Plaintiff Sallie Van Dyke is married to Sidney Van Dyke. Two children resulting from this marriage are living with them. Sidney Van Dyke has a child from a previous marriage who has never lived with plaintiff and her husband. Sidney Van Dyke, who is unemployed and has no assets, is obligated to pay monthly child support for the child of his previous marriage, pursuant to a decree of divorce entered on April 1, 1969. His payment of that obligation is in arrears.
In November of 1978, Sidney Van Dyke was served with a notice of debt and demand for payment from the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). This notice offered Sidney Van Dyke an opportunity for a hearing to determine the amount of his arrearage if he paid the amount DSHS had determined was then due. No notice or opportunity for a hearing was afforded plaintiff, Sallie Van Dyke. Sidney Van Dyke requested a hearing, but was not given one because he did not make payments as directed in the notice.
In May 1979, defendant served an order on plaintiff's employer to withhold and deliver to DSHS 25 percent of her wages to satisfy the obligation to support the child of her husband's prior marriage.
Plaintiff brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court granted summary judgment to plaintiff. It held DSHS had no authority to collect the wages of a noncustodial stepparent to satisfy the noncusto*728dial parent's obligation to support the child of a previous marriage. The court further enjoined defendants from taking plaintiff's wages to satisfy the claim for the support of Sidney's child by the previous marriage. Defendants appealed directly to this court.
Three questions are presented: (1) The applicability of RCW 26.16.205 to a noncustodial stepparent; (2) whether the holding of Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wn.2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939), that the earnings of the obligated parent in a new community could be reached for child support, should be extended so that the interest of the obligated parent in the community earnings of the noncustodial stepparent could be reached for child support; and (3) if either (1) or (2) are answered in the affirmative, what are the due process requirements necessary to protect the new community of an obligated parent and a noncustodial stepparent. Because of our response to issues (1) and (2), we need not and do not reach issue (3).
I
The family support statute is RCW 26.16.205. In 1969, the legislature amended the statute to include stepchildren:
The expenses of the family and the education of the children, including stepchildren, are chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or either of them, and in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or separately: Provided, That with regard to stepchildren, the obligation shall cease upon the termination of the relationship of husband and wife.
(Italics ours.) RCW 26.16.205. Portions italicized were enacted in 1969. Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 207, § 1, p. 1549.
Defendants contend RCW 26.16.205 conflicts with previous common law principles in this state (Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Wn.2d 510, 364 P.2d 444 (1961), only stepparents in loco parentis were required to contribute to the needs of a child), and that its effect is to create obligations between stepparents and stepchildren equal to those between natural children and their parents. Thus, RCW 26.16.205 would *729apply to the community and separate property of both the encumbered parent and the noncustodial stepparent. On the only other occasion when the court considered RCW 26.16.205, the question of "whether the statutes apply to stepchildren not residing with stepparents" was specifically reserved. Washington Statewide Organization of Stepparents v. Smith, 85 Wn.2d 564, 565 n.2, 536 P.2d 1202 (1975). It is the view of defendants that if the legislature had intended to restrict RCW 26.16.205 to custodial stepparents, it would have placed this qualification in the statute.
Plaintiff, however, asserts that if the legislature had intended this radical change in the common law its intent would have been clearly manifested. She points out there are two interpretations which can be given to the 1969 amendment: (1) A stepchild would be considered part of the family of a stepparent only if the stepparent were married to the child's custodial parent. This is simply a codification of the common law. Taylor v. Taylor, supra. It is the position of plaintiff. (2) The spouses of noncustodial obligated parents would be separately liable for the support of their spouse's children of earlier marriages. This is the position of defendants.
We cannot believe the legislature intended the result proposed by defendants. Nothing in the legislative history indicates such an intention. See Senate Journal, 41st Legislature (1969), at 1413-14. Indeed, legislation passed during the same 1969 legislative session gives credence to a contrary view. RCW 26.16.200, the so-called "marital bankruptcy" statute, was also amended in 1969. The statute as amended provides that some antenuptial obligations may be enforced against a debtor who has subsequently married. It is limited in two critical ways: First, the ante-nuptial creditor must reduce the claim to a judgment within 3 years of the marriage. Second, the judgment is enforceable only against the earnings and accumulations of the debtor spouse. The 1969 amendment provided that "For the purpose of [RCW 26.16.200] neither the husband nor the wife shall be construed to have any interest in the *730earnings of the other". This specific immunizing of the earnings and accumulations of a nonobligated spouse from the creditors of the obligated spouse in RCW 26.16.200 is persuasive evidence that the same legislature did not intend to eliminate this immunity when it amended RCW 26.16.205.
If the legislature had intended the departure from the common law urged by defendants, it could have chosen clear, unambiguous language. Green Mountain School Dist. 103 v. Durkee, 56 Wn.2d 154, 351 P.2d 525 (1960). It did not do so. We reject the position of defendants and hold RCW 26.16.205 does not apply to either the separate or community property of a noncustodial stepparent.
