Plaintiff, Edna Wilder, appeals from the district court grant of defendant John Redd’s summary judgment motion and the dismissal of her complaint. In this appeal, Wilder alleges that the district court improperly applied the co-employee immunity doctrine. We disagree and affirm the district court’s order dismissing Wilder’s complaint.
At approximately 11:30 a.m. on August 1, 1984, Edna Wilder, an employee of E.G. & G Idaho, Inc., was struck by an automobile while she was walking across a roadway within the parking lot owned by E.G. & G. Idaho, Inc. The automobile which struck Edna Wilder was driven by John Redd, another E.G. & G. employee. At the time of the accident, Redd had left his office and was going to lunch. Wilder was in the process of performing her employment duties.
After Wilder filed a negligence action against Redd, Redd filed a motion for summary judgment in the district court. This motion urged the court to dismiss Wilder’s complaint under the co-employee immunity doctrine established under I.C. §§ 72-2091 *142and 72-211.2 In May of 1985, the district court issued a memorandum decision, finding that, since Wilder and Redd were both acting within the “course of employment” at the time of the accident, the co-employee immunity doctrine barred Wilder’s suit. From the district court’s order dismissing Wilder’s complaint, Wilder now appeals.
Idaho workmen’s compensation statutes provide the exclusive remedy of an employee for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. I.C. § 72-211; Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 104 Idaho 333, 334, 659 P.2d 87, 88 (1983). The employer’s exemption from tort liability has been extended, by statute, “to the employer’s surety and all officers, agents, servants and employees of the employer or surety.” I.C. § 72-209. This exemption from liability does not, however, extend to non-employee third parties. See I.C. § 72-223. Under I.C. § 72-223, injured employees may receive workmen’s compensation benefits and thereafter bring negligence actions against third party tortfeasors. Tucker v. Union Oil Co. of California, 100 Idaho 590, 603, 603 P.2d 156, 169 (1979). In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the district court correctly ruled that Redd was a co-employee entitled to the exemption from liability given to a co-employee under I.C. § 72-209, or whether, under the facts of this case, Redd should be subject to liability as a third party tortfeasor under I.C. § 72-223.
Wilder argues that since Redd was on personal business, i.e., going to lunch, at the time of the accident he should not be considered an employee for purposes of the co-employee immunity doctrine as set forth in I.C. § 72-209. Wilder argues that the co-employee immunity doctrine is only available to an employee if that employee is acting within “the scope of employment” at the time of the accident, rather than merely “the course of employment.” According to Wilder, an employee’s conduct is within the scope of employment only if the conduct is actuated to some extent by an intent to serve the master. In other words, Wilder argues that an employee is only entitled to co-employee immunity if an employee is acting in an agency capacity and a respondeat superior relationship exists between the employee and the employer. Wilder argues that the district court erred in applying the co-employee immunity doctrine here because, at the time of the accident, Redd’s conduct was not actuated to some extent by an intent to serve the employer.
Redd, on the other hand, argues that the district court was correct in concluding that, under existing Idaho law, he is entitled to co-employee immunity since he was acting within the “course of employment” at the time of the accident. He argues that the district court correctly applied the regular workmen’s compensation “course of employment” standard set out in I.C. § 72-102(14)(a), rather than a “scope of employment” standard, to determine whether he was entitled to co-employee immunity under I.C. § 72-209. Redd asserts that there is no “scope of employment” standard in the Idaho Workmen’s Compensation Act, and therefore I.C. § 72-209 should be interpreted to make it internally consistent with I.C. § 72-102(14)(a), and that the “course of employment” standard of I.C. § 72-102(14)(a) should be used to determine “employee” status for all purposes, including determinations as to whether an individual is an employee for purposes of co-employee immunity under I.C. § 72-209.
*143Having carefully considered the Idaho statutes, and our prior cases, we conclude that the district court correctly applied the “course of employment” standard.
Unlike the California legislature, which expressly limited co-employee immunity to “any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his employment ...,” see Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal.2d 124, 45 Cal.Rptr. 144, 403 P.2d 400 (1965), the Idaho legislature expressly extended an exemption from liability to “all officers, agents, servants, and employees of the employer or surety” without adopting the California “scope of employment” standard. I.C. § 72-209 (emphasis added). We believe it is significant that in adopting I.C. § 72-209, the legislature has expressly extended the immunity both to employees, as well as agents of the employer, referring to them separately. Since throughout the Workmen’s Compensation Act the relevant criteria for deciding “employee” status has been the “course of employment” test set forth in I.C. § 72-102(14)(a), it is clear that this same standard is to be used to determine “employee” status for purposes of determining co-employee immunity. See Foust v. Bufford, 92 Idaho 639, 448 P.2d 645 (1968).
The history of the co-employee immunity doctrine in Idaho also indicates that the legislature had the “course of employment” standard in mind when I.C. § 72-209 was enacted. Prior to the enactment of I.C. § 72-209, Idaho had acknowledged the general common law rule of co-employee immunity which was commonly recognized in other states. In the case of Foust v. Bufford, 92 Idaho 639, 448 P.2d 645 (1968), on facts strikingly similar to those involved in this case, this Court used the “course of employment” test in applying the common law co-employee immunity rule.3 Since the legislature is presumed to have enacted I.C. § 72-209 with knowledge of this Court’s prior common law interpretation, see C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 515, 547 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1976), it may be presumed that, in the absence of statutory directive otherwise, the statute was adopted with this Court’s prior interpretation upon it.4 Accordingly, we must conclude that in enacting I.C. § 72-209, the legislature intended the “course of employment” standard to apply.
