(dissenting) — I would hold that the place and content restrictions in the permanent injunction, ordering the picketers to refrain from picketing directly in front of the medical clinic and enjoining oral use of the words "murder", "kill" and their derivatives, while young children are present, violate federal free speech protections. I would reverse the trial court and dismiss the contempt orders.
Place Restrictions
In my view the majority has engaged in an unlawful abridgment of appellants' exercise of their First Amendment right to picket and demonstrate in a peaceful and orderly manner. The place restrictions contained in the injunction go far beyond measures that are justifiable as reasonably necessary to maintaining access to and from a health care facility or in protecting a woman's privacy right. The majority, instead of proscribing only activity posing a serious threat to those desiring access to the health care facility and searching for less restrictive alternatives, has chosen the easier course of riding roughshod over the demonstrators' exercise of First Amendment rights in the very place where they are entitled to the most protection — our public sidewalks. It is rather ironic and unfortunate that at a time when the abortion issue is at the forefront of public debate this court places a severe impediment upon those most desirous to have their opinions heard.
*249We start with certain indisputable propositions of constitutional law. The first of these is that public places, particularly streets and sidewalks, are the normal and natural locations for our citizens' exercise of their First Amendment right of free speech.
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939); see also Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303, 41 L. Ed. 2d 770, 94 S. Ct. 2714, 2717 (1974); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Coun., 96 Wn.2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
While the State may reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of the exercise of First Amendment rights as necessary to protection of other compelling public interests, Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 17 L. Ed. 2d 149, 87 S. Ct. 242 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471, 85 S. Ct. 453 (1965), "time and place" regulations can enormously hinder the individual's ability to engage in effective advocacy. "Access to the 'streets, sidewalks, parks, and other similar public places . . . for the purpose of exercising [First Amendment rights] cannot constitutionally be denied broadly. . . .'" Grayned, at 117 (quoting Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Vly. Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315, 20 L. Ed. 2d 603, 88 S. Ct. 1601 (1968)). Even when regulation is justified, it must be "narrowly tailored to further the State's legitimate interest." Grayned, at 116-17; Police Dep't, at 98; Cox, at 575-76. Moreover, exercise of First Amendment rights, when logically related to a par*250ticular forum, is further protected from regulations which would preclude the use of that place. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 15 L. Ed. 2d 637, 86 S. Ct. 719 (1966) (plurality opinion); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319, 1323-24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974).
In balancing the individual's right to demonstrate against the concern for the protection of others, the competing interests must be assessed on an individual basis; blanket bans and absolute prohibitions against picketing in front of or near a site have been universally condemned where a less restrictive and more clearly tailored alternative may be formulated. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Police Dep't v. Mosley, supra at 100-01:
Predictions about imminent disruption from picketing involve judgments appropriately made on an individualized basis, not by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject matter.
In short, although limited regulation is permitted, it must be carefully defined and sufficiently circumscribed to minimize the opportunities for abuse of discretion, lest this treasured constitutional right of free speech be subjected to excessive or unnecessary restraints.
The proper discharge of this responsibility is difficult. The court's task would be easier if it had broad discretion to squelch free speech and assembly without the necessity of tailoring any restraints to what is absolutely necessary in each individual case. Unfortunately, such discretion has been exercised in the present instance. The result, unsurprisingly, is an excessive restraint. The majority has placed its concern for protection of one constitutional right above another, and paid scant heed to basic time-honored principles of free speech and expression.
The resulting injunction, as approved by the majority, prohibits picketers from (1) picketing, demonstrating, or "counseling" at the Sixth Avenue Medical Building, except along the public sidewalk north of the bus stop on Stevens Avenue; (2) threatening, assaulting, intimidating or coerc*251ing anyone entering or leaving the Medical Building; (3) interfering with ingress or egress at the building or parking lots to the south and southeast of the premises; (4) trespassing on the premises; (5) engaging in any unlawful activity directed at respondent physicians or their patients; (6) referring, in oral statements while at the picket site, while young children are present, to physicians or patients, staff or clients as "murdering" or "murderers", "killing" or "killers", or to children or babies as being "killed" or "murdered" by anyone in the Medical Building.
