I dissent. The question is whether despite Labor Code section 4661 the employer may reduce this longshore worker’s state-mandated *93permanent disability indemnity simply because his federally required temporary disability indemnity exceeded the amount available under state law. By allowing such a reduction in violation of section 4661 the majority upset the balance of distinct economic interests embodied in California workers’ compensation law.
Chris A. Lopez, a harbor worker at the Port of Oakland, injured his shoulder while lifting a heavy box overhead. The injury rendered him 20 V2 percent permanently disabled. For this permanent disability he was awarded $10,220—$140 for 73 weeks—under state workers’ compensation law. He was also awarded $7,040.88 in federal permanent disability benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) (33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950). Although the latter award was reversed on a federal administrative appeal, Lopez was not required to return the funds.
Lopez was out of work for more than a year during two nonconsecutive periods as a result of the injury. He was earning $540 per week, and was reimbursed for two-thirds of his wage loss—$25,457.14—as temporary disability indemnity under the LHWCA, at a rate of $360 per week. Thus his actual lost wages were approximately $38,166. Under state law he was entitled to $15,840 in temporary disability benefits for wage loss, at a rate of $224 per week—that is, reimbursement for about 41.5 percent of his likely wage loss.
Lopez and his employer stipulated that Lopez’s injury was subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the LHWCA and the California Labor Code.
A state workers’ compensation judge observed that Lopez and his employer had agreed that state law entitled the employer to credit for payments made under the LHWCA. The judge explained: “The parties further agree that the applicant is not entitled to a ‘double recovery’ as a result of the concurrent jurisdiction. Therefore, the applicant concedes that the employer is entitled to a credit before the [Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board] for all payments made under the LHWCA for benefits of the same class or species. That is, because temporary disability payments under the LHWCA are not subject to the rather low maximum rate found in the state system, the applicant is not entitled to any additional temporary disability payments under state law. Similarly, the applicant agrees that the employer is entitled to a credit against his state permanent disability award of permanent disability payments made to him under the LHWCA. [<H] . . . [U The only issue which remains undecided is whether the employer is entitled to a credit against the state permanent disability award for the LHWCA temporary disability payments in excess of the California temporary disability cap.”
*94The workers’ compensation judge ruled that any offsets must be confined to the same category of benefit: i.e., indemnity for temporary and for permanent disability. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denied a petition for reconsideration. Believing that it was further entitled to offset its state law permanent disability liability to the extent that LHWCA temporary disability payments exceeded those available under state law, the employer sought review.
Because the question presented is purely legal, the WCAB decision should be reviewed independently. Even under that less deferential standard, it is clear that its decision was correct and should be sustained.
Labor Code section 4661—unlabeled statutory references are to this code—could hardly be plainer in its specification that an injured worker must receive both temporary and permanent disability if entitled to both. It provides, as relevant here: “Where an injury causes both temporary and permanent disability, the injured employee is entitled to compensation for any permanent disability sustained by him in addition to any payment received by such injured employee for temporary disability.” (Italics added.) As the italicized words emphasize, the statute does not limit such temporary disability payment to that received under state law.
The reason for the legislative requirement of full reimbursement for temporary and permanent disability is not hard to discern. “It must be remembered that temporary disability indemnity and permanent disability indemnity were intended by the Legislature to serve entirely different functions. Temporary disability indemnity serves as wage replacement during the injured worker’s healing period for the industrial injury. [Citation.] In contrast, permanent disability indemnity compensates for the residual handicap and/or impairment of function after maximum recovery from the effects of the industrial injury have [sic] been attained. [Citation.] Permanent disability serves to assist the injured worker in his adjustment in returning to the labor market. [Citation.] Thus, in many instances the allowance of credit for a temporary disability overpayment against permanent disability indemnity can be disruptive and in some instances totally destructive of the purpose of permanent disability indemnity.” (Maples v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 827, 836-837 [168 Cal.Rptr. 884] (Maples).)
