The trial court issued a sweeping permanent injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protesters from picketing on the public *1026sidewalk in front of a health clinic at which abortions are performed. The only issue before this court is whether the injunction improperly restricted the protesters’ right of free expression, in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This is the second time that we have addressed the validity of the injunction. Originally, a majority of this court held the injunction to be constitutional. (Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc. v. Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 860 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 873 P.2d 1224], hereafter Planned Parenthood I.) I disagreed. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and directed this court to reconsider the matter in light of the high court’s recent decision in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. _ [129 L.Ed.2d 593, 114 S.Ct. 2516] (hereafter Madsen), which set forth the constitutional limitations on the power of a trial court to enjoin anti-abortion picketing in front of a clinic.
Again, a majority of this court holds that the trial court’s injunction does not violate the First Amendment. Again, I dissent. In my view, the trial court’s injunction violates the principles set forth in Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. _ [129 L.Ed.2d 593, 114 S.Ct. 2516], in two respects.
First, Madsen permits the trial court to erect “buffer zones” (defined areas in which protesting or picketing is restricted or prohibited) in front of clinics at which abortions are performed only when “necessary to serve a significant government interest.” (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 608, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2525].) In this case, the trial court’s broad permanent injunction was unnecessary, because previously a more narrow preliminary injunction had been effective in protecting the health and safety of the clinic’s patients, in providing unimpeded public access to the clinic’s facilities, and in ensuring the free flow of traffic on the street and sidewalk in front of the clinic.
Second, Madsen requires that injunctions creating “buffer zones” in front of clinics be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the injunction’s objective. (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 600-610, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2526].) But, in this case, the permanent injunction is much broader than necessary to accomplish its objective because it defines an area that is the reverse of what the United States Supreme Court meant by the term “buffer zone.” A buffer zone, as I just explained, is a carefully defined and narrowly circumscribed area in which expressive conduct such as picketing or leafletting is restricted or prohibited by court order. The injunction here stands this concept on its head by defining a small area and *1027then decreeing that expressive activities may take place only in that demarcated space, thereby prohibiting such activities in an undefined and potentially infinite area outside the designated zone. An injunction in this form— walling speech in rather than out—is altogether different from the injunction involved in Madsen. Whether the First Amendment ever permits expressive activity to be caged and confined by such a reverse buffer zone is a novel question; certainly, such a drastic curtailment of speech cannot be constitutionally justified on the facts shown here.
The picketers in this case sought to express views that undoubtedly were disturbing or offensive to the clinic’s patients and employees. But, as the United States Supreme Court has observed, to warrant First Amendment protection “the communication need not meet standards of acceptability.” (Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe (1971) 402 U.S. 415, 419 [29 L.Ed.2d 1, 5-6, 91 S.Ct. 1575].) Thus, under our system of government we may not prohibit the dissemination of views simply because they are controversial, distasteful, or disturbing. To sanction such a prohibition “would be a complete repudiation of the philosophy of the Bill of Rights.” (Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943) 319 U.S. 105, 116 [87 L.Ed. 1292, 1300, 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 81].)
I
Ordinarily, an appellate court’s review of a trial court’s factual findings is limited to determining whether the record of the trial contains substantial evidence to support them. (Ford & Vlahos v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1220, 1235 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 885 P.2d 877]; Peery v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 837, 845 [176 Cal.Rptr. 533, 633 P.2d 198].) But, in reviewing a trial court’s order restricting First Amendment rights, an appellate court has “a constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole, without deference to the trial court.” (Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995) _ U.S. _, _ [132 L.Ed.2d 487, 500, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 2344].) The trial court’s order may be upheld only when the reviewing court concludes, after independently examining the record, that the judgment “ ‘does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.’ ” (Ibid., quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 285 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 709-710, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412]; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 499 [80 L.Ed.2d 502, 515-516, 104 S.Ct. 1949].)
