(dissenting) — This matter is before us upon a writ of certiorari issued, pursuant to the order of the Chief Justice on August 28, 1969, to review a certain order granting a temporary injunction and denying a writ of mandate entered by the Superior Court for Thurston County on August 27, 1969 in a certain action pending wherein Paul Irwin et al. were plaintiffs and Wes Estes et al. (the county commissioners and county auditor) were defendants.
The complaint filed August 22, 1969 (which is designated as Complaint in Nuisance) alleged that plaintiffs were residents of the town of Tenino and that the New American Community, Inc. was proposing to conduct a “rock festival,”2 at a certain location near the town, which more *298than 50,000 persons were expected to attend. In sub-paragraphs g. and h. of the first cause of action it is alleged:
g. That activities conducted at prior operations of similar rock festivals indicate that many of the patrons engage in loud and boisterous conduct, trespassing and going over property of other persons, drinking and consuming intoxicating liquor in excessive amounts and on many occasions, conducting themselves in a lewd and dissolute manner; that many of the patrons attending prior rock festivals may be expected to attend the proposed festival and it is reasonable to anticipate that their conduct will annoy, injure or endanger the safety, health, comfort and repose of this plaintiff and others in Tenino similarly situated and will render him insecure in or essentially interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or the use of his property.
h. That the defendants proposed to issue a license or permit for such a public exposition or show for the dates of August 30, 31 and September 1, 1969; that the operation so contemplated constitutes a nuisance.
A second cause of action alleged that plaintiff C. T. Jensen resided in an area immediately joining and adjacent to the location of the proposed rock festival where he had about 80 head of cattle, and that at prior rock festivals the participants have appropriated livestock to their personal use for food purposes; that there was real danger the aforesaid plaintiff may be damaged in the loss of his livestock. This second cause of action also contains the same allegations as quoted above regarding the proposed activities of the applicant for the license constituting a public nuisance.
Plaintiff Fred Martin, in a third cause of action, alleged that he owned a parcel of land immediately south of the location of the rock festival and that the premises were presently unoccupied but had substantial growing timber thereon and an unoccupied house and barn of substantial value. It is then alleged in sub-paragraphs b, c and d of the third cause of action:
b. That there is inadequate housing proposed for the patrons of the “rock festival” and that it is probable that many of the patrons will come upon the property of this plaintiff causing damage to his house' and barn. • ■
*299c. That there is considerable dry grass and hay growing on the premises which grass and hay is quite inflammable in nature and it is quite possible that a fire may be started in this dry grass and spreading to the timber and buildings located on this plaintiff’s property.
d. An emergency exists and an order should be entered restraining and enjoining the defendants from issuing any permit until a hearing can be held on this complaint.
Then follow allegations similar to the first two causes of action relating to the manner of conducting prior rock festivals and state that the operation of the contemplated one constituted a nuisance.
For a fourth cause of action plaintiff Myrtle Mann alleged she was the owner and resided on certain described real estate adjacent to the location of the proposed rock festival site and further stated:
That she is advised and given to understand that numerous of the patrons attending this type of enterprise are engaged in the use of narcotics or other drug substances and while under the influence of these drugs will likely conduct themselves in a lewd and dissolute manner and trespass or otherwise enter on adjacent property and cause damage thereon; that plaintiff’s home residence is immediately across the road from the large field of the proposed tract and that the loud noise will disturb this plaintiff’s health, comfort and repose and that it is likely to interfere with her safety and comfortable enjoyment of her property.
She averred that the defendant county officers proposed to issue a license for such rock festival and that the contemplated operation thereof constituted a nuisance.
Plaintiff James Nelson alleged that he was the owner of real property in the immediate vicinity of the rock festival site on which he was running a large number of livestock and that:
this plaintiff is running a large number of livestock in this area; that it is probable that the patrons of the proposed enterprise may come upon the property of this plaintiff and frighten or damage or otherwise interfere with plaintiff’s livestock; that the premises is covered *300with dry grass which is quite inflammable and that there is a strong likelihood that a fire may be started destroying much valuable property belonging to plaintiff and damaging or destroying his livestock; that said probable conduct is an unreasonable hazard to this plaintiff’s enjoyment of the use of his property.
The plaintiffs prayed that an order be entered by the court determining that the proposed facility was a nuisance and forbidding the issuance of a license therefor by defendants.
A temporary restraining order was entered (based on the affidavit of Paul Irwin) restraining defendants from issuing a license until a hearing was had by the court. Defendants were cited to appear on August 26, 1969.
