concurring.
I join Chief Justice Cappy’s interpretation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738, as I believe subsection (b) provides a named insured the option of waiving both inter- and intra-policy stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and that option is not undone by subsections (c) and (d), even though the language of those subsections seems to speak to the intrapolicy situation alone.
I write separately to address the household vehicle exclusion in Randall’s policy, see Majority Op., 586 Pa. at 488-92, 895 A.2d at 533-34, which State Farm argues is valid and enforceable. While the majority does not reach a discussion of this clause, I believe the clause also precludes the Craleys’ recovery of uninsured motorist benefits under Randall’s poli*508cy. This clause is similar to household vehicle exclusion clauses this Court previously has held enforceable. See Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 813 A.2d 747, 755 (2002) (household exclusion consistent with public policy of MVFRL); Eichelman v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 551 Pa. 558, 711 A.2d 1006, 1010 (1998) (household exclusion enforceable as it furthers legislative policy behind underinsured motorist coverage in MVFRL and furthers MVFRL’s intent of stopping spiralling costs of automobile insurance). There is no reason, public policy or otherwise, to not enforce this exclusion.
For the reasons offered above, I concur.