This heightened standard of review applies in this case, in which the trial court’s permanent injunction bans all picketing and leafletting on the public *1028sidewalk in front of the clinic. Picketing and leafletting are expressive activities at the core of the First Amendment. (See, e.g., Boos v. Barry (1988) 485 U.S. 312, 318 [99 L.Ed.2d 333, 342-343, 108 S.Ct. 1157]; United States v. Grace (1983) 461 U.S. 171, 176-177 [75 L.Ed.2d 736, 742-744, 103 S.Ct. 1702].) Indeed, “handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint [] is the essence of First Amendment expression.” (McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n (1995) 514 U.S. _, _ [131 L.Ed.2d 426, 440-441, 604, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 1519].) And a public sidewalk is a quintessential public forum, a place traditionally used for exchanging ideas and expressing opinions. (Frisby v. Schultz (1988) 487 U.S. 474, 480 [101 L.Ed.2d 420, 428-429, 108 S.Ct. 2495]; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund (1985) 473 U.S. 788, 802 [87 L.Ed.2d 567, 579-580, 105 S.Ct. 3439]; Clark v. Burleigh (1992) 4 Cal.4th 474, 482 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 841 P.2d 975].)
Here, an independent review of the record can lead to only one conclusion: the trial court’s permanent injunction banning all picketing by antiabortion protesters on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic burdens the protesters’ right of free expression substantially more than is necessary to achieve any significant government interest.
II
Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo, Inc.’s (Planned Parenthood), clinic is located in a one-story building in the City of Vallejo. Its entrances, as well as the clinic itself, are in the rear of the building. The building is set well back from the sidewalk and the street. In front of the building is a parking area that extends around one side and behind the building. Two driveways intersect the sidewalk, providing clients and staff of the clinic with access to Broadway, a busy four-lane avenue.
On August 8, 1990, Planned Parenthood filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the Superior Court of Solano County. The complaint alleged that beginning in March 1990, defendants (Citizens for Life and its director, Christine Williams) had intimidated and harassed the clinic’s staff and patients by accosting people entering and leaving the clinic’s parking lot and attempting to force anti-abortion literature on them, and by obstructing the clinic’s driveway. The complaint further alleged that defendants had disrupted business at the clinic through nonamplified noise and by gaining, or attempting to gain, entrance to the clinic’s parking lot, grounds, walkway, and offices.
In its complaint, Planned Parenthood asked the trial court to enjoin defendants from engaging in various forms of conduct and speech. The only *1029issue before this court, however, is the constitutionality of the ban on picketing on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic. (Planned Parenthood I, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 868.) In this regard, the complaint did not seek a total ban on picketing: rather, it asked the court to restrict defendants to two pickets. In a declaration attached to the complaint, Janice Schoenfeld (an employee of Planned Parenthood) stated: “One picket could stand on one of the sidewalks, and one on the other side of the driveway in safety in order to get their message across. All people going into the clinic would have to pass their signs. Their viewpoint would be clear to passers-by on Broadway [the clinic’s location].” Schoenfeld urged the court “to regulate the pickets by ordering that two only, no children, may stand on the public sidewalk.” A second declaration, by Karen Ryer (an attorney representing Planned Parenthood), contained a similar request: “There are two sections of sidewalk in front of the building, ideal for pickets. However, the sidewalks are small, and only one picket could occupy each section. Otherwise, they could risk being hit by cars turning into the parking lot from a very busy Broadway Avenue.”
On August 8, 1990, the day on which Planned Parenthood filed its complaint, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order pending consideration of preliminary and permanent injunctions. The order, prepared for the trial court’s signature by Planned Parenthood, permitted defendants two pickets on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic.
On September 12, 1990, the court held a hearing on Planned Parenthood’s request for a preliminary injunction. Two witnesses testified at the hearing: Janice Schoenfeld, the Planned Parenthood employee whose declaration had been submitted with the complaint, and Jeanette Hammer, an anti-abortion protester.
