The plaintiff-appellant, Hobbs, has an interest in two businesses located in Preston, Idaho and Franklin, Idaho, that are licensed to sell beer in Franklin County. On April 28, 1980, Franklin County Commissioners passed an ordinance (1) banning the sale of keg beer within Franklin County and (2) making it illegal for any person, not a licensed wholesaler or dealer, to possess a keg of beer in the unincorporated areas of Franklin County.1 This ordinance, 80-1, went into effect on May 1, 1980. On May 28, 1980, Hobbs filed a declaratory judgment action against the Franklin County Commissioners, the Franklin County Clerk, the Sheriff for Franklin County and the County. Hobbs claimed that the ordinance prohibited him from carrying on a lawful business and asked that the district court declare the ordinance void. Hobbs filed a motion for summary judgment on July 16, 1980. After a hearing the district court declared that ordinance 80-1 was valid and enforceable and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Hobbs appealed this decision.
The respondents preliminarily challenge the appellant’s right to proceed by way of a declaratory judgment action. I.C. § 10-1202, the statute controlling who may bring a declaratory judgment action, states that,
“[a]ny person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.”
The respondents claim that following this statute the declaratory judgment action is *207improper because the appellant, a retailer, is attempting to establish his right to sell beer in kegs under I.C. § 23-1007 and § 23-1007 only refers to wholesalers and dealers.2 Because the appellant has no rights under I.C. § 23-1007 the respondents argue that he is not affected by the ordinance.
The appellant is only relying on I.C. § 23-1007 in an attempt to persuade this Court that the county ordinance is unconstitutional because a conflict exists between this state statute and the county ordinance. He alleges that a conflict exists because the statute gives him the right to sell beer in kegs and the county ordinance now forbids him from selling beer in kegs. Even assuming he has no statutory right to sell beer under I.C. § 23-1007, his status was affected because before the passage of the ordinance he was able to sell beer in kegs and after its passage he was prohibited from selling beer in kegs. Therefore, we hold that he is a proper party to challenge the validity of the section of the ordinance that prohibits the sale of beer in kegs in Franklin County.
The main argument raised by the appellant is that this ordinance is unconstitutional under Article 12, § 2 of the Idaho State Constitution. It provides:
“Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws.”
This Court has stated that there are three general restrictions that apply to ordinances enacted under the authority conferred by this constitutional provision: “(1) the ordinance or regulation must be confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the same, (2) it must not be in conflict with other general laws of the state, and (3) it must not be an unreasonable or arbitrary enactment.” State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 374, 399 P.2d 955, 960 (1965).
Concerning the first restriction, that the ordinance must be confined to the limits of the governmental body enacting the ordinance, the appellant argued before this Court that the portion of the ordinance prohibiting the sale of beer in kegs in “Franklin County” applies to incorporated municipalities within the county, and therefore, the ordinance should be found void. He argued it should be void because a county has no power to prescribe police regulations effective within a municipality.
This Court has previously held that following Article 12, § 2 of the Idaho State Constitution, a county cannot make police regulations effective within a municipality. Clyde Hess Distributing Co. v. Bonneville County, 69 Idaho 505, 510, 210 P.2d 798, 801 (1949), cited with approval in Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968). It is irrelevant that the ordinance in question is not in conflict with any existing ordinance of a municipality because “[t]he question is one of power and not one of conflict.” Id. at 511, 210 P.2d at 801. However, “[t]he fact that the regulation in question does not, in terms, exclude municipalities, does not make it invalid in the territory to which it is applicable.” Id. at 512, 210 P.2d at 802. Therefore, while the Franklin County ordinance is without force and effect within the limits of the incorporated municipalities located in Franklin County, the failure to expressly exclude municipalities does not invalidate the ordinance.
*208The appellant’s businesses are both located in incorporated towns, but as stated above, the ordinance can only apply to the unincorporated areas of the county. The possession portion of the ordinance specifically states that it only applies to the “unincorporated areas of Franklin County.” Because of this the ordinance does not affect the appellant’s activities within the incorporated municipalities in Franklin County. Thus, this Court will not address the remaining constitutional arguments challenging the portion of the ordinance that prohibits the selling and possessing of keg beer in the unincorporated areas of the county.
The district court issued a memorandum opinion concluding that the ordinance was valid and then requested counsel for the defendant to submit “proposed findings and conclusions and a proposed judgment” in accordance with the memorandum opinion. However, the appellant’s Notice of Appeal was filed prior to the trial court’s entering any declaratory judgment in this matter but the record indicates that the district judge intended to enter a judgment in accordance with his decision and the parties did stipulate on appeal that the Memorandum Decision should act as a judgment. Therefore, based on the trial court’s statement in his Memorandum Decision and the parties’ stipulation this Court can consider this civil matter, but because a formal judgment is not a part of the record, we remand with directions to enter a declaratory judgment consistent with this opinion.
No costs or attorney fees on appeal.
BAKES, J., and McFADDEN, J., Pro Tern, concur. SHEPARD, J., concurs in the result.. The pertinent sections read:
“SECTION TWO
UNLAWFUL TO SELL BEER “It shall be unlawful for any person by himself, his or her employees or agents to sell, or to expose or keep for sale directly or indirectly upon any premises, any keg of beer within Franklin County, State of Idaho. This ordinance shall not prohibit the dispensing of beer from kegs for sale on the premises of licensed beer retailers.”
“SECTION THREE
POSSESSION OF KEGS
“1. It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, consume, or possess either solely or jointly with another, any beer in a keg in the unincorporated areas of Franklin County, State of Idaho, except that persons licensed as manufacturers and distributors and other licensed individuals, possessing a valid license to possess keg beer issued by a political subdivision of the State of Idaho may possess keg beer for the purpose of transportation through Franklin County or other lawful purposes within Franklin County.”
. Prior to the 1982 amendment I.C. § 23-1007 stated:
“SALES BY DEALERS AND WHOLESALERS — PROHIBITED UNLESS OBTAINED FROM LICENSEES — CONSUMPTION ON PREMISES PROHIBITED — MINIMUM SALE ON LICENSED PREMISES OF UNBROKEN PACKAGES OR KEGS. — It shall be unlawful for any dealer or wholesaler to sell, or dispose for use, within the state of Idaho any beer produced, manufactured, imported or bought by such dealer except through licensed dealers, wholesalers or retailers; nor shall any dealer or wholesaler allow for a consideration such beer to be consumed upon the premises of such dealer or wholesaler; provided, however, that any dealer or wholesaler shall be allowed to make sales of beer in unbroken packages or kegs of not less than four (4) gallons to a consumer at his licensed premises.”