(concurring specially).
While I agree with the majority that the result reached in this case is correct, I come to the conclusion on much narrower grounds. I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of “church,” because it too narrowly defines “church” and “religion” for constitutional purposes.
This court’s duty in reviewing tax cases has been defined in other cases. Decisions of this court indicate that a decision of the Tax Court will not be disturbed on appeal if it has any reasonable basis in law. See Red Owl Stores v. Commissioner, 264 Minn. 1, 5, 117 N.W.2d 401, 405 (1962); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 245 Minn. 346, 368, 71 N.W.2d 797, 811 (1955). “[T]he function of this court in reviewing a decision of the board of tax appeals involving questions of fact is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the decision.” Miller v. Commissioner, 240 Minn. 18, 20, 59 N.W.2d 925, 926 (1953) (citations omitted).
Whether an organization “ is actually formed and operated as a tax-exempt institution is primarily a question of fact. See Parker v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 792 (8th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026, 87 S.Ct. 752, 17 L.Ed.2d 674 (1967); Hammerstein v. Kelley, 349 F.2d 928 (8th Cir.1965); Stevens Brothers Foundation v. Commissioner, 324 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 969, 84 S.Ct. 1135, 12 L.Ed.2d 84 (1964). In Parker, an entity known as the Foundation for Divine Meditation sought to establish itself as a tax-exempt religious organization for charitable contribution purposes under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3). The exemption was denied. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held:
*318Whether or not an organization has a substantial nonexempt purpose, is, of course, a question of fact to be determined by the Tax Court. As a question of fact, the determination will not be disturbed by this Court unless the finding was clearly erroneous.
365 F.2d at 798.
Even if we decide that some aspects of the religious beliefs of the Ideal Life Church members must be evaluated, the type of consideration used by the Tax Court and by the majority in this court is inappropriate. The Tax Court and tax agencies are concerned with many kinds of tax fraud; therefore, the substance of the transaction or operation, not merely its form, must be examined for tax purposes. See Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254, 44 S.Ct. 490, 491, 68 L.Ed. 1001 (1924); Worthing, "Religion” and “Religious Institutions” Under the First Amendment, 7 Pepperdine L.Rev. 313, 352 (1980). The use of any definition does not necessarily prevent fraud; a clever person might be able to fit a fraudulent organization within even a carefully constructed definition. The goal is not to show that a particular activity is not a church but “that the beliefs asserted to be religious are not held in good faith by those asserting them, and that forms of religious organization were erected for the sole purpose of cloaking a secular enterprise with the legal protections of religion.” Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1162 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963, 90 S.Ct. 434, 24 L.Ed.2d 427 (1969). See Worthing, supra, at 351-52. Although determining the sincerity of belief is a most sensitive undertaking, it has been accepted as a means of showing that an organization is entitled to tax-exempt status. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.1981); Founding Church of Scientology, 409 F.2d at 1162; note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1056, 1079-82 (1978); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-29, 235, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535-40, 1543, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (exemption from compulsory education); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965) (exemption from draft law).
The Tax Court evaluated the belief-sincerity of Ideal Life Church members. The court found that the primary, and perhaps the sole, purpose for incorporating the Ideal Life Church was to provide the Rossow family with the benefit of a tax-free home while maintaining the same use and control they had prior to incorporation. This finding of fact is not clearly erroneous and should not be overturned here. Furthermore, this finding requires the use of none of the factors enumerated by the Tax Court.
It is not true, as the majority asserts, that only a few jurisdictions have attempted to define “church” or related terms. Federal courts have been very active in this area. The number of cases in which courts have grappled with a definition is even larger once we recognize that “church” is used in the same fashion as a “denomination,” “religion,” or “religious organization” under the Internal Revenue Code and in a number of cases. Whelan, “Church” in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 Fordham L.Rev. 885, 910, 923-25 (1977); Note, Real Property Tax Exemption in New York: When is a Bible Society Not Religious?, 45 Fordham L.Rev. 949 (1977).
