concurring:
I.
The sole issue presented for our consideration is whether the district court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrants in light of the deficiencies in the affidavit.1
In rejecting the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, the district court relied exclusively on section 16-3-308, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.), Colorado’s statutory “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. Section 16-3-308 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be suppressed by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer, as defined in section 18-1-901(3)(1), C.R.S., as a result of a good faith mistake or of a technical violation.
(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section:
(a) “Good faith mistake” means a reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.
(b) “Technical violation”' means a reasonable good faith reliance upon a statute which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake, or a court precedent which is later overruled.
On appeal, the defendant claims that section 16-3-308 is not applicable to the type of error committed by the police officer in this case, and that the statute violates article II, section 7 and article III of the Colorado Constitution. I find both arguments to be unpersuasive.
A.
Application of Section 16-3-308
The General Assembly has broad powers under article III of the Colorado Constitution and may enact laws not expressly or impliedly prohibited by the United States of Colorado Constitutions. People v. Y.D.M., 197 Colo. 403, 593 P.2d 1356 (1979); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Hummer, 36 Colo. 208, 84 P. 61 (1906). In determining whether section 16-3-308 conflicts with the United States Constitution, the exclusionary rule must be examined as federal constitutional doctrine.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that the exclusionary rule developed in the federal courts was binding on the states. Prior to Mapp, state courts had been free to employ remedies other than the exclusionary rule to enforce fourth amendment guarantees. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. *11491782 (1949). In Mapp, however, a divided Supreme Court overruled Wolf and held that prospectively “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691. Writing for a plurality of four,2 Justice Clark described the exclusionary rule as an “essential part” of the privacy right embodied in the fourth amendment, and noted that the remedy was therefore enforceable against the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 367 U.S. at 656, 81 S.Ct. at 1692.3
Since Mapp, the Supreme Court has restricted the application of the exclusionary rule in several areas of fourth amendment law.4 In general, the Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule in cases where the deterrent objective of the rule cannot be achieved. Despite the recent limitations, however, the Supreme Court has not retreated from its holding in Mapp that the exclusionary rule is binding on the states.5 The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution therefore prohibits a state legislature from enacting legislation that is contrary to or inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s directives on when *1150the exclusionary rule must be invoked. U.S. Const, art. VI, § 2. However, a state may enact legislation that is consistent or coextensive with the constitutional limitations imposed on the exclusionary rule by the Supreme Court. Consistent legislative limitations do not violate federal constitutional standards. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-24, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2017-19, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the exclusionary rule for suppressing reliable evidence, and calling upon Congress and the states to enact a statutory remedy that would compensate persons whose fourth amendment rights had been violated).
In the present case, the primary issue is whether section 16-3-308 is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decisions that dictate when a state court must invoke the exclusionary rule to deter violations of the fourth amendment. In enacting the good faith statutory exception to the exclusionary rule, the General Assembly stated:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Colorado that when evidence is sought to be excluded from the trier of fact in a criminal proceeding because of the conduct of a peace officer leading to its discovery, it will be open to the proponent of the evidence to urge that the conduct in question was taken in a reasonable, good faith belief that it was proper, and in such instances the evidence so discovered should not be kept from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible. ...
§ 16-3-308(4), 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.).
In furtherance of that legislative policy, section 16-3-308(1) expressly provides that a district court shall not suppress evidence that is lawfully seized by a police officer as a result of a “good faith mistake” or a “technical violation.” It is significant that in enacting section 16-3-308, the General Assembly saw fit to create two separate and distinct categories of police mistakes: (1) those mistakes that constitute “good faith” mistakes within the meaning of section 16-3-308(2)(a); and (2) those mistakes that are “technical violations” as defined by section 16-3-308(2)(b). The mistake committed by the police officer in the present case falls squarely within subsection (2)(b), which is directed to “a reasonable good faith reliance upon ... a warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake.”6
At the time of the defendant’s suppression hearing, there was no judicial authority interpreting the language contained in subsection 2(b). In People v. Quintero, *1151657 P.2d 948 (Colo.), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3535, 77 L.Ed.2d 1386, cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 543, 78 L.Ed.2d 719 (1983), however, this court interpreted the “good faith” language in subsection (2)(a) as applying only to a good faith mistake of fact not to a mistaken judgment of law. We noted in Quintero that section 16-3-308(2) did not apply to the police officer’s mistaken belief that he had probable cause to make an arrest. See Y. Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause, ” “Good Faith, ” and Beyond, 69 Iowa L.Rev. 551 (1984). The defendant argues that subsection (2)(b) incorporates a good faith mistake as defined by subsection (2)(a), and that the portion of the definition of “technical violation” which refers to “good faith” reliance on search warrants only encompasses mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law. I disagree.