Schoenfeld described some of the disruptive activities of the protesters, but admitted that she had never asked the police to arrest any protesters and that she had never made a citizen’s arrest of any protesters. She stated that the police had come to the site once and admonished the protesters to stay on the sidewalk. She said she had no objection to picketing on the sidewalk in front of the clinic, so long as it did not involve a large number of pickets or blocking of the clinic entrance.
Anti-abortion protester Hammer testified that, she had done “counseling” (which Hammer described as approaching people with literature and attempting to engage them in conversation) in the parking lot near the clinic’s door. She explained why counseling should be permitted in the parking lot rather than the sidewalk.
*1030On September 19, 1990, a week after the hearing, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction increasing to four the number of picketers permitted on the sidewalk in front of the clinic. (The preceding temporary restraining order had allowed only two picketers.) The court restricted “picketing and/or counseling to the public sidewalk in front of the building,” and it ordered that “not more than two [of the protesters] shall be less than ten feet from any other picketer or counselor.” (Diagram A, attached to this dissenting opinion, depicts the site approximately to scale and shows the restrictions imposed by the preliminary injunction.) The preliminary injunction remained in effect for the next 11 months; the record contains no evidence that defendants ever violated its terms.
On April 18, 1991, Planned Parenthood’s application for a permanent injunction was tried to the court. The trial lasted less than four hours and included the testimony of just three witnesses, all called by Planned Parenthood.
Planned Parenthood’s first witness was Janice Schoenfeld, the Planned Parenthood employee who had testified at the hearing on the preliminary injunction. Most of her testimony concerned events occurring before the trial court issued its preliminary injunction. With respect to events occurring after the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the record shows only the following exchange:
“Q. [by counsel for Planned Parenthood]: Have you observed picket activity since the injunction?
“A. [by Schoenfeld]: Yes, but they followed the injunction usually, except for picketers.
“[Counsel for Planned Parenthood]: Thank you. I have nothing further. Thank you.
“The Court: You say they followed the injunction?
“The Witness: They followed the injunction, yes since the injunction.”
The second witness at the trial was Marsha Anderson, the clinic’s director. Her testimony was devoted exclusively to the behavior of the protesters before the trial court’s preliminary injunction, with the possible exception of one statement that may have concerned activities occurring after the injunction was issued: “I called the police to issue the injunction a couple of times, to hand it out to people who were on the sidewalk and were about to break the rules, or breaking the rules.”
*1031The third and final witness at the trial was defendant Christine Williams, the director of defendant Citizens for Life. She testified that Planned Parenthood had called the police in August 1990, when the trial court’s temporary restraining order was in effect, but that since the issuance of the preliminary injunction the picketing by the abortion protesters had been lawful.
On August 1, 1991—four months after the trial on Planned Parenthood’s request for a permanent injunction and eleven months after issuance of the preliminary injunction^-the trial court issued a permanent injunction. Even though Planned Parenthood had never asked the trial court to completely prohibit picketing on the sidewalk in front of the clinic, the court ordered that “[a]ll picketing, demonstrating, or counseling at the Planned Parenthood building shall only take place along the public sidewalk across the street from Planned Parenthood building.” (Italics added; attached as diagram B to my dissent is a drawing of the site approximately to scale showing the extent of the restrictions imposed by the permanent injunction.)
III
The First Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits government action abridging freedom of speech and assembly. The right to freely express one’s beliefs or ideas, unpopular as they may be, is essential to “nearly every other form of freedom.” (Palko v. Connecticut (1937) 302 U.S. 319, 327 [82 L.Ed. 288, 293, 58 S.Ct. 149].) “Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith. We have founded our political system on it.” (Dennis v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 494, 584 [95 L.Ed. 1137, 1191, 71 S.Ct. 857].) Our nation’s historic vigilance against attempts to curtail the expression of speech “has been the one single outstanding tenet that has made our institutions the symbol of freedom and equality” (id. at p. 585 [95 L.Ed. at p. 1191]) and “sets us apart from totalitarian regimes” (Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) 337 U.S. 1, 4 [93 L.Ed. 1131, 1134-1135, 69 S.Ct. 894]).
