dissenting.
I agree with Justice Corcoran’s dissent. The United States Supreme Court remanded this case to us to reconsider in light of Harmelin. Putting aside the difficulties of interpreting every nuance of Harmelin, one fact is incontrovertible: the United States Supreme Court held that Michigan may constitutionally impose lifetime imprisonment without possibility of parole upon a first-time offender for possession of 650 grams of cocaine. That being the case, I fail to understand why Arizona may not constitutionally impose a “flat” fifteen-year term on an adult convicted of sexual conduct with a minor, to be followed by a “flat” twenty-five-year term for another conviction for a similar offense with a different minor.
Because our review is limited to the constitutionality of the sentence, rather than to its wisdom, I believe we are compelled to affirm the original sentence. The majority’s arguments, including those relative to “the realities of adolescent life” (majority opinion 171 Ariz. at 308, 830 P.2d at 829), are appropriately addressed to the legislature, which is charged with the responsibility of determining the wisdom of the punishment. Our role is much more limited— we may only determine whether the punishment is constitutional. In my opinion, Harmelin teaches that it is.
APPENDIX
Because our opinion in Bartlett I was vacated by the United States Supreme Court, we reproduce here the intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons we conducted there.
*317Part I
Sentences Imposed for Other Crimes in Arizona quoting Bartlett I, 164 Ariz. at 236-37, 792 P.2d at 699-700.
We next examine the sentences imposed in Arizona on defendants who commit crimes more serious than this defendant’s. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010; State v. Jonas, 164 Ariz. 242, 249, 792 P.2d 705, 712 (1990). We have previously disapproved the practice of comparing only those crimes encompassed within the challenged sentencing statute to conclude that the punishment is proportionate because all crimes within the statutory scheme receive the same penalties. See Jonas, 164 Ariz. at 249-250, 792 P.2d at 712-713, disapproving the analysis in State v. Smith, 156 Ariz. 518, 526, 753 P.2d 1174, 1182 (1987), and State v. Crego, 154 Ariz. 278, 280, 742 P.2d 289, 291 (1987).
However, a comparison of the other crimes punishable under the same mandatory sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-604.01 is helpful in this case to show that more serious offenses do not receive any greater punishment. For example, second degree murder, forcible sexual assault, taking a child for the purposes of prostitution, or involving a child in a drug offense are all considered first degree crimes against children, subject to the same mandatory minimum sentences of 15 and 25 years that defendant received. A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A), (D). More potentially serious crimes than those committed here, such as aggravated assault, child molestation, child abuse, or kidnapping, are subject to a lesser minimum sentence of 12 years for the first offense and 23 years for the second offense. See A.R.S. § 13-604.01(B), (D).
Other more serious crimes that do not involve children similarly receive lesser penalties than those mandated in this case. Class 2 felonies not involving a dangerous weapon or threatened physical injury are punishable for a first offense with a minimum term of 5.25 years, a presumptive term of 7 years, and a maximum of 14 years, with early release potentially available after only half the sentence has been served. A.R.S. §§ 13-701, -702. Such first-time offenders are eligible for probation, or, if imprisoned, can earn early release credits of 1 day for each 2 days served. A second offense carries a minimum term of 7 years, a presumptive term of 10.5 years, and a maximum of 21 years, with early release potentially available after two-thirds of the sentence has been served. A.R.S. §§ 13-701, -702, -604(B). The first and second sentences are presumed to run consecutively but the trial court has discretion to make them concurrent by stating its reasons on the record. A.R.S. § 13-708. Included within this scheme of punishment for class 2 felonies are the following crimes, all potentially more serious than the offenses committed by this defendant: kidnapping, A.R.S. § 13-1304; sexual assault of an adult, A.R.S. § 13-1406; first degree burglary of a residential structure, A.R.S. § 13-1508; and arson of an occupied structure, A.R.S. § 13-1704. Additionally, manslaughter, a class 3 felony, A.R.S. § 13-1103, is punishable with a minimum sentence of 3.75 years, a presumptive term of 5 years, and a maximum term of 10 years. A.R.S. § 13-701(C)(2), -702(B).