While it is apparent that the mistake committed by the detective here involves a legal issue, that factor alone does not preclude resort to the provisions of subsection (2)(b). A common sense reading of subsection (2)(b) reveals that the General Assembly intended that the provisions of the subsection include good faith mistakes of law as well as good faith factual errors.7 To hold otherwise would be to ignore the intent of the General Assembly. In applying the good faith statute in this case, however, I recognize that the resolution of each search and seizure case necessarily depends on the particular facts that are before the court. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950); Cowdin v. People, 176 Colo. 466, 491 P.2d 569 (1971).
Following the suppression hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Leon, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984). In both decisions, the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be invoked when a police officer relies in good faith on a warrant that is later declared to have been issued in violation of constitutional standards.8 I be*1152lieve that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sheppard provides persuasive authority for determining what types of law enforcement errors constitute “technical violations” within the meaning of section 16-3-308(2)(b).9 Sheppard also provides a constitutional benchmark for assessing the validity of Colorado’s good faith statute under the federal constitution.
In Sheppard, a police officer obtained substantial evidence linking the defendant to a murder, and subsequently prepared an affidavit that set forth facts that were sufficient to establish probable cause to validate a search warrant. Unable to find a suitable warrant form, however, the officer used a standardized “controlled substances” warrant form that he modified as best he could. He presented the affidavit and the warrant to a judge who made some minor alterations and signed the warrant. However, the judge did not alter the substantive portions of the warrant that merely authorized a search for controlled substances. Relying on the apparent legality of the altered warrant, the police searched Sheppard’s residence and recovered several items that tied Sheppard to the murder. At trial, the court suppressed the evidence because of the facial defects in the search warrant.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s suppression order due to the officer’s good faith conduct. The Court noted that the police had taken “every step that could reasonably be expected of them” and that their conduct was “objectively reasonable and largely error-free.” — U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 3429, 82 L.Ed.2d at 744-45. The Court acknowledged that while “an error of constitutional dimensions may have been committed with respect to the issuance of the warrant ... it was the judge, not the police officers, who made the critical mistake.” — U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 3429, 82 L.Ed.2d at 745. Because the judge had committed the crucial error, the Court refused to suppress the evidence.10
Sheppard is analogous to the present case in several respects and is also consistent with the technical violation language contained in section 16 — 3—308(2)(b). In both Sheppard and in this case the police had probable cause to obtain a search warrant as a result of thorough investigations. Cf. United States v. Leon (police had not gathered sufficient information to constitute probable cause at the time they sought to secure a search warrant). In addition, the police in both cases prepared detailed affidavits that a neutral and detached judge reviewed and approved. Moreover, the error asserted in both cases involved a “facial” defect that a reasonably prudent police officer could not be expected to detect. Finally, both this case and Sheppard involve a mistake that, when considered in the context of the entire record, had no tangible impact on the defendant’s constitutional rights.11
*1153I conclude, therefore, that, in light of the similarities to Sheppard and the analysis of the Supreme Court, the error in the present case constitutes a “technical violation” within the meaning of section 16-3-308(2)(b). I would also hold that section 16-3-308(2)(b), as applied to the facts in this case, is consistent with fourth amendment precedent and does not violate federal constitutional standards.
B.
Article II, Section 7
The defendant asserts that section 16-3-308 vitiates the probable cause requirement of article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. Accordingly, he claims the statute is unconstitutional and that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence. I do not agree with his analysis.
Like the fourth amendment, article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution expressly requires that a warrant be supported by probable cause established by affidavit. Article II, section 7 provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be seized, as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing.
