I dissent in Number 17176.
The majority opinion holds in effect: (1) That the entity to receive the tax exemption provided by article XIII, section 1½ of the California Constitution, must use its property for “religious worship.” This, of course, is obvious. The Constitution so provides. (2) That apparently, in order to avoid the application of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the courts in determining the validity of tax exemptions to entities using property for religious worship have held that it is not the fact that the property is so used that makes the exemption valid but the fact that those entities use the properties not only for religious worship, but also “to inculcate principles of sound morality” (County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 F. 385, 400), or as the majority opinion states, “for the many other things all churches do which are properly cognizable by the state.”
Thus, we have the rather anomalous situation that the entity must be a religious one which type is prohibited from receiving any consideration from government and yet because it uses its property for cultural, social and moral purposes, it is entitled to the exemption in spite of its main purpose.
The third holding, then, is that any entity which, although admittedly not using its property for “religious worship” in the strict sense (and in the sense which undoubtedly was intended by the people and the legislators at the time the exemption was placed in the various state constitutions) may in a broad sense pursue its principles with religious fervor and provide those “other things all churches do which are *704properly cognizable by the state,” must likewise be interpreted as engaged in “religious worship”; otherwise the exemption provisions would be violative of the First Amendment. It may very well be that the reasoning of the courts in holding, as they have, that churches (using “religious worship” in the commonly accepted definition as “adoration, or reverence, paid to God”) are entitled to exemption because of the use of their properties for other laudable purposes rather than strictly religious purposes, is a very artificial one. Actually, as shown in the majority opinion, some courts have held that the religious aspect is the real reason for the exemption. As said in Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, vol. LXXXIV, Washington Law Reporter, page 1072, cited in the majority opinion (p. 1082): “Viewing taxation as an important branch of the science of economics, exemption from taxation of religious institutions can be justified by the fact only that religion and religious societies teach people to be good, honest and law abiding, less likely to injure their neighbors, tortiously or contractually, and less apt to violate the criminal laws; and, by reason thereof, of economic value to the community. On any such basis the petitioner would be entitled to the same exemption as afforded a church. But one would have to be naive to believe that the exemption to religious societies was based on any such consideration—that it was logical rather than emotional. The exemption was given to promote religion and the belief in, and the worship of God, and was due to our early religious background. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 465 [12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226].”
In his dissenting opinion in McCollum v. Board of Education (1948), 333 U.S. 203 [75 S.Ct. 306, 99 L.Ed. 713, 2 A.L.R. 2d 1338], the case dealing with release of public school pupils during the school day for religious instruction in tax supported public school buildings, Mr. Justice Reed said “It seems clear to me that the ‘aid’ referred to by the Court in the Everson case could not have been those incidental advantages that religious bodies . . . obtain as a by-product of organized society. This explains the welt-known fact that all churches receive ‘aid’ from government in the form of freedom from taxation.” (P. 249; emphasis added.)
In the federal tax system corporations, funds and foundations for religious purposes are exempted from the federal income tax. ([26 U.S.C.A.] Int. Rev. Code, § 501, subd. (c) (3).) Even the fair rental value of a parsonage to a minister *705of religion or a rental allowance paid to him is exempt from income tax action. ([26 U.S.C.A.] Int. Rev. Code, § 107, subds. (1) and (2).) Gifts to religious organizations are deductible. ([26 U.S.C.A.] Int. Rev. Code, § 170, subd. (c).)
While Fellowship of Humanity and other philosophical beliefs of similar type are commendable organizations, it must be remembered as was pointed out in the Washington Ethical Society case concerning that society (p. 1083) that the Fellowship, while possibly not actively opposed to the belief in or worship of a Supreme Being, nevertheless discourages such belief. To allow tax exemption to such an organization would be directly contrary to the intent of the adopters of the tax exemption provisions. Reverence for morality, ethics and right living (no matter how desirable and laudable it may be) is not religious worship.
Congress itself has interpreted the meaning of religion in enacting the Selective Service Act of 1948 (50 U.S.C.A. § 456 (j).) It said: “... Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views of a merely personal moral code.” Equally significant is the fact that by amendment of June 27, 1952, to the Nationalization Act of 1940 (e. 477, tit. III, ch. 2, § 337, 66 Stats. 258, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1448), a definition of "religious training and belief” identical with the definition of such term in the Selective Service Act of 1948, was adopted.
Again Congress recently added to the oath of allegiance the words “under God.” From before the Declaration of Independence, which refers to “the separate and equal station to which . . . nature’s God entitle[s]” a people and states that all men “are endowed by their Creator ...” and ends with “a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence,” to the present date, history shows that “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” (Zorach v. Clauson, 343 Ü.S. 306, 313 [72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954].)
In view of the historic background of the tax exemption provisions and the generally accepted and time honored definition of the words “religious worship” I cannot accept in that definition the practice of ethical and philosophical principles and ideas, no matter how fervently and sincerely carried on. To do so would open the door to many organizations completely *706beyond the intent and purview of the exemption provisions. Most fraternal organizations except for certain limitations could qualify. They have altruistic principles, advocate the brotherhood of man and following the Golden Rule. Of course, the facts that membership is not open to all who might be willing to espouse their beliefs, that their social nature is equally, if not more, important than their altruistic nature, the absolute requirement of payment of initiation fees and dues, and other distinctions, make them ineligible to the exemption.
Nor do I believe that applying the theistic requirements to the definition of “religious worship” constitutes a violation of the First Amendment, and is a law “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” As pointed out in the majority opinion as well as here, this definition has been accepted over the years by the people, Legislatures and the Congress, and although the effect of the First Amendment upon such definition has not directly been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court, as to tax exemption, it has held such definition in other matters not to be violative of the Constitution (even though sometimes by a divided court).
Moreover, tax exemptions of this kind have gone practically unquestioned as to the effect of the First Amendment for nearly a century and a half. See quotation in majority opinion from Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal.2d 644 [298 P.2d 1], “An examination of court opinions discloses the fact that legislation granting indirect subsidies, in the form of tax exemption, is upheld by the courts, even though a direct subsidy to the same institutions would be denied under the doctrine of direct public purpose. This is amply illustrated in the case of churches . . .” (Minn. L. Rev., vol. 18, at p. 419 (1933-1934).)
During the time that the courts have been upholding tax exemptions to entities engaged in “religious worship” they have assumed or held that the definition of those words meant worship of a Supreme Being.
While of course length of time will not make that constitutional which is unconstitutional, nevertheless time-honored tradition may be important in determining the meaning of a constitutional provision. (See article on State Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, Stan. L. Rev. (March, 1957), vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 366-375.)
Concerning my opinion I deem it only fair to say that *707the writer of the majority opinion has done a painstaking and excellent work in analyzing the problems involved and the authorities upon the subject. I agree with most of the opinion except only the portion to the effect that to save tax exemption from the First Amendment it is necessary to extend the exemption to philosophical and ethical organizations and not to limit it to “churches” in the generally accepted view of that term.
I therefore would reverse the judgment in Number 17176.
I concur in the opinion in Number 17175.
Appellants’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court in No. 17176 was denied November 5, 1957. Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.