We also compare the circumstances under which other defendants have been subjected to the same mandatory sentencing scheme. In State v. Taylor, we upheld an aggregate prison term of 2,975 years for 85 counts of dangerous crimes against children. 160 Ariz. 415, 773 P.2d 974 (1989). In that case, the defendant performed and photographed various sexual acts with children aged from 18 months to 8 years old, and many other unidentified small children. He also had a prior criminal history of sex crimes with young children in two other states. We recognized the “irreparable harm which he has caused to the normal development of numerous children,” and his inability “to control his proclivity for sexual conduct with children” as important factors justifying the harshness of the sentence. Taylor, 160 Ariz. at 423, 773 P.2d at 982. In State ¶. Crego, the court of appeals upheld two consecutive 20-year prison terms for a defendant who molested 3 different victims under age 15 a few months after he had been released from prison for a similar *318offense, and while he was on parole. 154 Ariz. at 279, 742 P.2d at 290. In State v. Smith, the court of appeals also upheld a mandatory prison sentence of 91 years for a defendant who repeatedly molested a 10-year-old boy and photographed the numerous incidents on approximately 60 occasions. 156 Ariz. at 520, 753 P.2d at 1176. Defendant also points out other cases in which harsh sentencing provisions were appropriately applied in situations involving repeated and cruel sexual offenses against small children. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 148 Ariz. 588, 716 P.2d 45 (App. 1985) (defendant, a scoutmaster, performed multiple acts of oral and anal sex on 12- to 13-year-old male victims; was sentenced to 5 concurrent prison terms ranging from 7 to 15.75 years); State v. O’Neill, 117 Ariz. 343, 572 P.2d 1181 (1977) (defendant, while babysitting, molested a two-year-old infant, resulting in a tear between her vagina and rectum; was sentenced to 20 years to life). These and other cases stand in stark contrast to the circumstances under which this defendant was sentenced in this case.
We conclude that a comparison of the punishments imposed for other crimes in Arizona reveals the disproportion with which defendant was sentenced under these factual circumstances.
Part II
Sentences Imposed for the Same Crime in Other States quoting Bartlett I, 164 Ariz. at 237-40, 792 P.2d at 700-03.
We also examine the punishment imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292,103 S.Ct. at 3010. This comparison is difficult because the offenses defendant committed are chargeable as a broad variety of crimes with varying punishments. However, we have attempted to compare penalties for the crimes closest to those committed here: consensual, nonincestuous, heterosexual intercourse with a 14-year-old.
Additionally, we compare each of defendant’s sentences individually, keeping in mind that the 15-year sentence was imposed for a first offense, and that the 25-year sentence was imposed for a second offense. We also consider only those sentences imposed for a defendant with no prior felony convictions, other than the first offense used as an enhancement • factor for the second offense. Our focus is necessarily on the mandatory minimum sentences imposed in other jurisdictions, because that is what defendant received here. We do not consider significant the state’s argument that defendant could have received maximum sentences in other jurisdictions greater than the minimums imposed in this case, because the record clearly indicates that the trial court did not find aggravating factors justifying maximum sentences under these circumstances.
(1) 15-year Sentence for First Offense
In 10 jurisdictions, defendant’s offenses would either not be a crime or would be punishable only as a misdemeanor with a sentence of less than one year and/or a fine.15 For a first felony offense in the remaining jurisdictions, defendant would have faced a minimum penalty of one, two, or three years,16 with probation often *319available. Thus, our statute is unique among all jurisdictions in that it imposes a minimum mandatory term of 15 years, which is 5 times higher than that imposed in any other jurisdiction. In all jurisdictions but Arizona, the sentencing judge has a wide range of discretion in imposing a sentence at the bottom of the statutory range that fits the individual circumstances of the crime. Although the maximum allowable sentence in some jurisdictions would have fallen within the range of sentencing provided for a first offender under A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A), in no jurisdiction would the sentencing judge be required to impose a sentence of more than 3 years for the identical offense. Thus, our legislature has mandated a penalty potentially disproportionate to an individual criminal act or defendant. See J. Howe, Thoughts on Mandatory Sentencing, Ariz. Bar J. June-July 1985, at 24-25.
Such potential disproportionality is not enough to allow us to find defendant’s sentences cruel and unusual. See State v. Taylor, 160 Ariz. 415, 773 P.2d 974 (1989) (“Although on the national spectrum Arizona deals with crimes against children more severely than many other states, ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a state reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how to best administer its criminal laws.’ Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3164, 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 355 (1984)”). Such potential differences in sentencing are “a mark of federalism, not unconstitutionality.” State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 272 (Utah 1986).
