Concurs in Part/Dissents in Part.
¶ 1 Although I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm Appellant’s Judgment and Sentence regarding Counts II and III, I dissent to the decision to affirm Count I. I would find that Appellant’s argument in Proposition I is meritorious, holding that Appellant’s convictions for both Larceny from a House and Larceny of an Automobile violated the statutory prohibition against double punishment under 21 O.S.1991, § 11. The evidence presented at trial supported the finding that Appellant stole the purse from the house with the ultimate objective of taking the truck keys from it and stealing the truck. This holding is supported by this Court’s analysis of section 11 in Hale v. State, 1995 OK CR 7, 888 P.2d 1027.
*128¶2 Although the majority states that its decision to uphold each of the larceny convictions is supported by an analysis under Hale, it goes on to criticize Hale, rejecting much of the language found therein. The majority claims, without recitation of authority, that Hale is not based upon proper statutory construction and contains language which goes beyond what the legislature intended. It rejects as unfounded the language in Hale which holds that section 11 prohibits double punishment for crimes which are mere means to some other “ultimate objective,” or part of a “primary offense.” The majority dismisses this language as having no precedent in Oklahoma. In so ruling, the majority has disregarded a significant line of cases dating back to 1971, in which this Court utilized the language to which the majority objects. A thorough reading of Hale reveals that these cases are noted therein. See Hale, 1995 OK CR 7, at ¶ 3, n. 1, 888 P.2d at 1028, n. 1.
¶ 3 A review of these early cases reveals that this Court gave significant consideration to its statutory construction of section 11. The Court noted in Shackelford v. State, 1971 OK CR 49, 481 P.2d 163, that California had enacted a code provision identical to section 11. The Supreme Court of California had ruled in Neal v. State, 55 Cal.2d 11, 9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 611, 357 P.2d 839, 843-44 (1960), that under the California statutory prohibition against double punishment, “[i]f all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” In Shackelford, 1971 OK CR 49, at ¶¶ 5-8, 481 P.2d at 165, this Court found this statutory construction to be sound and persuasive. Accordingly, I find that the majority’s rejection of this Court’s analysis in Hale is unnecessary to the disposition of this case and is not based upon established precedent.