(dissenting)—I am in accord with the views expressed in Judge Finley’s dissenting opinion, but I wish to emphasize his reference to the supremacy clause of the United States constitution because, in my opinion, we are bound by the interpretation which the United States supreme court placed upon the word “activities” in § 9 (b) of the atomic energy act of 1946, in Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U. S. 232, 96 L. Ed. 257, 72 S. Ct. 257. To my mind, this constitutional provision is the key to the solution of the problem presented in this case.
The contract between respondent and the atomic energy commission (described in the findings of the trial court) makes it very evident that respondent is merely spending money belonging to the United States in the manner directed by the commission. Respondent’s actions pursuant to the contract are not its own but are in fact, as well as in law, activities of the commission. The relationship created by the contract differs materially from that which existed between the government and the contractor in Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186, 82 L. Ed. 187, 58 S. Ct. 233, where the latter undertook to construct a certain dam and power house for a lump sum. In so doing, the contractor expended its own funds and presumably realized a profit. Here respondent’s actions are directly controlled by the commission in the minutest detail, and the only monetary compensation received by respondent for acting as the commission’s agent is the sum of one dollar.
Article VI of the United States constitution contains the supremacy clause, which reads:
“This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties *432made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall he hound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding” (Italics mine.)
This provision means that, as a judge of this court, I am bound by the interpretation which the supreme court of the United States has placed upon the act of Congress involved in the case at bar. This statute in § 9 (b) provides that “. . . the activities ... of the commission are hereby expressly exempted from taxation in any manner or form by any state. ...”
The supreme court, which is the final authority on the meaning of acts of Congress, has given the term “activities” a broad interpretation and this is binding upon all state courts. Federal statutes must be uniformly construed throughout the United States both in Federal and state courts.
Therefore, under the supremacy clause, the decision in the Carson case, supra, holding that the term “activities” in the atomic energy act means “all authorized methods of performing the governmental functions” compels an affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.
The only remedy available to appellant is to seek redress from the Congress.
May 18, 1953. Petition for rehearing denied.