Although article II, section 7 contains language virtually identical to its federal counterpart, this court has, in the past, interpreted article II, section 7 as providing an individual with even greater protections than those guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 (Colo.1983) (individual has reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone pen register under the Colorado Constitution even though he has no corresponding right under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980) (a taxpayer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records under article II, section 7, even though he has no similar right under the federal constitution); Hernandez v. People, 153 Colo. 316, 385 P.2d 996 (1963) (article II, section 7 is more restrictive than fourth amendment and requires that probable cause must be supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing). Thus, even though section 16-3-308 does not violate federal constitutional provisions, the statute’s constitutionality must also be assessed under Colorado’s own constitutional guarantees.
In enacting a good faith statutory exception to the exclusionary rule, the General Assembly left intact the probable cause requirement and the other constitutional standards for obtaining a valid warrant. The statute does not affect the rights guaranteed under article II, section 7, but merely alters the mechanism available to enforce those rights. Under section 16-3-308(2)(b), the exclusionary sanction simply will not apply in cases in which a police officer has relied in good faith on a defective warrant, a court precedent, or a subsequently invalidated statute.
The defendant argues, however, that the exclusionary rule is an integral part of article II, section 7 and cannot be modified or restricted by the General Assembly. I reject the defendant’s argument. The exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, but is a judicially created remedy designed to deter illegal police behavior. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); People v. Harfmann, 638 P.2d 745 (Colo.1981); People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d 213 (Colo.1981). Neither the fourth amendment nor article II, section 7 affords a citizen a. constitutional right to have illegally obtained *1154evidence excluded at his trial. At best, the individual defendant stands as an incidental beneficiary of the court’s decision to suppress the evidence.
In recognition of the fact that the exclusionary rule is a prophylactic remedy and not a personal constitutional right, this court has never required that all evidence seized in violation of article II, section 7 be suppressed. See, e.g., Thomeczek v. Bray, 198 Colo. 341, 600 P.2d 66 (1979) (illegally seized evidence can be used in extradition proceedings); People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448, 541 P.2d 896 (1975) (illegally obtained evidence is admissible in probation proceedings); LeMasters v. People, 678 P.2d 538 (Colo.1984) (illegally obtained evidence can be used at trial for impeachment purposes when the defendant elects to take the stand). In general, this court has restricted the exclusionary rule to those areas where its deterrent objectives are most “efficaciously served.” Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 152 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
By limiting the exclusionary rule to cases where deterrence can be achieved, this court’s search and seizure jurisprudence has roughly paralleled the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court. See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254-61, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2340-44, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 558-63 (1983) (White, J., concurring). Despite the similarities, however, differences do exist between article II, section 7 and the fourth amendment. In some areas, article II, section 7 affords an individual with protections not guaranteed by its federal counterpart in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Sporleder, 666 P.2d at 140. Compare People v. Hill, 182 Colo. 253, 512 P.2d 257 (1973), with Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 99 S.Ct. 2088, 60 L.Ed.2d 640 (1979). In those rare cases, Colorado courts can, if necessary, invoke the exclusionary rule to deter police officers from violating Colorado’s constitutional guarantees, even though fourth amendment precedent does not require suppression.
In the present case, however, I do not perceive how respect for Colorado’s constitutional rights can be achieved by suppressing the evidence. The record reveals that the detective conducted himself in an objectively reasonable manner throughout the entire chain of events that precipitated the search. After conducting a thorough investigation, the detective obtained substantial evidence linking the defendant to the sexual assaults. The detective then prepared an affidavit; as required by article II, section 7. It is undisputed that the detective had the facts necessary to establish probable cause for the search at the time he prepared the affidavit, but that he inadvertently failed to include the facts in the affidavit. The detective presented the affidavit to a judge and obtained official sanction for the search by securing the necessary warrants. Relying on the apparent propriety of the warrants, the officer executed the search in a reasonable manner, searching only those areas specified in the warrants and seizing only those items that he was authorized to seize.
The detective’s sole mistake, throughout the entire investigation, was his failure to allege known facts in the affidavit that would link the defendant to the residence to be searched. Such an inadvertent omission, in my opinion, does not demonstrate a willful or flagrant disregard of the defendant’s rights under the Colorado Constitution. To the contrary, the detective’s actions throughout the investigation were those of a conscientious law enforcement officer concerned with following proper police procedures. The affidavit was prepared and the search warrant was issued after the police officers had obtained an order pursuant to Crim.P. 41.1 and had taken Deitchman into custody at 3300 West Ohio Avenue for the lineup. Thus, the police knew that Deitchman lived at 3300 West Ohio Avenue but inadvertently failed to include that information as the basis for their conclusion that incriminating evidence would be found at that address.
