Painter v. State Ex Rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division

THOMAS, Justice,

dissenting.

I must dissent from the decision reflected in the majority opinion in this ease. The district court correctly reversed the award of attorney fees by the hearing examiner because the hearing examiner had no jurisdiction. Further, there is no authority to be found in the statute for a hearing examiner to award attorney fees except in the instance of a contested case, and there was no contested case here. The decision of the district court should be affirmed.

I take it that there is no disagreement among the members of the court that the office of hearing examiners is an administrative agency. The office of hearing examiners is established pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 9-2-2201 (Supp.1994), which provides:

(a) The office of administrative hearings is created as a separate operating agency pursuant to W.S. 9-2-1704(d).

*957The referenced statute, Wyo. Stat. § 9-2-1704 (Supp.1994), makes the agency status of the office of hearing examiners even more clear:

(a) Pursuant to this act and other laws establishing individual departments, the entire executive branch of state government shall be organized into not more than fourteen (14) principal departments except for the offices of the following officials and except as provided in subsection (d) of this section:
(i) Governor;
(ii) Secretary of state;
(iii) State treasurer;
(iv) State auditor;
(v) Attorney general;
(vi) Superintendent of public instruction.
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(d) The entities of state government specified in this subsection are designated as separate operating agencies, which are separate and distinct from the departments and offices specified in subsection (a) of this section because of their quasi-judicial responsibility or because of their unique, specialized function which precludes their inclusion in another department. This act does not otherwise apply to separate operating agencies. Separate operating agencies are as follows:
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(xi) Office of administrative hearings created by W.S. 9-2-2201;

Similarly, the statutory process for placing a worker’s compensation matter before the office of hearing examiners is straightforward. The relevant statute, WYO. STAT. § 27-14-601 (Supp.1994), provides in pertinent part:

(k) Determinations by the division pursuant to this section and W.S. 27-14-605 shall be in accordance with the following:
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(iv) Any interested party may request a hearing before a hearing examiner on the final determination of the division by filing a written request for hearing with the division within fifteen (15) days after the date the notice of the final determination was mailed by the division. If the division has not rendered a final determination within sixty (60) days following the date the claim was filed, any interested party may request a hearing before a hearing examiner in the manner prescribed by this paragraph. If the written request for hearing is sent to the division by certified or registered mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, proof of such mailing within the time provided by this subsection with a receipt signed by an agent of the state of Wyoming shall be presumed to be timely filing of the request with the division;
(v) Upon receipt of a request for hearing, the division shall immediately provide notice of the request to the appropriate clerk of court and the appropriate hearing authority as determined pursuant to W.S. 27-14r-616[.]

The award of attorney fees by the hearing examiner is specifically provided for in the statutes, and it must be limited to those situations. The relevant provision is found in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602 (Supp.1994) (emphasis added):

(a) A hearing examiner designated by the office of administrative hearings created by W.S. 9-2-2201 shall conduct contested cases under this act in accordance with this section.
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(d) Upon request, the hearing examiner may appoint an attorney to represent the employee or claimants and may allow the appointed attorney a reasonable fee for his services at the conclusion of the proceeding. An appointed attorney shall be paid according to the order of the hearing examiner either from the worker’s compensation account, from amounts awarded to the employee or claimants or from the employer. If the employer or division prevails, the attorney’s fees allowed shall not affect the employer’s experience rating. Fees allowed shall be at an hourly rate established by the director of the office of administrative hearings and any application for attorney’s fees shall be supported by a verified itemization of all services provided. No fee shall be award*958ed in any case in which the hearing examiner determines the claim to be frivolous and without legal or factual justification.

An administrative agency has only the power granted to it by statute, and the justification for the exercise of any authority by the agency must be found in the statutes. E.g., Tri County Telephone Assoc., Inc. v. Wyoming Public Service Comm’n, 910 P.2d 1359 (Wyo.1996); Kerr-McGee, Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 903 P.2d 537, 541 (Wyo.1995); Union Pacific Resources Co. v. State, 839 P.2d 356 (Wyo.1992); Jackson v. State ex rel. Workers’ Comp. Div., 786 P.2d 874 (Wyo.1990). The jurisprudential principle applicable in this case was stated clearly by the court in LoSasso v. Braun, 386 P.2d 630, 631 (Wyo.1963) (citations omitted):

If the legislature did in fact have such an intention, it failed to express it, and of course, we could not if we would act for the legislature by adding an exception which is clearly omitted. Such action would be in violation of the general rule that courts cannot supply omissions in a statute and will not read into a statute exceptions not made by the legislature. * * *
As stated in State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, 87 Ariz. 206, 349 P.2d 774, 776, it is a universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.

That is exactly what the court has done in the majority opinion. The decision enlarges, stretches, expands and extends the statute to approve the award of attorney fees that is not justified by the express provisions of the statute. It has supplied a perceived omission in the statute, by adding to the authority of the hearing examiner beyond that provided by the statute. It is bad jurisprudence, and my experience teaches me that normally bad jurisprudence results in bad law. The decision of the district court should be affirmed.