Picketing is a time-honored method of protest and persuasion, uniquely suited to conveying targeted, site-specific messages that gain their force from the location and context in which they are displayed. Understandably, it is rarely welcomed by the person or business at which it is directed. Those targeted by picketing have often sought to invoke the broad injunctive powers of the judiciary to prohibit picketers from expressing their views, generally contending that picketing is likely to lead to violence or disruption. Although courts may restrict picketing upon proof that the picketers or their supporters have engaged in repeated acts of violence, intimidation, or physical obstruction, restriction on free speech cannot be justified by speculative *1032predictions of future violence or claims of past violence not supported by substantial evidence. (See United Farmworkers of America v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 902, 911-912 [122 Cal.Rptr. 877, 537 P.2d 1237].) Yet there have been times in our history when courts, purportedly acting to avert violent or illegal conduct, have misused their injunctive powers to prohibit even peaceful and orderly picketing by those expressing certain views, as the following discussion illustrates.
The early part of the 20th century saw the burgeoning unionization of America’s labor force. With it came industrial conflict. As workers began striking for better working conditions and higher wages, they encountered fierce opposition from employers who were determined to crush the strikes. The employers turned to the courts, which, receptive to the employers’ position, resorted to their broad injunctive powers to prohibit picketing by the strikers. For example, in Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union No. 218 (C.C.N.D.Ohio 1901) 110 Fed. 698, 700, the court held that picketing by a striking union could be enjoined, regardless of whether it had been accompanied by violence, because picketing “in its nature leads to disturbance, and has a tendency to intimidate.” Similarly, the court in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee (C.C.S.Diowa, 1905) 139 Fed. 582, 584, explaining why the court’s injunctive powers could be used to prohibit picketing by striking workers, stated: “There is and can be no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity .... When men want to converse or persuade, they do not organize a picket line.” (See also, Amer. Foundries v. Tri-City Council (1921) 257 U.S. 184, 205 [66 L.Ed. 189, 198, 42 S.Ct. 72, 27 A.L.R. 360] [pointing out that “[t]he name ‘picket’ indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with peaceable persuasion.”].) Judicial abuse of the injunction became so widespread that both the Democratic and the Republican parties spoke out against it, and proposed “the correction of abuses due to judicial intervention in labor conflicts.” (Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930), p. 1.)
No doubt aware of this background, the high court in Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at page _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pages 606-607, 114 S.Ct. at page 2524], recognized that the broad injunctive powers of the courts are fraught with the “risks of censorship and discriminatory application.” Because of these risks, a reviewing court considering whether an injunction has violated the First Amendment must apply a more stringent test than the standard used to evaluate the constitutionality of content-neutral statutes regulating the time, place, and manner of expression. (Madsen, supra, at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at *1033pp. 606-607, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2524.)1 Thus, the pertinent inquiry is whether “the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” (Id. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 607-608, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2525].) This standard, the court explained, “requires that an injunction be ‘couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective’ of the injunction.” (Id. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 609-610, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2526], quoting Carroll v. President and Comm’rs of Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S. 175, 183 [21 L.Ed.2d 325, 332-333, 89 S.Ct. 347].) In this case, the permanent injunction fails that test.
In Madsen, the trial court issued the injunction only after a prior less restrictive injunction had failed, a fact that figured prominently in the high court’s decision. (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. _, _-_, _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 603, 607-608, 610-611, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2521, 2523-2524, 2527].)
By contrast, here the permanent injunction’s prohibition of all picketing on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic was imposed after a less restrictive injunction had succeeded. Shortly after issuing a temporary restraining order permitting two picketers on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction increasing the permissible number of picketers to four on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic. Roughly a year later, the permanent injunction followed, banning all picketing on the sidewalk in front of the clinic, even though Planned Parenthood had not requested this prohibition. Why this total ban? Had the terms of the preliminary injunction been less than completely effective, Planned Parenthood could certainly have been expected to present evidence of specific problems in the 11 months that the preliminary injunction was in force. Indeed, Planned Parenthood, as the plaintiff in the action (see Evid. Code, § 500) and as the party seeking to restrict speech (see Healy v. James (1972) 408 U.S. 169, 184-185 [33 L.Ed.2d 266, 281-282, 92 S.Ct. 2338]), was required to do so, and without such a showing this crucial factual issue must be resolved against it (see Evid. Code, § 115). Yet Planned Parenthood offered no such evidence at trial.