In my view, the critical error in the present case was committed by the judge who reviewed the affidavit, and not by the police officer who prepared it. Police officers, unlike magistrates and judges, are not trained experts in the subtleties and nuances of fourth amendment law. It is the responsibility of the judge, and not the officer, to examine an affidavit to insure *1155that it complies with constitutional requirements. In the present case, the detective had the information needed to correct the defect in the affidavit had the error been brought to his attention by the judge. To suppress the evidence in this case would serve only to punish the detective for the judge’s error, and would not contribute to the deterrence of unconstitutional police activity. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Leon, “[Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of [constitutional] violations.” — U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 3420, 82 L.Ed.2d at 697. See also United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653 (9th Cir.1984).12
Moreover, any incremental deterrent benefit that might be achieved by excluding the evidence must be balanced against the substantial costs of suppressing evidence that is highly probative on the issue of guilt. Significantly, the defendant here has not challenged the authenticity of the evidence seized from his home. Nor has he questioned the adequacy or thoroughness of the police officer’s investigation and the existence of probable cause to support his arrest for the crimes charged. Cf. People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo.), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3535, 77 L.Ed.2d 1386, cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 543, 78 L.Ed.2d 719 (1983) (police officer did not have sufficient information to constitute probable cause for arrest, therefore section 16-3-308(2)(a) of good faith statute is inapplicable). The defendant’s sole objection concerns a mistake in the affidavit that had no measurable impact on his constitutional rights.13 I do *1156not believe that suppression of the evidence here would advance the justifications underlying the exclusionary rule.14 In fact, the only discernible effect of excluding the evidence in the present case would be to keep relevant and trustworthy evidence from the trier of fact — a result that is particularly unacceptable given the serious nature of the offenses committed.
I would therefore hold that article II, section 7 does not require the suppression of evidence when a police officer acts in good faith reliance on a technically defective warrant. Accordingly, I reject defendant’s claim that the good faith statute, as applied to the facts in the present case, violates article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution.
C.
Separation of Powers
The defendant also claims that section 16-3-308 violates the principle of separátion of powers embodied in article III of the Colorado Constitution. He asserts that the good faith statute is an unconstitutional usurpation by the legislature of the powers belonging exclusively to the judiciary. I disagree.
Whether a particular statute violates the provisions of article III depends on whether the statute is classified as “procedural” or “substantive” in nature. Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979); People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978). As we noted in Clark, the judiciary has exclusive jurisdiction over “procedural” matters while the General Assembly has complete control over matters of “substance.” 197 Colo, at 318, 592 P.2d at 800. A precise test to differentiate procedural matters from matters of substance has never been fully developed. In McKenna, however, we specified the following guidelines to determine whether a “rape shield” *1157statute was a matter of substance or procedure:
If the purpose ... is to permit a court to function and function efficiently, the rule-making power is inherent unless its impact is such as to conflict with other validly enacted legislative or constitutional policy involving matters other than the orderly dispatch of business.
196 Colo. at 371, 585 P.2d at 277 (quoting Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 Mich.L.Rev. 623, 629-30 (1957)).
This court has traditionally recognized that the General Assembly has great latitude in enacting legislation that affects the admissibility of evidence in criminal and civil trials. See, e.g., McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978) (rape shield statute); People v. Mulligan, 193 Colo. 509, 568 P.2d 449 (1977) (statute affecting the admissibility of inconsistent statements); Estate of Thomas v. Davis, 144 Colo. 358, 356 P.2d 963 (1960) (dead man’s statute). As a general rule, we have upheld the General Assembly’s right to limit the admissibility of evidence as a matter of substantive public policy.
The defendant claims, however, that the “good faith” statute constitutes a legislative attempt to circumvent the exclusionary rule and to regulate the procedural operation of the courts. In making this argument, the defendant ignores the General Assembly’s intent in enacting a good faith statutory exception to the exclusionary rule. The basic purpose of section 16-3-308 is one of public policy. See § 16-3-308(4). The statute represents the Colorado General Assembly’s response to growing public disapproval of an exclusionary rule that undermines the truth finding process and often causes the guilty to go free. Thus, the statute deals with a matter of substantive public policy, and not with the internal operating proceedings of this court. Id. In my opinion, section 16-3-308 does not violate article III of the Colorado Constitution.