A number of courts and commentators have sought to establish that the definition of church or religion used in free exercise cases is more expansive than that used for establishment clause purposes. E. g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-6 at 827-28 (1978); see Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961). But the eloquent views of Justice Rutledge1 on the *319unitary definition of religion, dissenting in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), were not disputed by the majority of the Court. Malnak v. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 211 n. 51 (1979). (Adams, J., concurring).
The United States Supreme Court has held that it is constitutional under the establishment clause to provide property tax exemptions for churches and religious institutions. Such property exemptions are a matter of legislative grace. They neither advance nor inhibit the establishment of religion if equally applied. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). Unequal application occurs when tax exemptions are accorded some “churches” and not others.
The 19th century definitions of religion were uniformly theistic and narrowly traditional. See Tribe, supra, at 826-27; Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207 (Adams, J., concurring). That traditional view has been rejected. See, e. g., Welsh, Torcaso. New definitions, however, have not been fully formed. It may even seem, as one commentator has suggested, that, even though objective facts and circumstances may be enumerated, the ultimate conclusion is based on a subjective judgment of what religion is in the “I know it when I see it and this isn’t it” fashion, alluding to Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1964), dealing with pornography. S. Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should The Church Render Unto Caesar? 29 U.Fla.L.Rev. 50, 6.
Courts have sensed the constitutional inability to define religion, so:
when they cannot avoid a decision, [they have] turn[ed] to some vague “man-in-the-street” idea of what “religion” should be: It involves prayer, and has something to do with a deity, etc. But a man-in-the-street approach would surely have ruled out early Christianity, which seemed both subversive and atheistic to the religious Romans of the day. The truth is that one man’s “bizarre cult” is another’s true path to salvation, and the Bill of Rights was designed to safeguard minorities from the man-on-the-street’s uncertain capacity for tolerance * * *.
Professor Harvey Cox of the Harvard Divinity School, reprinted in Tribe, supra, at 827 n.8. Dictionary definitions used by the majority are nothing more than “man-in-the-street” reflections by a dictionary publisher. Such definitions should not and cannot appropriately be used to prescribe a constitutional standard.
The Tax Court adopted an eight-factor test based on the criteria developed by the Internal Revenue Service for use in determining whether an organization is a church. Both the IRS and the Tax Court have said that an organization need not meet all the criteria. Some widely recognized religious bodies not only do not meet all, but do not meet many, of the criteria, e. g., Quakers and Christian Scientists. Worthing, supra, at 344-45 & n. 175. Neither this court’s majority nor any other court has stated how few or how many of the criteria a group must meet in order to qualify as a church. It is important to note also that these criteria require an organization to be a developed denomination with patterns similar to those reflected in mainline churches and do not recognize denominations which deviate substantially. Furthermore, it may not be wise to define churches based on their developed states, since it is the early developing church that is most in need of constitutional protection. Worthing, supra, at 345.
Some courts have used analogies instead of strict definitions to find that groups were religious because their activities were similar to those of traditional churches. *320Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127 (1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957). In some cases, the beliefs were found to be “religious” because they held “parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders.” Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166, 85 S.Ct. at 854. It is one thing to conclude, by analogy, that an organization or group of ideas is religious. It is quite a different thing to elucidate precisely what indicia are to be examined in making and justifying the analogy. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207 (Adams, J., concurring).
The majority has not used analogies in examining the Ideal Life Church; it' has used defined criteria instead. While the result in this case is not wrong, based on the insincerity of belief of the members and the use of the Rossow home as a home just as it was used before incorporation of the church, the factors used are unduly restrictive and traditional. I cannot agree that such a test is appropriate for use in protecting the important constitutional liberty of freedom of religion.
. “Religion” appears only once in the [First] Amendment. But the word governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one narrow to forbid “an establishment” and another, much broader, for securing “the free exercise thereof.” *319“Thereof” brings down “religion” with its entire and exact content, no more and no less, from the first into the second guaranty, so that Congress and now the states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as they are regarding the other. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 32, 67 S.Ct. 504, 519, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).