dissenting.
In Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985), a majority of this Court defined the aggravating circumstance of an offense committed by means of torture, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8), as encompassing the infliction of a considerable amount of pain and suffering on a victim which is unnecessarily heinous, atrocious, or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity. I dissented from this characterization of torture because it impermissibly expanded the limited circumstance provided for by the Legislature in § 9711(d)(8). I continue to believe that the definition of torture must be more carefully circumscribed. The importance of distinguishing between offenses committed by means of torture and acts which are heinous, atrocious, or cruel is demonstrated by the jury’s finding of the aggravating circumstance of torture in the instant case.
*320Unquestionably, the brutal acts of the Appellant were of a heinous and atrocious character. It is a wearisome aspect of human existence to be time and again confronted with such violent, depraved acts of individuals. In some sense it is arguable that all killings are atrocious. It is clear, however, that not all killings are properly made subject to capital punishment. Due process and fairness considerations of constitutional magnitude require that the decision to impose this “extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) be “suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Id. at 189, 96 S.Ct. at 2932.
To this end, the General Assembly has defined in specific terms the only circumstances under which the death penalty might be appropriate in this Commonwealth. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). Although the United States Supreme Court has found no constitutional infirmity in statutory language imposing capital punishment for “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” murders if properly restricted, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2968, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2938, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), our General Assembly has chosen not to invoke the death penalty for all such depraved conduct. As I noted in Pursell, the legislature specifically rejected an amendment phrasing the aggravating circumstance in terms of the murder being “especially heinous,” and opted for the present terminology, that the offense was “committed by means of torture.” I reiterate my observation that these two categories are not co-extensive. While all torture may by definition be considered to be heinous, atrocious, or cruel, not all heinous, atrocious, or cruel conduct is torture. This Court exceeds its authority by ignoring the restrictive terms chosen by the General Assembly and making the death penalty applicable to a broader range of cases. In addition to usurping the legislative prerogative of defining the narrow circumstances appropriate for the imposition of capital punishment, by allow*321ing for an expansive definition of statutory language the Court rapidly approaches a point where the aggravating circumstance is applied without meaningful guidance. Although the statement by the Appellant cited by the majority demonstrates that the Appellant intended to cause the death of the victim, he did not act with the intention to cause pain and suffering through the continued or prolonged infliction of physical or mental abuse upon the victim. Until such a distinction is drawn, juries will continue to impose the death penalty upon a finding of torture for particularly gruesome and offensive murders, as it did in the instant case. As a result, this Court will have created the very risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action by juries which the Constitution forbids and which the Legislature painfully sought to avoid by carefully delineating the circumstances under which the death penalty may be imposed.