Accordingly, I agree that the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.
Justice ROVIRA has authorized me to say that he joins in this concurrence.. We need not consider whether the affidavit that supported the issuance of the warrant violated the defendant’s rights under either the United States or Colorado Constitutions. The prosecution conceded at the suppression hearing that the affidavit failed to comply with constitutional prerequisites. Therefore, that issue is not properly before us.
. Justice Black concurred in Mapp, but was not persuaded that the fourth amendment, standing alone, was enough to support extending the exclusionary rule to the states. In his concurring opinion, Justice Black described the exclusionary rule as a "judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate.” 367 U.S. at 661, 81 S.Ct. at 1695 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1367, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (Black, J., concurring)).
. Significantly, only four justices in Mapp concluded that the exclusionary rule was mandated by the fourth amendment. However, in the cases immediately following Mapp, the Supreme Court treated the exclusionary rule as an "essential part" of the fourth amendment’s privacy right and routinely excluded evidence in nearly every case involving a fourth amendment violation. E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). Because the exclusionary rule has been treated as constitutional doctrine state courts have excluded evidence to comply with Mapp and its progeny. See generally C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure: An Analysis of Constitutional Cases and Concepts § 2.03 at 18 (1980).
. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (illegally seized evidence can be used for impeachment purposes); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (exclusionary rule does not apply when police officer relies in good faith on a statute that is later declared unconstitutional); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (passenger in an automobile lacks standing to challenge the legality of search); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (exclusionary rule not available in civil proceedings); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975) (exclusionary rule not available when police officer relies in good faith on court precedent); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (exclusionary rule not available in grand jury proceedings).
.Charles Moylan points out, however, that:
Even as the Supreme Court reluctantly adopted the Exclusionary Rule as a desperation measure, because no other feasible sanction appeared on the horizon, it never pretended that it was doing so for the benefit of the defendant. In the best of all worlds, the defendant should have gone to jail for the crime which the physical evidence proved he had committed and the officer who violated the Constitution should have felt the sting of some other sanction. The defendant only received the undeserved and unintended benefit of exclusion because he was the necessary vehicle through whose case the sanction had to be applied to the officer.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 [94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561] (1974), asserted flatly that the exclusion of evidence was not "a personal constitutional right of the person aggrieved.” Linkletter v. Walker [381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)], spoke to the same effect, "The ruptured privacy of the victims’ homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late.” The majority opinion in Leon reaffirmed this unremitting rejection of exclusion as a constitutional entitlement:
"The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘works no new Fourth Amendment wrong.’ ”
C. Moylan, Back to Normalcy! Some Off-The-Cuff Observations on the Leon & Sheppard Decisions, Printed in The Daily Record, Baltimore, Maryland (July 12, 1984) (quoting United States v. Leon, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3405 at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 at 687 (1984)).
. Section 16-3-308(2)(a) is inapplicable to the facts in the present case. Section 16 — 3— 308(2)(a) defines a good faith mistake as a "reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.” In People v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo.), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 3535, 77 L.Ed.2d 1386, cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 543, 78 L.Ed.2d 719 (1983), we held that section 16-3-308(2)(a) applies only to factual errors committed by a police officer and not to mistaken judgments of law. 657 P.2d at 951. Quintero has no application to the facts presently before us. In Quinte-ro, the police received a call reporting a "suspicious looking man” standing at a bus stop carrying a television set. The police officer responded to the call and arrested the man without knowledge that a television set had been stolen. Probable cause was not established until more than five hours after Quintero was arrested. Given these critical facts, we held that the good faith statute did not apply. In Quintero, we refused to read section 16-3-308(2)(a) as supplanting the constitutional requirement that a police officer must have probable cause prior to making an arrest and conducting an incidental search. Unlike the facts'in the present case, the police officer in Quintero was not acting pursuant to a judicially issued search warrant. Therefore, the provisions of section 16-3-308(2)(b) did not apply.
