concurring in the result with the limitations hereinafter set forth:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I feel it is necessary to clarify why, in my opinion, the police officers were justified in conducting a limited search for weapons under the facts of this case.
The testimony of the police officers at the trial revealed facts which, when viewed objectively, would cause a man of reasonable caution to believe that the defendant might be armed and dangerous. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). At the time the search was initiated, the defendant was close enough to the location of the suspected weapon to enable him to gain control over the weapon. As a result, the possibility of harm to the officers was present. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
The reasonable apprehension of danger or injury to the police officers — judged by objective standards — provides a sufficient basis for this search to fall within the search for weapons exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 906 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948). Moreover, since the danger to the police officers was still present at the time the search was initiated, the immediate search for weapons was reasonable under the circumstances.
Accordingly, I concur in the result.