In this case, however, the potential disproportion between the sentences defendant received and those sentences actually imposed on other similarly situated defendants in other jurisdictions is actual. Defendant has supplied us with a myriad of examples in the published case law of other jurisdictions. A few representative citations illustrate his point; Diefenderfer v. State, 745 P.2d 556 (Wyo.1987) (defendant pleaded guilty to third degree sexual assault of a girl under 14; the execution of his sentence of 3 to 5 years suspended and 4 years probation imposed); State v. DeJesus, 10 Conn.App. 591, 524 A.2d 1156 (1987) (defendant pleaded guilty to second degree sexual assault of a 14-year-old; sentence of 5 years upheld); State v. La Borde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958) (defendant convicted of carnal knowledge of 14-year-old; sentenced to one year, 9 months); State v. Smart, 247 La. 174, 170 So.2d 365 (1965) (defendant convicted of carnal knowledge of a 13-year-old; sentenced to 3 years); State v. Rodriguez, 179 N.J.Super. 129, 430 A.2d 957 (1981) (defendant convicted of sexual assault of a 13-year-old; sentenced to 4 years); State v. Newell, 82 N.C.App. 707, 348 S.E.2d 158 (1986) (defendant convicted of taking indecent liberties with a consenting child between 13 and 16; sentenced to 3 years); State v. Hartman, 145 Wis.2d 1, 426 N.W.2d 320 (1988) (defendant convicted of statutory rape of a 14-year-old; sentenced to a term of not more than 3 years, but suspended and defendant placed on probation with 6 months in county jail work release program). Additionally, defendant’s appellate counsel has avowed to the court that he “has diligently searched *320two centuries of case law of each of our 50 sister states. This required the review of just over 2,600 cases. Not one case was found where a similarly situated defendant received an aggravated sentence remotely comparable to that imposed as a mandatory minimum upon Mr. Bartlett.”
Given this authority, we conclude that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed on defendant for his first offense was disproportionate to sentences received by similarly situated defendants in other jurisdictions.
(2) 25^year sentence for second offense
A comparison of the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence defendant received for the second offense with those imposed in other jurisdictions is complicated by the enhancement of defendant’s second sentence because the first count was treated as a prior predicate felony. Most jurisdictions punish repeat offenders more stringently, and enhancement of penalties on the basis of prior offenses has been consistently upheld against eighth amendment attacks. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1140, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Cocio v. Bramlett, 872 F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir.1989). However, we are mindful that the legislature, in requiring a 25-year minimum sentence for a second offense, implicitly assumed that it was enhancing a constitutionally proportionate minimum sentence of 15 years for a first offense. We have already found the minimum sentence for the first offense to be disproportionate to the facts of this case. Additionally, the “prior” felony in this case was one for which defendant was simultaneously tried and sentenced with the second offense, a factor not existing in other jurisdictions. See A.R.S. § 13-604(H).
Also complicating our analysis is the mandatory consecutive nature of the two sentences, along with the absence of the availability of parole. We have previously refused to find the consecutive nature of two sentences for two separate crimes to be a factor that would render the second sentence disproportionate. Jonas, 164 Ariz. at 249, 792 P.2d at 712. We thus do not consider that factor here.17 Nonavailability of parole, however, is a factor in determining proportionality, although the absence of parole, in itself, does not make a sentence disproportionate. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 and n. 24, 103 S.Ct. at 3013 and n. 24; Jonas, 164 Ariz. at 249, 792 P.2d at 712. In this case, the absence of parole availability requires us to consider that defendant will serve the entire 25-year sentence for the second offense.
Despite these difficulties, a comparison of what penalties defendant would face for a second offense in other jurisdictions, although not as clear as the comparison for a first offense, compels the conclusion that defendant would be subject to a much lighter minimum mandatory sentence for his second offense in all but one state.
In Nebraska, defendant would be subject to a statutory range of 25 to 50 years for a second conviction of sexual assault involving a consenting child less than 16 years old, and would not be eligible for parole. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-319(l)(c), (3). However, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Solem v. Helm, a finding that a defendant could have received an identically harsh sentence in one other state is also a clear indication that he “could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 50 States.” 463 U.S. at 299, 103 S.Ct. at 3014 (emphasis added). Furthermore, we have not been advised by the state of any defendant charged in Nebraska with offenses similar to Bartlett’s actually receiving such a harsh sentence. Rather, the published cases that we have found challenging the mandatory Nebraska sentence for a second offense have involved more heinous offenses, including forcible rape *321with serious physical injuries to the victim. See, e.g., State v. Brand, 219 Neb. 402, 363 N.W.2d 516 (1985) (defendant received 35-year sentence for his second conviction of first-degree sexual assault involving the use of force; sentence found not disproportionate to crime). Under these circumstances, we cannot find the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence for defendant’s second offense to be proportionate merely on the basis of the Nebraska statute.