In my view, section 16-3-308(2)(a), under which Quintero was decided, simply restates the existing standard for probable cause. Probable cause has never required absolute certainty on the police officer’s part. Rather, probable cause deals with probabilities and takes into account the reasonable factual misperceptions of the officer. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965); People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971); see also Note, The Colorado Statutory Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Step Too Far?, 53 U.Colo.L.Rev. 809, 816-17 (1982); W. LaFave Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect Into Custody (1965).
. Section 16-3-308(2)(b), when read in its entirety, further supports my conclusion that the "good faith” language in subsection (2)(b) encompasses good faith mistakes of law. Subsection (2)(b) evinces an intent, consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s rulings, to limit the exclusionary rule to those areas where the deterrent objectives of the rule can actually be achieved. For example, subsection (2)(b) includes within its definition of a good faith "technical violation” instances where a police officer relies on a statute that a court later declares unconstitutional. The wording of the statute parallels Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held that evidence should not be suppressed when it is seized pursuant to an ordinance which is later found to be unconstitutionally vague. The Court noted in DeFillippo that unlawful police activity would not be deterred by suppressing the evidence because a “prudent officer [could] not [be] required to anticipate that a court would later hold the ordinance unconstitutional.” 443 U.S. at 37-38, 99 S.Ct. at 2632. The mistake committed by the police officer in DeFillippo, like the mistake made by the detective here, was a “mistake of law.” See 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 1.2 at 10-11 (1984 Supp.).
Similarly, subsection (2)(b) also declares that evidence should not be suppressed when a police officer relies on a court decision that is later overruled. The statute again is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975). In Peltier, the Supreme Court recognized that deterrence is not achieved by suppressing evidence under circumstances in which a police officer has relied upon a "validly enacted statute, supported by long-standing administrative regulations and continuous judicial approval.” 422 U.S. at 541, 95 S.Ct. at 2319. The mistake made by the police officer in Peltier again involved a "mistake of law.” 1 W. La-Fave, supra at 11. See also Note: The Exclusionary Rule and a Good Faith Exception: Is it Time for a Change?, 35 Mercer L.Rev. 699 (1984).
. Despite their broad language, Leon and Sheppard do not create a blanket rule of admissibility for all evidence seized pursuant to a defective warrant. Under the good faith exception, a court still retains the power to exclude evidence in those cases where deterrence can be achieved. Specifically, the exclusionary rule is retained in the following situations: (1) where a magistrate or judge plainly had "no business” issuing a warrant; (2) where a magistrate or judge relied on false or misleading information; (3) where the warrant clearly lacks a probable cause basis; and (4) where a judge or magistrate wholly abandons his role as a neutral and detached decision-maker. See Leon, - U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 3421-22, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698-99.
. I would not decide today whether a “technical violation” as defined by section 16-3-308(2)(b) includes the type of law enforcement mistake committed by the police officers in United States v. Leon. In Leon, unlike the facts in Sheppard and the present case, the police had not gathered sufficient information to constitute probable cause at the time they attempted to secure a search warrant.
. The appropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule is also addressed by the Leon decision. Justice White, writing for a majority of the Court, stated:
Judges and magistrates are not adjuncts to the law-enforcement team; as neutral judicial officers, they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of exclusion thus cannot be expected to significantly deter them.
United States v. Leon, — U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 3418, 82 L.Ed.2d at 695. Moylan comments that:
Once it is accepted that the only purpose for denying the jury competent evidence is to "police the police," the decisions in Leon and Sheppard follow ineluctably. Deterrence is only obtained by punishing the police when they are unreasonable and by forbearing to punish them when they are reasonable. The fact patterns, therefore, are analyzed not from the constitutional vantage point of the defendant but from the subjective vantage point of the police. Everything reduces itself to the pivotal question, "Was the police action reasonable?"
Moylan, supra note 5.
.In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the majority in Sheppard for deciding the case on “the broadest possible grounds." — *1153U.S. at -, 104 S.Ct. at 3448, 82 L.Ed.2d at 724 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Justice Stevens’ view, the police officer’s search was "reasonable” and therefore did not violate fourth amendment strictures. Accordingly, Justice Stevens saw no reason for the court to even reach the good faith issue. For a similar criticism of the Sheppard decision, see Wasserstrom & Mer-tens, The Exclusionary Rule on The Scaffold: But Was it a Fair Trial?, 22 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 85, 100 (1984).
. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegal police activity by suppressing evidence that is obtained as a result of police misconduct. However, under some circumstances, such as when an officer mistakenly believes that his conduct comports with the Fourth Amendment, the rule fails to deter official misconduct. In response to such cases, the Fifth Circuit announced a "good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule and refused to suppress evidence "discovered by officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that they are authorized.” United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S.Ct. 946, 67 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981). The court of appeals reasoned that the good faith exception is consistent with the purpose of the exclusionary rule which exists to deter willful or flagrant actions by the police, but not their reasonable good faith actions. See also Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The Reasonable Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 67 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 635 (1978); Comment, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule — Adoption by Williams and Richmond, 51 U.Cin.L.Rev. 83 (1982); Note, Good Faith and the Exclusionary Rule: Demise of the Exclusion Illusion, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. 863 (1981); Note, United States v. Williams: The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 32 Mercer L.Rev. 1392 (1981); Note, Is it Time for a Change in the Exclusionary Rule? United States v. Williams and the Good Faith Exception, 60 Wash.U.L.Q. 161 (1982); Recent Development, Limiting the Application of the Exclusionary Rule: The Good Faith Exception, 34 Vand.L. Rev. 213 (1981). In addition, several states have enacted legislation codifying a good faith exception, see, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3925 (1982); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-3-308 (1981); Colorado Survey; Recent Legislation and Colorado Supreme Court Pecisions, The Colorado Statutory Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: A Step Too Far?, 53 U.Colo.L.Rev. 809 (1982); and a similar exception has been proposed on the federal level. See S. 2231, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Erickson, Pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court Relating to the Criminal Law Field: 1982-83, 99 F.R.D. 345, 370 (1983).
. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure suggests using a “substantiality test" for determining when unlawfully seized evidence should be excluded at trial. Under the substan-tiality test, a court would not invoke the exclusionary sanction in cases, like the present, involving relatively minor police misconduct. American Law Institute, Model Code of Pre-Ar-raignment Procedure § 290.2 (1975). It has been the unlimited application of the exclusionary rule, especially in cases where the police error was inadvertent, that has prompted widespread criticism of the rule in its present form. The substantiality test takes into account both the "willfullness” of the police officer’s conduct and the "seriousness” of his mistake in determining whether the exclusionary rule should be invoked. The Model Code provides in pertinent part:
(2) Determination. A motion to suppress evidence pursuant to this section shall be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is based was substantial, or if otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or of this State.
If the court finds a violation not to be substantial it shall set forth its reasons for such finding.
*1156is) Violations Deemed Substantial. A violation shall in all cases be deemed substantial if it was gross, wilful and prejudicial to the accused. A violation shall be deemed wilful regardless of the good faith of the individual officer if it appears to be part of the practice of the law enforcement agency or was authorized by a high authority within it.
(4) Circumstances to be Considered in Determining Substantiality. In determining whether a violation not covered by Subsection (3) is substantial, the court shall consider all the circumstances including:
(a) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(b) the extent to which the violation was wilful;
(c) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code;
(e) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered; and
(f) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party’s ability to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him.
Id. at § 290.2(2) — (4).
. In addition to the deterrence justification, the Supreme Court has addressed the normative function or goal of judicial integrity as a second reason for suppressing illegally seized evidence. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960); see also People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 150 (Colo.1983) (Erickson, C.J., dissenting). As Justice Brandéis stated in dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandéis, J., dissenting), "[i]f the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for its laws.” While occasionally alluded to, judicial integrity has never been seen as an independent justification for excluding evidence. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search & Seizure, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 665, 669-70 (1970). In recent years, the deterrence rationale has been described as the primary basis for invoking the exclusionary rule. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1741, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); see also Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future, 12 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 507, 510 (1975).
To the extent that the normative rationale remains viable, the reason for invoking the exclusionary rule in this case is lacking. The "imperative of judicial integrity” requires admission of the evidence in issue. The court approved the affidavit by issuing the two warrants. The validity of the warrants issued by the court could not be questioned by Detective Foster. The police should not be punished and would not be deterred if the evidence was suppressed because of the court's error in approving the affidavit and issuing the warrants.