The trial court's findings, which purportedly justify these restrictions, are that (1) picketers have positioned themselves on the public sidewalks along Sixth Avenue and at the only walkway to the main entrance; (2) picketers have obstructed the passage of visitors and staff at the Medical Building; (3) picketers have caused the physicians and patients emotional distress, created a substantial risk of physical and mental harm, and forced "counseling" upon persons attempting to enter or leave the premises; (4) picketing has been conducted in an aggressive, disorderly and coercive manner, and in instances has given rise to a clear and present danger to patients; (5) picketing has been conducted in a manner incompatible with the character and function of the Medical Building; and (6) picketers have repeatedly referred to physicians practicing in the Medical Building as killers or murderers in the presence of young children.
Although these findings are supported by the record, the record also clearly demonstrates that such incidents have been isolated and infrequent in occurrence. Restrictions less onerous than complete removal of the picketers from the public sidewalk fronting the health care facility are available to protect the State's interest of assuring access to the facility.
In Parkmed Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, Inc., 110 Misc. 2d 369, 442 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1981), a New York trial court enjoined antiabortion picketers "from demonstrating, picketing and in any way interfering ... on the . . . plaza area *252and its steps". On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, struck down this portion of the injunction on the ground that it "was overly broad and unnecessarily restricted peaceful picketing and demonstrating ..." Parkmed Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 551, 552, 457 N.Y.S.2d 27, 29 (1982). Likewise the injunction at issue is broader than necessary, because it prohibits peaceful, controlled picketing that does not impede ingress or egress. The majority in effect concedes that the restrictions are overly broad in regard to effectuating access to the medical facility.
With respect to the State's interest in maintaining ingress and egress, the injunction arguably could be narrowed without compromising that interest. The injunction could (1) limit the number of picketers, (2) require them to remain a certain distance from the walkway leading to the entrance, (3) require them to picket in single file, or (4) all of the above. By narrowing the injunction, the State could serve its significant interest in maintaining convenient access to medical care without unduly limiting the picketers' expressive activities.
Majority opinion, at 231.
The majority nonetheless condones this excessive restraint as necessary to mitigate the harassing effect of antiabortion picketers. In so doing, the majority makes a monumental error in its constitutional analysis. The majority perceives that such picketing invades a woman's privacy rights in effectuating the abortion decision. The privacy interest espoused in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973), however, deals with a woman's right to make a decision concerning abortion without governmental intrusion. See also Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 76 L. Ed. 2d 687, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). This does not mean that a woman is entitled to make a decision about abortion in a vacuum, free from public comment including the views expressed by picketers. This privacy interest does not extend to isolate a woman from public debate by silencing others.
Moreover, speech does not lose its protected character *253simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1215, 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419, 29 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 1575 (1971). According to the Supreme Court, " [t]here is a 'profound national commitment' to the principle that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'" Claiborne, at 913 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964)). In the words of Justice Rutledge, " 'Free trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts." Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537, 89 L. Ed. 430, 65 S. Ct. 315 (1945).
The majority seemingly acknowledges the overzealousness of its concern for a woman's privacy interest when it states that
it is difficult to ascertain what constitutes "harassment" in the apprehensive mind of a woman coming face-to-face with the picketers. By restraining picketing to Stevens Avenue, the court can avoid conjecture on this point, knowing that the woman's right of privacy is protected to the extent permissible under the First Amendment.
Majority opinion, at 231-32.
The ultimate strength of our constitutional guaranties lies in their being unhesitatingly applied in time of controversy and tranquility alike. "If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483, 78 L. Ed. 413, 54 S. Ct. 231, 256, 88 A.L.R. 1481 (1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). The majority here has affirmed an overly broad injunction which abridges the picketers' First Amendment right of free speech.
For these reasons I would remand this case to the trial court with directions to narrow the injunction by eliminating the place restrictions which prohibit picketers from *254picketing, demonstrating, or counseling on the sidewalk fronting the Medical Building. The remaining restrictions in the injunction are sufficient to assure adequate access to the facility.