Except for Nebraska, no other jurisdiction imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of more than 10 years for a second offense similar to defendant’s. In no jurisdiction did we find the particularly harsh combination of provisions present here, including both mandatory consecutive sentencing and nonavailability of parole. We must conclude, therefore, that the 25-year mandatory minimum imposed for defendant’s second offense is also disproportionate to the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants in other jurisdictions.
Based on the above analysis, we hold that defendant’s sentences of 15 years for the first offense and 25 years for the second offense are disproportionate to the crimes he committed under the specific facts of this case, and thus violate the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. This is a narrow holding limited to the facts and circumstances of this case. The Supreme Court has said that successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are “exceedingly rare.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90, 103 S.Ct. at 3009. This is such a rare case.
. See Ark.Stat. § 5-14-106 (third degree carnal abuse, a class A misdemeanor); Cal. Penal Code § 261.5, 264 (unlawful sexual intercourse); Ga. Crim.Code § 26-2010 (fornication); Haw. Rev.Stat. § 707-732 (sexual abuse in the third degree); Ill.Crim.Code § 11-4.1 (contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child); Md.Ann. Code § 27-464C (fourth degree sexual offense); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 566.030 (not a felony; age of consent is 14); Pa.C.S.Ann. § 18-3122 (not a felony; age of consent is 14); S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-655 (not a crime; age of consent is 14); W.Va.Code Ann. § 61-8B-9(a) (sexual abuse in the third degree).
. Felony penalties for a first offense in other jurisdictions include the following sentencing ranges: Ala.Code § 13A-6-62 (2 to 20 years); Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.434, 12.55.125 (1 to 10 years); Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 18-3-4-3, 18-1-105 (2 to 8 years); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-71(a)(l), 53a-35a (1 to 10 years); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11 §§ 773, 4205 (3 to 30 years); Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 800.04, 775.082 (1 to 15 years); Idaho Code §§ 18-6101, 18-6104 (1 year to life); Ind.Code Ann. §§ 35-42-4-3(c), 35-50-2-6 (2 to 8 years); Iowa Code § 709.4 (1 to 10 years); Kan.Crim. Code Ann. §§ 21-3503, 21-4501 (3 to 20 years); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 510.060 (1 to 5 years); La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:80 (1 to 10 years); Me.Rev. *319Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A, §§ 254, 1252(2)(D) (1 year); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. Ch. 265, § 23 (1 year to life); Mich.Comp.Laws § 750.520(4)(a), M.S.A. § 28.-788(4)(a) (1 to 15 years); Minn.Stat.Ann. § 609.-344(1)(b), (2) (1 to 15 years); Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-21 (1 to 10 years); Mont.Code Ann. § 45-5-503(3)(a) (2 to 40 years); Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 200.-364(3), 200.368(1) (1 to 10 years); N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 632-A:3, 651:2 (1 to 7 years); NJ.Rev. Stat. §§ 2C:14-2(c)(5), 2C:43-6, a(2) (2 to 10 years); N.M.Stat.Ann. §§ 30-9-13(B), 31-18-15 (1 to 2 years); N.Y.Penal Law §§ 130.25, 70.00, sube. 2(e) (1 to 4 years); N.C.Gen.Stat. §§ 14.202.1, 14-1.1(a)(8) (1 to 10 years); N.D.Cent.Code §§ 12.1— 20-03, 12.1-32-01, subd. 3 (1 to 15 years); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. §§ 2907.04, 2929.11(D)(1) (1 to 2 years); 21 Okla.Stat.Ann. §§ 1114(B), 1116 (1 to 15 years); Or.Rev.Stat. §§ 163.355, 161.605 (1 to 5 years); RJ.Gen.Laws §§ 11-37-6, 11-37-7 (1 to 5 years); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-1(5) (1 to 15 years); Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-605 (1 to 5 years); Tex.PenaI Code Ann. § 22.011 (2 to 20 years); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-401(1), 76-3-203(3) (1 to 5 years); Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 13 § 3252 (1 to 20 years); Wash.Rev.Code §§ 9A.44.079, 9.94A.310, table 1 (1 to 5 years); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 940.-225(2)(e) (1 to 10 years); Wyo.Stat.Ann. §§ 6-2-304, 6-2-306(A)(iii) (1 to 5 years); D.C.Code Ann. §§ 22-2801, 24-203 (1 year to life).
. We do not hold, however, that we would never consider the requirement of consecutive sentences to be a factor in determining proportionality. This is not, for example, a case in which consecutive sentences were imposed on a defendant who engaged in one single course of conduct that resulted in separate repetitive crimes with consecutive sentences. In such a case, the consecutive nature of the sentences would perhaps be a factor in deciding proportionality.