On August 25, 1969 defendants, through the prosecuting attorney, moved for an order joining the New American Community, Inc. and John Chambless, its director, as parties defendant in the action.
On the same day the court issued a show cause order directed to the New American Community, Inc. and John Chambless, its director, requiring them to appear at the hearing set for August 26, 1969. At this hearing it was stipulated by all parties that the corporation and its director be deemed intervenors in the action.
On August 26, 1969 New American Community, Inc. and John Chambless, its director, filed a cross-claim for a writ of mandamus directing the county auditor to issue a license to operate a rock festival pursuant to their application or show cause why he has not done so. The affidavit of John Chambless in support thereof stated that on August 10, 1969 he had attempted to make application for such license and was advised to apply again on August 25. Meanwhile, on August 21, the prosecuting attorney advised affiant not to make an application at that time.
Also on August 26 the corporation and its director filed a motion to quash defendants’ order to show cause (which was set for hearing on that date) on three grounds: (1) No showing that defendants had grounds for issuance of a temporary injunction; (2) The county commissioners and *301county auditor had no standing to apply for injunctive relief; and (3) Defendants had an adequate remedy at law (if one be necessary).
On the same day the Trans West Company was permitted to intervene as an additional plaintiff. It owned the timber located on the real property owned by the plaintiff Myrtle Mann.
During the hearing on the order to show cause the Northern Pacific Railway Company was permitted to intervene. Its main line tracks running between Seattle and Portland pass through the area where the festival was to be held. At this point its tracks are on a fill which is approximately 27 feet above the level of festival terrain.
The hearing lasted 2 days. In addition to the five plaintiffs and the director of the proposed rock festival, nine witnesses testified at the hearing. It concluded at 8:05 p.m. on August 27, 1969 after the trial court had announced its decision that it would grant the temporary injunction enjoining the New American Community, Inc. and its agents and representatives from sponsoring and conducting the proposed festival, such injunction to become effective upon the filing of a $25,000 injunction bond. No such bond was filed.
The trial court’s order so provided and also dismissed the defendants county commissioners and county auditor as not being proper parties to the action.
The order contained the following findings:
Witnesses having been sworn and testimony having been taken, the Court find that the interest of plaintiffs, defendants, second intervenors, and third intervenors are of common nature and that they will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiffs and that first intervenor’s interests are adverse and that they will hereinafter be referred to as defendants. The Court further finds
That the defendants propose to conduct a festival on certain property approximately two miles north of the Town of Tenino and adiacent to the Tenino-Olympia road and that the plaintiffs have complained that the operation of the festival will constitute a nuisance. The Court finds
*302That the area is rural in type, that access to the festival premises is gained over the Tenino-Olympia road which is two-lane in nature. That the festival will be conducted on the dates of August 30, 31, and September 1, 1969, and that approximately twenty-five thousand (25,000) people would be expected to attend the festival each day. The Court further finds
That the notice of the proposed festival came to public attention on or after August 15, 1969, and that the pattern of prior festivals indicate that some of the persons attending, although few in relation to the total number, are susceptible to criminal acts and that the Court would be derelict in its duty to permit an event to occur knowing possibilities of major infractions of the law as it now exists. The Court further finds
That the tremendous influx of people as will be anticipated over the weekend will unreasonably inconvenience the surrounding property owners, the residents of the Tenino area and of Southern Thurston County, and that adequate advance planning has not been made to protect the interest of the various plaintiffs in their lives, property, comfort and convenience, and as a result, the Court is of the conclusion that the proposed festival constitutes a nuisance private in nature to the immediate property owners and public in nature to the residents of the general area.
Proceedings in the Supreme Court
On August 28, 1969 the New American Community, Inc. and John Chambless petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari seeking a review of the trial court’s order “because the judgment was erroneous and exceeded the jurisdiction of said court and there is no speedy and adequate remedy at law.”
On the same day the Chief Justice entered an order for the issuance of the writ, the operative portion of which read as follows:
It is hereby ordered that a Writ of Certiorari, alternatively or in conjunction therewith, petition for writ of mandate issue out of and under the seal of this Court directed to Judge Frank Baker, commanding him forthwith to certify fully and return to this court at 9:00 o’clock on the 29th day of August, 1969, a full and com*303píete transcript of the record and proceedings therein, with the intent that the same be reviewed by this Court as to said claim by petitioners that said proceedings and judgment in said cause were contrary to law.