The majority violate the rule contained in section 4661 in the case of certain longshore workers—indeed they create a principle allowing the reduction or even the outright elimination of temporary or permanent disability payments mandated under state law. In announcing a rule that is *95“destructive of the purpose of permanent disability indemnity” (Maples, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at p. 837), the majority reduce Lopez’s permanent disability entitlement under state law, if not his actual award, from $10,220 to $602.86. The Legislature did not intend this implausible result.1
In support of their conclusion, the majority quote section 4661 and Maples, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 827, 836-837, and note the Court of Appeal’s reliance on those authorities. They then assert that “we are not convinced section 4661 provides the answer” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 88), and proceed to declare that because section 4661 was last amended before certain changes occurred in federal law, “there is nothing in the history or context of section 4661 from which to infer a legislative intent to mandate a final recovery greater than that available under the state act by combining the most generous temporary and permanent disability benefits from separate federal and state awards without full crediting.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 88.)
The sole rationale for this conclusion is that the Legislature last amended section 4661 in 1949 (Stats. 1949, ch. 107, § 1, p. 346), “long before [United States Supreme Court cases] and the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA confirmed that certain maritime injuries were subject to concurrent federal-state jurisdiction.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 88.) But what the federal high court later “confirmed” was a regime of concurrent jurisdiction established by court decision a year and a week after the United States entered World War H. In Davis v. Department of Labor (1942) 317 U.S. 249 [87 L.Ed. 246, 63 S.Ct. 225], the court decided, albeit opaquely, “[a]fter a decade and a half during which there had not been formulated ‘any guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of state power in advance of litigation,’ id., at 253, . . . that the border between federal and state compensation schemes was less a line than a ‘twilight zone,’ in which ‘employees must have their rights determined case by case . . . ,’ id., at 256 [87 L.Ed. at p. 250]. Within this zone, Davis effectively established a regime of concurrent jurisdiction.” (Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania (1980) 447 U.S. 715, 718 [65 L.Ed.2d 458, 461, 100 S.Ct. 2432] (Sun Ship).) The separate opinions in Davis made this clear. (317 U.S. at pp. 258-259 [87 L.Ed. at pp. 251-252] (conc. opn. of Frankfurter, J.); id. at p. 261 [ 87 L.Ed. at p. 253] (dis. opn. of Stone, C. J.) [the latter referring to the “overlapping dual system of the sort which the Court now espouses . . . .”].) When the Legislature last amended section 4661, concurrent jurisdiction over longshore compensation claims was in effect.
*96In sum, Sun Ship simply belies the majority’s chronology. Moreover, even if the majority were chronologically accurate, their point would be irrelevant. We are governed by the words of section 4661. It plainly provides that employees are entitled to permanent disability benefits “in addition to any payment ... for temporary disability.” (Italics added.) “Any payment” means any, not just any state-mandated payment. Reducing Lopez’s permanent disability entitlement from $10,220 to $602.86 because of temporary disability benefits mandated by federal law cannot be reconciled with section 4661. The majority do not attempt to do so. They never grapple with the words of section 4661, instead discussing anachronistically its “history” and “context” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 88). But history and context are interpretive aids to be utilized only if the plain language cannot be understood. (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 597-599 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 695, 918 P.2d 999].) That is not the case here: the statute’s meaning is clear.
The majority also rely on Travelers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 804 [50 Cal.Rptr. 114] (Travelers), for the principle that an employer is entitled to offset payments made under another regime against its state law liability regardless of category. That reliance is misplaced. By listing dollar amounts paid in that case for temporary and permanent disability (maj. opn., ante, at p. 89) the majority imply that Travelers addressed the issue of category-by-category credit. But it did not.
Travelers does contain language that, if the question of category-by-category credit had been at issue, conceivably might support the majority’s conclusion. As they observe, Travelers stated that “it was proper for the [industrial accident] commission, in order to prevent a double recovery for the same injury, to allow a credit against the award made under the workmen’s compensation law of California in a sum equal to the payments made on behalf of the insured under the workmen’s compensation law of Alaska.” (240 Cal.App.2d at p. 810.) But our relevant issue does not appear to have been before the Travelers court; accordingly the majority read too much into the decision. “It is axiomatic that an opinion is not authority for an issue not considered therein.” (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 243 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 207, 902 P.2d 225].)
