dissenting:
In his first assignment, appellant contends he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied a post-examination competency hearing prior to trial. I agree.
On August 21, 1985, the trial judge ordered a competency examination of appellant after finding that “a doubt exists as to [his] present competency.” (O.R. 49) Following examination at Eastern State Hospital in Vinita, Oklahoma, a staff psychiatrist wrote a letter to the trial judge expressing her opinion that appellant was competent to stand trial. (O.R. 48) Contrary to the provisions of 22 O.S.1981, § 1175.4(A), the trial judge resumed criminal proceedings without holding the mandatory post-examination competency hearing. On June 2, 1988, in an unpublished order, a majority of this Court, with this writer dissenting, remanded this case for a post-examination competency hearing.
Two prior unanimous decisions of this Court have held that a new trial is required under such circumstances. See Kelly v. State, 735 P.2d 566, 567 (Okla.Crim.App.1987); Scott v. State, 730 P.2d 7, 9 (Okla.Crim.App.1986). Once a trial court finds a doubt as to an accused’s competency, it must order a competency examination. 22 O.S.1981, § 1175.3(D). The accused is then examined by an expert who must answer a number of specific questions related to the competency of the accused. 22 O.S.1981, § 1175.3(E). Once this examination has been completed, a post-examination competency hearing “shall” be held. 22 O.S.1981, § 1175.4(A). Criminal proceedings “shall resume” after the post-examination competency hearing only if the accused is found to be competent. 22 O.S.1981, § 1175.6(1). Therefore, having failed to comply with Section 1175.4(A), the trial judge in the instant case was without authority to proceed to trial. Under the Oklahoma competency statutes, 22 O.S.1981, §§ 1175.1-1175.8, once a doubt has been found as to an accused’s competency, the trial judge has authority to proceed to trial “only after a post-examination hearing at which the fact finder resolves the doubt and makes an official determination that the defendant is competent to stand trial.” Scott, 730 P.2d at 9. Scott thus makes it clear that, under Oklahoma statutory law, the post-examination competency hearing must be held prior to trial. This is why the majori*1235ty’s reliance on Rowell v. State, 699 P.2d 651, 652 (Okla.Crim.App.1985), is misplaced. Moreover, in Rowell, unlike here, the accused voluntarily and intelligently waived his statutory right to a post-examination hearing. Id. at 652.
Finally, the majority expressly directed the trial judge to “make findings concerning the feasibility of presently determining appellant’s competency to stand trial in light of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966)....” Anderson v. State, No. F-86-466 (Unpublished Order, June 2, 1988). However, in the response sent to this Court by the trial judge, no such findings were made. Therefore, because the majority has not enforced the requirements set forth in its remand order, the serious questions concerning the feasibility of determining whether appellant was competent to stand trial, some thirty (30) months after trial, have gone unanswered. The United States Supreme Court has recognized “the difficulty of retrospectively determining an accused’s competence to stand trial” and the “need for concurrent determination_” Pate, 383 U.S. at 387, 86 S.Ct. at 843.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.