In adopting the “course of employment” standard, the legislature adopted what Larson, in his comprehensive treatise on workmen’s compensation law, has called “the more satisfactory test.” As Larson states:
“The commonest question that arises in these [co-employee immunity] cases is: which test of ‘course of employment’ applies? Is it the workmen’s compensation test, or the vicarious liability test? The answer may be dictated by the wording of the immunity clause itself. In California, for example, under the statutory phrase ‘acting within the scope of his employment,’ suit is barred against the co-employee only if at the time of the injury he was actively engaged in some service for the employer____
“South Carolina, Nevada and Texas also have adopted the common-law test of *144scope of employment, as when in parking lot cases they have ruled that a tort action against the tortfeasor employee was not barred because under the circumstances the employer could not have been held liable in tort for the same injury.
“The more satisfactory test, unless expressly ruled out by statute, is that adopted by New Jersey, Kentucky, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Florida, which simply use the regular workmen’s compensation course of employment standard for this purpose. After all, there are troubles and complications enough administering one course of employment test under the act, without adding a second. By adopting the compensation test, a court has at hand a ready-made body of cases with which to dispose of most borderline situations.” 2A Larson, Workman’s Compensation Law § 72-23 (citations omitted).
Thus, through legislative directive, Idaho has joined with Larson, and with the courts of those states which have chosen to read their workman’s compensation laws in an internally consistent manner, granting immunity to those employees acting within the “course of employment.” See, e.g., Blank v. Chawla, 234 Kan. 975, 678 P.2d 162, 168 (1984); Massey v. Selensky, 685 P.2d 938, 940 (Mont.1984); Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226 (Wyo.1982); Ward v. Tillman, 179 Ind. App. 626, 386 N.E.2d 1003 (1979); Jackson v. Hutchinson, 453 S.W.2d 269 (Ky.Ct.App. 1970). This reading of the workmen’s compensation laws will serve to promote harmony in the workplace. Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, supra at 1231; Meyer v. Kendig, 641 P.2d 1235, 1239-40 (Wyo. 1982); Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 484 (La.1981). We conclude that the district court did not err in the application of the “course of employment” standard.
The district court also correctly determined that Redd was acting within the “course of employment” at the time of the accident, based on our prior cases. At the time of the accident, Redd was in his vehicle, in the company parking lot, on his way to lunch. In Foust v. Birds Eye Division of General Foods Corp., 91 Idaho 418, 422 P.2d 616 (1967), Mrs. Foust was injured by an automobile driven by a fellow employee as the co-employee backed from a parking space in a company parking lot. At the time of the accident, both the driver and Mrs. Foust had ended their shifts and were preparing to go home. The employer appealed to this Court after Mrs. Foust received an award of workmen’s compensation benefits. On appeal, this Court affirmed the finding that Mrs. Foust’s injuries arose in the course of her employment. Moreover, in Foust v. Bufford, 92 Idaho 639, 448 P.2d 645 (1968), decided one year later, this Court held that the driver of the car which struck Mrs. Foust was also acting in the course of his employment. As the district court in the instant case correctly stated, “The Foust case has a fact situation which is almost identical to the ease at hand.” Thus, despite Wilder’s arguments to the contrary, this Court has previously determined that an employee, preparing to immediately depart from the place of employment is, for purposes of the co-employee immunity doctrine, acting within the course of employment, at least while still on the employer’s premises. Under the holding in Foust, Redd was acting within the course of his employment, and therefore he is entitled to co-employee immunity pursuant to I.C. § 72-709.
Accordingly, the district court’s application of the “course of employment” standard to determine whether an employee is entitled to co-employee immunity is correct, as is the district court’s conclusion that, under the facts of this case, Redd was entitled to co-employee immunity.
Affirmed. Costs to respondent.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD, J., concur.. 72-209. Exclusiveness of liability of employer. — (1) Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, the liability of the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
(2) The liability of an employer to another person who may be liable for or who has paid damages on account of an injury or occupational disease or death arising out of and in the course of employment of an employee of the employer and caused by the breach of any duty or obligation owed by the employer to such other person, shall be limited to the amount of compensation for which the employer is liable under this law on account of such injury, disease, or death, unless such other person and the employer agree to share liability in a different manner.
(3) The exemption from liability given an employer by this section shall also extend to the employer’s surety and to all officers, agents, servants and employees of the employer or surety, provided that such exemptions from liability shall not apply in any case where the injury or *142death is proximately caused by the wilful or unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents, servants or employees, the loss of such exemption applying only to the aggressor and shall not be imputable to the employer unless provoked or authorized by the employer, or the employer was a party thereto. (Emphasis added.)
. 72-211. Exclusiveness of employee’s remedy. — Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee on account of an injury or occupational disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this law shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury or disease.
. While the pre-1971 Workmen’s Compensation Act contains no statute dealing with co-employee immunity, the act did contain the same "course of employment" standard for determining an employee's right to compensation. This standard was then carried over into the 1971 recodification of the workmen’s compensation laws. See I.C. § 72-102(14)(a).
. We expressly reject Wilder's contention that this Court adopted the narrower "scope of employment,” or agency, test in White v. Ponozzo, 77 Idaho 276, 291 P.2d 843 (1955). In White, it was clear that the plaintiffs co-employee was ácting within the "scope of employment.” As an agent of the employer, this Court stated, "the co-employee becomes merged in the employer and is not a third person, within the meaning of the compensation law, against whom a damage action may be maintained.” Id. at 280, 291 P.2d at 845. Thus, while White provides that agents of an employer are entitled to immunity, White does not limit this immunity to such agents. It was not until this Court decided Foust v. Bufford, supra, that the question whether non-agent employees were entitled to immunity was addressed. As noted above, Foust determined that employees acting within the "course of employment,” as defined under the workers compensation laws, also were entitled to this immunity.