The same defect surrounds the majority’s consideration of Duong v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 980 [215 Cal.Rptr. 609], Bobbitt v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 845 [192 Cal.Rptr. 267], and Industrial etc. Exchange v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 480 [182 P.2d 309]. In none of these cases was category-by-category credit at issue: rather, the issue was merely one of credit per se. *97Evidently neither the parties nor the courts in those cases contemplated the question now before us. Of paramount significance—certainly of far greater significance than the isolated passages on which the majority rely—is the fact that it is impossible to tell whether the injured workers in Duong, Bobbitt, or Industrial etc. Exchange even suffered both temporary and permanent disability. As the Court of Appeal majority correctly explained, “[t]he above decisions seem to agree that ‘double recovery’ is impermissible, but they do not explain what that term means. The California decisions expressed a view that dollar-for-dollar credit was proper, but none of the courts had the issue before them, and so their statements are of no precedential value.” The majority’s statement that Duong and Bobbitt “expressed a view that . . . full economic credit for LHWCA benefit payments is proper” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 87) is simply incorrect. As stated, California law does not permit a double recovery for a compensable industrial injury; the question is whether credit must be extended fully or by category of benefit. No case relied on by the majority addresses that question.
By focusing on the issue of double recovery, the majority seem to suggest that Lopez will receive a windfall if the WCAB decision is upheld. The law and the facts establish the contrary. Even if the decision were upheld, as it should be, the $35,677.14 Lopez would receive—$25,457.14 for temporary disability and $10,220 for permanent disability—would not compensate him even for the full amount of his wage loss, much less for his 20V2 percent permanent disability. As stated at the outset, Lopez’s actual lost wages approximated $38,166. Counsel for amicus curiae California Applicants’ Attorneys Association eloquently emphasized at oral argument that “[tjhere’s a small amount of money in dispute here, but that money may make the difference to the injured worker[s] as to whether or not they’re able to make their mortgage payment, pay for their car or provide medical treatment for their children. So the amount of money is significant to the injured worker. . . . [T]he applicant hasn’t been enriched—he’s lost money. .. . [W]hat he received were two partial recoveries for two separate consequences of one injury. He received a temporary disability payment for the time he was completely unable to work, and then he received a permanent disability payment. . . because he has lost his ability for the rest of his life to compete in an open labor market, and his ability to work is impaired on a permanent basis; his ability to survive in our society is impaired on a permanent basis. Both of those payments together do not add up to all the things that the applicant has lost. In addition to lost wages, in addition to the loss of ability to compete in the open labor market, the applicant now has possible lost future earnings and pain and suffering for the rest of his life, and nothing is going to be paid for that, however this is worked out. So the *98applicant, when all the benefits are put together, receives less than one full recovery. That can’t be constituted as a double recovery.”
The double recovery issue is, then, an unfortunate distraction. The majority and I recognize that “[a] basic premise of compensation law is that there shall be but a single recovery of benefits on account of a single injury or disability; to permit a double recovery would be to place a double burden on industry and encourage malingering; the right to recovery of compensation from more than one source is subject to the rule that a credit shall be allowed against an award for any payment to the extent that it permits a double recovery.” (Raischell & Cottrell, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 991, 997 [58 Cal.Rptr. 159].) But in this case there is no double recovery, however that term may be defined in workers’ compensation law. Lopez and his employer stipulated that state law entitled the employer to credit for payments made under the LHWCA “for benefits of the same class or species,” in the words of the workers’ compensation judge. Double recovery is not at issue.
Nor, as amicus curiae explained at oral argument, is there a windfall of any kind. As the workers’ compensation judge noted in his decision denying the employer permanent disability credit for temporary disability payments made under the LHWCA, “it cannot be said that the applicant was the beneficiary of a windfall, except in the sense that LHWCA benefits were less inadequate in making him whole for his wage losses than were state benefits. It is not as if the LHWCA benefits were so generous that there was an economic benefit to the applicant as a result of his industrial injury. Even the LHWCA benefits did not provide the applicant with full wage loss replacement.” (Italics added.) There is no windfall here.
