I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the judgment of the Court of Appeal upholding defendant’s sentence. I do so under compulsion of People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279] (Vera), in which a majority of this court held that violation of a defendant’s statutory right to a jury trial of an alleged prior conviction enhancement is not a structural error and, hence, is waived by a defendant’s failure to object in the trial court. By parity of reasoning, a violation of the right is subject to harmless error analysis. Here, although defendant essentially objected because he moved to strike the prior convictions on the ground the trial court did not permit the jury to decide whether the convictions were “serious” under the “Three Strikes” law, the undisputed facts show a properly instructed jury could have reached no conclusion other than that defendant’s prior burglary convictions were residential and, hence, qualified as serious. Accordingly, the error in removing the question from the jury must be deemed harmless.
I dissent, however, from the majority’s determination that defendant had no right to a jury trial as to whether his prior convictions qualified as serious felonies. As in People v. Wiley (1995) 9 Cal.4th 580 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d 541] (Wiley), here, too, a majority of this court misapprehends the meaning and import of Penal Code1 sections 1025 and 1158, thereby depriving criminal defendants in California, charged with having suffered prior felony convictions, of the most basic procedural protection granted them by our Legislature: the right to a jury determination of the truth .of those charges. Compounding its error, the majority in this case also disregards the clear import of a post-Wiley statutory amendment to section 1025. As a result, defendant will suffer a 25-year-to-life prison term without ever having had a jury determine whether his prior burglary convictions in fact qualified as serious felonies mandating his sentence under our Three Strikes law.
*460As the majority recognizes, defendant’s entitlement to a jury determination of the truth of his alleged prior felony convictions is based on neither the state nor the federal Constitution. (Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 585-586; Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 286 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) Rather, the matter is governed by two statutory provisions: sections 1025 and 1158. Section 1025, at the time of defendant’s crime, provided in pertinent part that “[wjhen a defendant who is charged in the accusatory pleading with having suffered a previous conviction pleads either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged against him, he must be asked whether he has suffered such previous conviction. . . . If he answers that he has not, his answer must be entered in the minutes of the court, and the question whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction must be tried by the jury which tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty, or in case of a plea of guilty, by a jury impaneled for that purpose, or by the court if a jury is waived.” (Stats. 1951, ch. 1674, § 88, p. 3844, italics added.)2 Section 1158, in turn, provides that “[wjhenever the fact of a previous conviction of another offense is charged in an accusatory pleading, and the defendant is found guilty of the offense with which he is charged, the jury, or the judge if a jury trial is waived, must . . . find whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction.” (Italics added.)
By these statutes, the Legislature has decreed that criminal defendants are entitled to have a jury determine whether or not they have suffered an alleged prior conviction for a serious felony. The majority ignores the plain meaning of these statutes to conclude a defendant’s right is limited to having a jury determine whether the defendant “has suffered” the prior, not whether the prior was for a “serious felony” as defined by section 1192.7, subdivision (c).3 To reach this erroneous conclusion, the majority engages in the same flawed reasoning that led astray a majority of this court in Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th 580. Thus, the majority asserts the issue is more appropriate for the trial court because it is “ ‘largely legal in nature’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 455) and is an issue “traditionally” resolved by trial judges (id. at pp. 456-457). Neither reason withstands scrutiny.
*461As I explained in my dissenting opinion in Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 598, “the majority’s construction ignores the actual language of the provisions relied on. Under sections 1025 and 1158, the defendant must admit or deny, and if denied, the People must prove the defendant suffered ‘such previous conviction.’ The antecedent of ‘such’ in section 1025 is the previous conviction ‘charged in the accusatory pleading.’ The charge of a prior serious felony conviction, within the meaning of sections 667 and 1192.7, impliedly alleges all of the necessary factual elements of the enhancement. [Citations.] Consequently, a defendant’s denial of a prior conviction alleged in the information puts at issue all facts necessary to the enhancement, i.e., each factual element of the charge. [Citation.]” (Dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., fn. omitted.) In other words, sections 1025 and 1158 require a jury trial on all the elements of the particular enhancement alleged under the Three Strikes law, not merely the general question whether the defendant suffered a specified prior conviction. Hence, these sections require the jury to determine, in those circumstances where the mere specification of the alleged prior does not, whether the prior conviction was in fact for an offense that qualifies as a “serious” felony.
Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th 580, does not compel the result in this case. Wiley held only that the determination of whether proven prior serious felony convictions had been “brought and tried separately” was a legal question for the court. (Id. at p. 590.) In extending Wiley to apply to the determination whether a defendant’s alleged priors were such as would qualify as “serious,” the majority impliedly rejects this court’s distinction in Wiley between the factual determination whether the defendant had suffered two prior convictions of serious felonies, a question for the jury, and the legal question whether the two priors had been brought and tried separately, a matter for the court. (Ibid.) The majority thus perpetuates the error made in that case, refusing to give weight to the Legislature’s considered judgment that— despite the absence of a constitutional obligation—criminal defendants should be protected from erroneous determinations of their status by requiring a jury to resolve this important question. Enactment of the Three Strikes law, in which prior felony convictions can be the trigger for imposition of a life sentence, makes such caution all the more important.
Of particular significance, in my view, is that since we decided Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th 580, the Legislature has acted, amending section 1025 by adding the language in subdivision (c): “Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (b) [providing for trial of alleged priors by jury], the question of whether the defendant is the person who has suffered the prior conviction shall be tried by the court without a jury.” It thus appears the Legislature, presumably cognizant of Wiley, determined to remove from the jury and give *462to the trial court one aspect of the prior felony determination—the offender’s identity. The obvious implication of subdivision (c) is that by excepting the question of the offender’ s identity from the general jury trial requirement—a requirement this court acknowledged in Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pages 589-590—the Legislature assumed the remainder of the determination would be for the jury, as in fact it was in Wiley, where the jury made the determination the defendant “had suffered two prior convictions of serious felonies under section 667(a)” (id. at p. 590). Had the Legislature believed otherwise, it would have had no reason specifically to amend the law to give to the trial court the determination of identity.
The majority misinterprets the amendment to section 1025, reasoning the new language narrows the jury’s role rather than expands it. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 458.) Certainly subdivision (c) narrows the jury’s role for questions of identity; it eliminates that role. The clear implication, however, is that for the balance of the component parts of the inquiry the jury is the proper trier of fact. To conclude the amendment to section 1025 leaves intact the jury’s role in determining the remaining components of the prior felony conviction determination is not to “expand” anything; it is merely to leave for the jury that which it has always had, i.e., the duty to decide “whether or not [an accused] has suffered such previous conviction” (§§ 1025, 1158), in this case, a previous conviction for a serious felony.4
The evidence being undisputed that defendant’s prior convictions were in fact serious, as defined by section 1192.7, subdivision (c), the error in this case must be deemed harmless under the reasoning of this court’s opinion in Vera, supra, 15 Cal.4th 269. I concur in the court’s judgment today on that *463basis alone. Because, however, the majority’s opinion extends Wiley to deprive criminal defendants of that which the Legislature has granted them, namely, a right to a jury determination of the seriousness of prior felony convictions alleged against them, I dissent from the opinion.
A11 statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The current version of section 1025 is essentially the same, with the exception of the addition of new language appearing in subdivision (c), discussed post. (See Stats. 1997, ch. 95, § 1.)
In most instances, the question will be one and the same. That is, a jury that finds a defendant has suffered a prior conviction for one of the offenses listed in section 1192.7, subdivision (c) will, by definition, have found he committed a felony that is “serious.” With respect to residential burglary, however, the matter is more complicated. A mere finding, as here, that defendant previously was convicted of the crime of burglary is insufficient to determine his prior was “serious.” That determination requires the further finding (here, made by the court) that the burglary was “of an inhabited dwelling house ... or the inhabited portion of any other building” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(18)).
I agree with the majority that “[t]he legislative history of the amendment to section 1025 is inconclusive.” (Maj. opn., ante,' at p. 458.) Although the majority reads the legislative history to support its position, there is contrary evidence. For example, an Assembly report notes the following: “2) Since This Bill States that the Judge Determines Who Suffered the Prior Conviction, What Is the Jury’s Role Concerning that Conviction? When the prosecutor alleges in a criminal complaint or information that the defendant suffered a particular prior conviction, there are several potential issues (although it is rare for a defendant to raise more than one or two of them): [H] Was someone convicted? What was the offense? What is the date of the conviction? In what court was the person convicted? Is the defendant the person who suffered the prior conviction? In some cases, there are additional questions, such as was the defendant sentenced to prison based on that conviction? How long has the defendant been out of custody since he or she suffered the prior conviction? fl[] Under current law, the jury determines all of these questions (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1146 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 19, 1997, p. 2, underscoring in original, italics added.)
The historical record thus contains significant evidence that the Legislature, in amending section 1025 to provide that the offender’s identity should be decided by the trial court, believed the balance of the decision whether the accused suffered a prior serious felony conviction would be made by the jury.