Because of the emergent time element it was impossible for the trial court to certify and transmit to the Supreme Court at 9 a.m. on August 29, 1969 a full and complete transcript of the record and proceedings in this case. A transcript of the pleadings and the orders of the trial court have been filed in this court, but no statement of facts has been certified and filed, as required by ROA 1-57(g)(4).3 While the minutes of the hearing indicate that a total of 15 witnesses testified in the trial, this court cannot know what their testimony was. From the allegations of the complaint and the trial court’s findings, the only inference to be drawn is that much of the testimony related the conduct of patrons at prior rock festivals.
At 10 a.m. on August 29, 1969 the matter was presented to this court pursuant to the order for the issuance of the writ of certiorari. Counsel for all of the parties who had appeared in the trial court were present and presented their respective arguments in support of their clients’ positions.
After the hearing an order was entered in which a majority of the justices who had heard the arguments of counsel and had participated in the hearing held: (1) That since no bond had been posted, the temporary injunction was ineffective; and (2) That the denial by the trial court of the New American Community, Inc.’s motion for a writ of mandate directing the county auditor to issue a license for holding the “festival” was erroneous, and this court directed that the license be issued to the applicants forthwith. It was further stated in the order that a majority and a dissenting opinion would follow.
*304Presumably the license was issued immediately on the filing of this court’s order and the rock festival was held on August 30, 31 and September 1,1969.
Conceding that the temporary injunction never became effective because the required bond was not posted, I am constrained to dissent from the action of the majority in directing the county auditor to issue a license to the promoters of the rock festival for three reasons: (1) The county auditor was not then a party to the action since the trial court had dismissed him as a party defendant; (2) The trial court found that the proposed rock festival constituted a public and private nuisance; and (3) The trial court’s record was not certified or authenticated as required in causes on appeal in compliance with ROA 1-57(g)(4), supra, 'and ROA 1-37. The certification of a statement of facts in causes on appeal must be signed by the trial judge.
In the absence of a certified statement of facts, this court cannot review any factual issues, but must accept the findings of the trial court as verities. Clark v. Fowler, 58 Wn.2d 435, 363 P.2d 812 (1961). Thus, in this case this court is bound by the finding that the proposed rock festival constituted a public and private nuisance and, in my opinion, on review of the trial court’s order this court should have affirmed its dismissal of the county auditor.
The rock festival is of very recent origin and there appear to be no decisions of courts of last resort dealing with the question of whether such gatherings constitute nuisances (either public or private). There are, however, numerous decisions relating to public dance halls and public dances as nuisances. There is an exhaustive annotation on this subject appended to the decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Barrett v. Lopez, 57 N.M. 697, 262 P.2d 981 (1953) which is found in Annot. 44 A.L.R.2d 1377 (1955).
In Section 9 of the annotation (at 1396) a number of cases are cited which hold that on the issue of nuisance it is immaterial whether or not the defendant has received a license from the local authorities to operate a public dance *305at a designated location. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Amusements and Exhibitions § 40, pp. 161-62 (1962).
Two decisions of this court are in accord with this rule. The proposed operation of a trade school at the Webster School in Spokane was enjoined as a nuisance (even though the legislature had expressly authorized the operation of trade schools by school districts) because of the location and all other factors involved, as pointed out by the majority of this court in Shields v. Spokane School Dist. 81, 31 Wn.2d 247, 196 P.2d 352 (1948). A similar result was arrived at by this court in Bruskland v. Oak Theater, Inc., 42 Wn.2d 346, 254 P.2d 1035 (1953) regarding the operation of a motion picture theater in a location zoned for such business. The court held that it was not the showing of motion pictures or the noise of the sound track that created the nuisance, but the part of the business involved in getting patrons on and off the premises.
In light of the authorities cited above, it is my opinion that the trial court’s findings (quoted above) must be considered as verities and, accordingly, it should be held that the proposed rock festival constituted a public and private nuisance. I cannot agree with the majority in holding that this court should direct the county auditor to issue the license therefor, because I do not think that a court of equity should in any manner foster the maintenance of a nuisance.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Justice Donworth is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Const, art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38).
The full name' of the festival according to its promoters was Sky River Rock Festival and Lighter Than Air Fair.
“Filing Record and Proceedings. Within the time allowed for the service and filing of his opening brief, the petitioner shall file with the clerk of the supreme court such portion of the record and proceedings in the superior court as is needed for the purpose of reviewing the application or the determination. The record shall be certified or authenticated as in causes on appeal.”