Indeed, a prime purpose of Congress in amending the LHWCA in 1972 was to alleviate “the paucity of relief under state compensation laws.” (Sun Ship, supra, 447 U.S. 715, 723 [65 L.Ed.2d 458, 465], italics deleted.) A House of Representatives Education and Labor Committee report confirms Sun Ship’s statement: “[M]ost State Workmen’s Compensation laws provide benefits which are inadequate,” the drafters explained; “even the better State laws generally come nowhere close to meeting the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws recommended standard of a maximum limit on benefits of not less than 200% of statewide average weekly wages.” (H.R. Rep. No. 92-1441, 2d Sess., p. 10 (1972) reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 4707.) The committee declared: “It is important to note that adequate workmen’s compensation benefits are not only essential to meeting the needs of the injured employee and his family, *99but, by assuring that the employer bears the cost of unsafe conditions, serve[] to strengthen the employer’s incentive to provide the fullest measure of on-the-job safety.” (Id. at p. 4699.)
In sum, if there is any source of California law that permits the employer herein to offset its liability for Lopez’s state-mandated permanent disability benefits by the difference between his federal temporary disability award and the smaller award for temporary disability under state law, the majority have not identified it. If the Legislature had wanted to force a longshore laborer to choose between federal and state compensation, it could have done so. Louisiana did so, enacting a statute providing, “ ‘No compensation shall be payable in respect to the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, or any of its extensions, or the Jones Act.’ ” (Dempster v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. (La.Ct.App. 1994) 643 So.2d 1316, 1317, italics deleted.) There is no similar provision in California law.
By stripping injured longshore workers of all or part of a recovery to which they are entitled, the majority “alter the carefully constructed and fundamental balance between the rights and interests of employees and employers which is the cornerstone of workers’ compensation laws.” (Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 268, 285 [179 CaLRptr. 30, 637 P.2d 266] (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.).) “[I]t must be remembered that worker’s compensation laws constitute an all-pervasive legislative scheme which attempts to effect a compromise between the employer and the employee’s competing interests. . . . Worker’s compensation laws are basically economic regulations by which the legislature, as a matter of public policy, has balanced competing societal interests.” (Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp. (1980) 95 Wis.2d 173, 180 [290 N.W.2d 276, 279-280].) The majority have forgotten this basic fact.
Finally, the majority may be understood to suggest that other jurisdictions’ cases cited in 4 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation (1996) Successive Awards, section 85.40, page 16-29 et seq., bolster their conclusion. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 88.) But unless those other jurisdictions have a statute identical in language or effect to section 4661, such cases would not serve as persuasive authority on the question before us. The majority do not claim that the other jurisdictions have such a statute.
One out-of-state case that did consider this issue, Bouford v. Bath Iron Works Corp. (Me. 1986) 514 A.2d 470, reached a different conclusion from the majority. Bouford's conclusion that no intercategory offset is available *100when “superior” (id. at p. 474) state law benefits “are separate and distinct from the benefits . . . received under the LHWCA” (id. at p. 472) is, as I have shown, correct under California law. Although the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine relied in part on Maine law in reaching this conclusion (id. at pp. 472-473), its opinion buttresses the general principles articulated in this dissent. So does Cross v. Newport News Ship. & Dry Dock (1996) 21 Va.App. 530 [465 S.E.2d 598], which the employer, with commendable candor, called to our attention just before oral argument. By contrast, the out-of-state authority on which the majority rely, McGowan v. General Dynamics Corp. (1988) 15 Conn.App. 615 [546 A.2d 893], affirmed (1989) 210 Conn. 580 [556 A.2d 587], is seriously flawed: The court’s nebulous opinion reveals that it was unsure whether to apply federal or state law. Here the majority recognize that the issue is a matter of state law. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 85.) But they fail to follow state law to its logical end.
Section 4661 provides that an injured worker eligible for permanent and temporary disability indemnities is to receive both. The majority deprive Lopez of part of the former because he received the latter. I doubt that the Legislature intended to rob Peter to pay Paul. I therefore dissent.
Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.
It is trae that, following deductions for attorney fees and the erroneous award of $7,040.88 in federal permanent disability indemnity, the sum at issue fell to $1,979.12. The fortuity of a large, erroneous and nonrefundable federal award in this case does not refute the fact that the majority’s analysis reduces Lopez’s entitlement for his 201/2 percent permanent disability to almost nothing.