II
It has been a basic principle of our community property law that community assets are not liable for the separate debts of a spouse. Achilles v. Hoopes, 40 Wn.2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952). An equally strong principle has been that the antenuptial responsibility for child support be met by an obligated parent. The conflict between these two principles was considered at length in Fisch v. Marler, supra. After an extended analysis, the court announced the following rules:
(1) The subsequent marriage of a divorced husband does not relieve him of his obligation to pay to his former wife permanent alimony as required by the decree of divorce, and the former wife has, and continues to have, a fixed and prior claim upon his earnings for the payment of such alimony. This rule finds particular support on grounds of justice and reason where there is a minor child or children of the former marriage.
(2) Garnishment is a proper proceeding to enforce such claims.
(3) The subsequent marriage of the divorced wife does not, of itself, terminate her fixed and prior claim upon the earnings of her former husband, whether he remarries or not, nor does her subsequent marriage ipso facto terminate her right to enforce her claim by garnishment. This rule is likewise particularly applicable in cases *731where there is a minor child or children of the former marriage.
(4) Although the claim of the divorced wife upon the earnings of her former husband is a fixed and prior one, it is not in all cases to be enforced to the point of exhaustion of such earnings, for the present wife also has a claim thereon which is entitled to consideration. Upon a showing by the present wife of necessitous circumstances, particularly where there is a minor child or children of the husband's subsequent marriage, the court may make such adjustment and allocation of the husband's earnings as may appear to it to be just and equitable in the premises.
(5) For the purpose of securing or protecting such rights as she may have in the earnings of her husband, the present wife may intervene in any proceeding which affects such earnings.
Fisch, at 715-16. It should be noted that the term "alimony" as used in Fisch v. Marler, supra, includes child support.
It is the contention of defendants that Fisch v. Marler was concerned with the obligation of the community to the antenuptial responsibility for child support. They subscribe to the view expressed in dicta in Hinson v. Hinson, 1 Wn. App. 348, 353, 461 P.2d 560 (1969):
The reasoning in Fisch v. Marler, supra, is equally applicable to the duty of child support imposed on both father and mother by statute. RCW 26.16.205; Hector v. Hector, [51 Wash. 434, 99 P. 13 (1909)]. Therefore, a man who marries a woman with children in the custody of the father, or a woman who marries a man with children in the custody of the mother, enters the new marriage relation subject to prior claim of child support against the community property of the new marriage. As a consequence, the earnings of the new community can be required to respond in contribution for reasonable child support, whether or not the children are resident with the new community.
Defendant's argument that public policy dictates the opposite conclusion as to a remarried mother is without merit in this day of women's emancipation and their participation at almost every level of responsibility in *732business, government and community affairs. Indeed, it would be contrary to public policy to permit either a father or a mother to evade his or her responsibility to support their offspring by the device of remarriage.
See also H. Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 729, 831 (1974).
We believe this is too expansive a reading of Fisch v. Marler. It is apparent the court chose its language very carefully in that case. At no time does it speak of the property of the new community. Rather, it consistently refers to the earnings of the obligated spouse. Thus, it is only that which is earned by the obligated spouse which is subject to this antenuptial responsibility. That these earnings are also community property is irrelevant to the holding of Fisch. Child support incurred as an antenuptial obligation may be pursued against the earnings of the obligated spouse in the new community. See RCW 26.16.200. There is no suggestion in Fisch v. Marler that the community earnings per se are subject to such debt; only the earnings of the obligated spouse. Thus, Fisch v. Marler is not authority for the proposition supported by defendants and announced in Hinson that any community earnings are liable for ante-nuptial noncustodial child support.
While there are ample public policy reasons for the exemption created by Fisch v. Marler, and while we are not unmindful of the need to support children of a prior marriage, we are not persuaded the exemption should be extended to reach that community property consisting of the earnings of the noncustodial, nonobligated stepparent. The 1969 amendment to RCW 26.16.200 reinforces this view. Furthermore, the rule urged by defendants would be contrary to other compelling public policies: It would discourage marriage; it would encourage married persons to live separate and apart and thereby characterize their earnings as separate property; it would place unwarranted stress upon a second marriage which is already faced with the tensions and demands both emotional and financial of dealing with children of the first marriage.
*733Given this clash of public policies, the limited scope of Fisch v. Marler, the 1969 amendment to RCW 26.16.200, and the fact that the legislature has not spoken clearly and unambiguously on the matter, we hold that the earnings of a noncustodial, nonobligated stepparent are not subject to the antenuptial obligation of child support.
Affirmed.
Brachtenbach, C.J., and Rosellini, Stafford, Hicks, Dore, and Dimmick, JJ., concur.