and ruse to purport to ratify the ... termination of Plaintiff____” Neither the complaint nor any subsequent document submitted by the plaintiff contains any hint that Schisler or any other state personnel acted with ordinary negligence.
In numerous cases this Court has held that, within the meaning of the Maryland Tort Claims Act,
“malice is defined as behavior ‘characterized by evil or wrongful motive, intent to injure, knowing and deliberate wrongdoing, ill-will or fraud.’ Barbre, 402 Md. at 182, 935 A.2d at 714 (quoting Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 268, 863 A.2d 297, 311 (2004))....”
Newell v. Runnels, supra, 407 Md. at 638, 967 A.2d at 763. See also, e.g., Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 181-182, 757 A.2d 118, 129 (2000); Shoemaker v. Smith, supra, 353 Md. at 163-164, 725 A.2d at 560; Sawyer v. Humphries, supra, 322 Md. at 261, 587 A.2d at 474.
Under the above definition, or any other definition of “malice,” the plaintiff’s action under the Maryland Tort Claims Act was entirely based on the allegedly malicious conduct of state personnel. Therefore, the action was excluded from the Tort Claims Act, and the Public Service Commission could not be sued because of sovereign immunity.
III.
With respect to the Maryland Tort Claims Act count in the complaint, affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, on a ground other than limitations, might seem at first glance to present a procedural problem. Nevertheless, upon analysis, as well as this Court’s prior opinions, there is no procedural bar to deciding that Count I, on its face, was not an action *147under the Tort Claims Act and that the action against the Public Service Commission was barred by sovereign immunity.
The Circuit Court’s final judgment in this case, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-601, was as follows:
“ORDER
Upon consideration of the Defendants Public Service Commission of Maryland (“PSC”) and Kenneth D. Schisler’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment and memorandum, review of the court file, and argument of the parties, it is this 21st day of February, 2008, by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, hereby ADJUDGED
That this Court finds, as more fully stated on the record in open Court on February 19, 2008, which is hereby incorporated by reference, that Plaintiff knew or should have known as of April 19, 2004, of the injury claimed, and the claim(s) in the Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiff on April 16, 2007, is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and that the Amended Complaint does not relate back to the original complaint filed January 6, 2006. And it is,
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. And further,
ORDERED, that judgment be entered in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff.
Costs to be paid by Plaintiff.”
The trial court, in the first two paragraphs of the above-quoted order, referred to both the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment, and decided that the “claim(s) in the Amended Complaint filed by the Plaintiff ... is barred by the Statute of Limitations.... ” The next line of the judgment, however, granted the motion for summary judgment. There was no express ruling on the motion to dismiss.
It is a “rule of Maryland procedure that, in appeals from grants of summary judgment, Maryland appellate courts, as a general rule, will consider only the grounds upon which the [trial] court relied in granting summary judgment.” Lovelace *148v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 729 (2001) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks deleted). See, e.g., Gourdine v. Crews, 405 Md. 722, 736, 955 A.2d 769, 777-778 (2008); Bednar v. Provident Bank, 402 Md. 532, 542, 937 A.2d 210, 216 (2007); Ross v. Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 659, 876 A.2d 692, 698 (2005); Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 10, 816 A.2d 844, 849 (2003); Gresser v. Anne Arundel County, 349 Md. 542, 552, 709 A.2d 740, 745 (1998); Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 588, 594 A.2d 121, 136 (1991).
The principle, that an appellate court reviews the grant of summary judgment on the ground relied upon by the trial court, is far from absolute. This Court’s opinions regularly qualify the principle. See Lovelace v. Anderson, supra, 366 Md. at 696, 785 A.2d. at 729 (The “ ‘appellate court will not ordinarily’ ” affirm summary judgment on a ground not ruled upon by the trial court) (emphasis added); Gresser v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 349 Md. at 552, 709 A.2d at 745 (“ ‘Where the judgment appealed from is entered on motion for summary judgment, the appellate court ordinarily will review only the issue decided by the circuit court,’ ” quoting T.H.E. Ins. v. P.T.P. Inc., 331 Md. 406, 409 n. 2, 628 A.2d 223, 224 n. 2 (1993), emphasis added); Boyer v. State, supra, 323 Md. at 588, 594 A.2d at 136 (same); Three Garden v. USF & G, 318 Md. 98, 107-108, 567 A.2d 85, 89 (same); Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 313 Md. 301, 314 n. 5, 545 A.2d 658, 664 n. 5 (1988) (same).
This Court has recognized that the principle discussed above is inapplicable under various circumstances. For example, when the ground relied upon by the trial court in granting summary judgment and the alternate ground are interrelated, the principle has not been applied. Eid v. Duke, supra, 373 Md. at 10, 816 A.2d at 849; Ross v. Board of Elections, supra, 387 Md. at 659, 876 A.2d at 698. The principle is inapplicable when “exceptional circumstances” are present. Gresser v. Anne Arundel County, supra, 349 Md. at 552, 709 A.2d at 745.
Another exception to the principle was set forth by Judge Rodowsky for the Court in Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medi*149cal Center, supra, 313 Md. at 314 n. 5, 545 A.2d at 664 n. 5 (emphasis added):
“On an appeal from the grant of a summary judgment which is reversible because of error in the grounds relied upon by the trial court the appellate court will not ordinarily undertake to sustain the judgment by ruling on another ground, not ruled upon by the trial court, if the alternative ground is one as to which the trial court had a discretion to deny summary judgment.”
The above-quoted language from Geisz has since been reaffirmed by this Court. See Lovelace v. Anderson, supra, 366 Md. at 696, 785 A.2d at 729; Three Garden v. USF & G, supra, 318 Md. at 107-108, 567 A.2d at 89-90.
In the present case, although the trial court designated the motion for summary judgment as the motion being granted, the court’s action was based upon the complaint. It was, in substance, no different from a grant of the motion to dismiss.
Moreover sovereign immunity, where applicable, is a threshold bar to the action against the State or a state agency. In addition, sovereign immunity is a much less debatable ground in this case than the limitations issue which has divided the Court. Even if the trial court’s action is treated as a grant of summary judgment, the sovereign immunity alternative ground is not “one as to which the trial court had a discretion to deny summary judgment.” Geisz v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, supra, 313 Md. at 314 n. 5, 545 A.2d at 664 n. 5. Furthermore, “exceptional circumstances” are present in this case.
Accordingly, I would not reach the Tort Claims Act limitations issue. Instead, with regard to the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Public Service Commission, I would uphold the judgment on the ground of sovereign immunity.
. The record in this case shows that the plaintiff filed a complaint, an amended complaint, and a corrected amended complaint. As indicated in Judge Murphy’s opinion for the Court, the corrected amended complaint is the viable pleading setting out the plaintiff’s asserted cause of action. In this opinion, the word "complaint” will refer to the corrected amended complaint.