Because I would hold that the place restrictions are invalid, I would also reverse the contempt orders and fee awards and assessments. These penalties were levied against picketers who violated the place restrictions by picketing along the sidewalk fronting the medical clinic. There was no evidence that these picketers violated any other restrictions in the injunction relating to interfering with ingress or egress to the clinic.
Content Restrictions
It is also my view that enjoining oral use of the words "murder", "kill" and their derivatives in the presence of children under an identified age violates First Amendment rights of free speech. Because the injunction restricts the content of speech in advance of actual publication or broadcast, it constitutes a prior restraint. The United States Supreme Court held in Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419 that "[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity. " Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-59, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976). The primary reason for this heavy presumption of invalidity was articulated by the Court in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559, 43 L. Ed. 2d 448, 95 S. Ct. 1239 (1975):
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.
The only basis upon which a prior restraint can be upheld is if the communication restrained is constitutionally unprotected speech such as obscenity, incitement to acts of violence, or speech that directly threatens military *255security. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 75 L. Ed. 1357, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931). The speech restrained by the majority here does not fall within any of these narrow categories.
The only possible unprotected category under which the restrained words in these actions might fall is the category of words identified in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 86 L. Ed. 1031, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942) as having "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, ..." and whose "very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
Contemporary applications of this doctrine prove that it is a very narrow exception to the rule that prior restraints are presumptively unconstitutional. In Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm'ty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969), the Court, overturning a restriction on wearing of armbands in school as a political protest, emphasized that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression." Restraint of speech may not be constitutionally justified from a "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." Tinker, at 509. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909-10, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1215, 102 S. Ct. 3409 (1982); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284, 91 S. Ct. 1780 (1971).
The evidence fails to demonstrate any incitement to violence or other significant harm to the listeners. Significantly, the words proscribed play an important role in the "exposition of ideas" in the abortion debate. The combination of the absence of significant harm and the importance of the restricted words to the abortion debate dictates that the prior restraint cannot be constitutionally justified. While the majority finds that the doctor-patient relationship may be harmed by the use of such words, and that they may have some "physical and psychological" effect on young children, none of the evidence demonstrates an incitement to violence or a harm that was any greater than *256the kind of anger, agitation, embarrassment, and emotional turmoil that is the natural product of debate and the conflict of ideas deemed permissible in the cases discussed above.
Further, the majority's command that the trial court provide guidelines for ascertaining when a child of susceptible age is present is an impossible task. I can conceive of no reasonable means of determining on casual meeting of a child on a sidewalk whether the child is 11 or 12 years of age. A prior restraint cannot be justified on such evidence.
The words "murder", "kill", and their derivatives play an essential role in the debate concerning abortion. To those opposed to abortion, the logical conclusion of that moral position is that abortions result in babies being killed or murdered. If the court were to deprive picketers of the words which most clearly embody the moral position of those picketers, it would eviscerate completely the debate concerning abortion. Just as abortion proponents must be able to articulate their belief that abortion is constitutionally justified as an aspect of a woman's right to procreative freedom, see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 44 L. Ed. 2d 600, 95 S. Ct. 2222 (1975), so must abortion opponents be permitted to articulate their belief that abortion should not be permitted because it involves the taking of human life.
There is no question that the use of words such as "kill" and "murder" caused some agitation and emotional turmoil. Such responses are an inevitable part of debate that lies at the very heart of freedom of speech. Those words embody and crystallize the position of antiabortion activists. Deprived of such words, antiabortion activists would be deprived of the right to carry their argument fully to the public. The worth of such words can only be evaluated in the commerce of ideas where they will be judged in relation to opposing arguments and ultimately either accepted or rejected.
In sum, the restrictions on content in the injunction is an unconstitutional prior restraint, and the evidence presented in this case did not establish a narrow exception on the rule *257of presumptive unconstitutionality for such restraints.
Conclusion
I would hold that the place and content restrictions in the permanent injunction are violative of picketers' First Amendment rights of free speech. The place restriction is overly broad and unnecessarily prohibits peaceful picketing and demonstrating on the public sidewalk fronting the medical clinic. The content restriction is an unjustified prior restraint which would prohibit use of words which are an inevitable part of debate concerning abortion.