According to the majority, the evidence at trial showed that the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction failed to safeguard the state’s interests in “protecting unimpeded access to the clinic and the *1034well-being of clinic patients . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1024.) To support this conclusion, the majority appears to rely on just two sentences of testimony.
I first turn to the majority’s statement that “the evidence at trial indicated that picketers had not followed the preliminary injunction . . . (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1024.) The only conceivable basis for this assertion is a statement that the clinic’s escort coordinator, Janice Schoenfeld, made in response to a question at trial whether she had observed picket activity following issuance of the preliminary injunction: “Yes, but they followed the injunction usually, except for picketers.” (Italics added.) This cryptic comment does not support the majority’s assertion, for three reasons. First, through a subsequent inquiry of Schoenfeld, the trial court clarified that the picketers had obeyed the preliminary injunction.2 Second, even if Schoenfeld’s testimony could be construed as suggesting that the picketers had not followed the injunction, her remark is simply a conclusion, unsupported by any specific facts. As such, it is not even competent evidence (see Evid. Code, § 800; People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210]; Lombardo v. Santa Monica Young Men’s Christian Assn. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 529, 540 [215 Cal.Rptr. 224]; Pond v. Insurance Co. of North America (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 280, 289 [198 Cal.Rptr. 517]), much less evidence sufficient to warrant curtailment of the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment to the federal Constitution. Third, even if the majority accurately characterized Schoenfeld’s testimony, it still does not support the trial court’s prohibition of any picketing on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic. When picketing “has been in general lawful,” even though there may have been “infrequent illegal acts not of a serious character,” a total ban of picketing is not permitted and “only the unlawful conduct will be enjoined.” (Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128 (1942) 19 Cal.2d 676, 684 [123 P.2d 20].)
The other fragment of testimony that forms the basis for the majority’s conclusion that the preliminary injunction was ineffective is this statement by the clinic’s director, Marsha Anderson: “I called the police to issue the injunction a couple of times, to hand it out to people who were on the sidewalk and were about to break the rules, or breaking the rules.” From this, the majority concludes that Anderson “had been forced to call the police to enforce the preliminary injunction . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1013.)
*1035But the record shows that Anderson, when she made the statement at issue, was referring to events occurring before the trial court issued the preliminary injunction. Counsel for Planned Parenthood began his questioning of Anderson by asking her to define her duties during March 1990 “up to the injunction date . . . after which he requested her to “describe the incidences that you can remember that occurred during the period of picketing before the injunction that occurred at the clinic.” (Italics added.) After Anderson had described several incidents in which the protesters had engaged in disruptive behavior, including one occasion on which the clinic had called the police, Planned Parenthood’s attorney asked her if she had been forced to call the police on any other occasion. Anderson gave the statement I quoted earlier: “I called the police to issue the injunction a couple of times, to hand it out to people who were on the sidewalk and were about to break the rules, or breaking the rules.” Given the context in which Anderson made this statement, it appears that she was referring to episodes occurring before the preliminary injunction, and that in using the term “injunction” she probably meant the temporary restraining order that preceded the preliminary injunction. It is hardly surprising that the clinic had to ask the police to issue copies of the temporary restraining order to the protesters, for the order was obtained ex parte and the protesters therefore would not have known of its terms;3
Even if Anderson’s statement could be construed as referring to events occurring after issuance of the preliminary injunction, it would not support the trial court’s ban of picketing on the sidewalk in front of the clinic. Anderson’s testimony is devoid of any specifics that would lead her or anyone else to conclude that the protesters were “about to break the rules, or breaking the rules.” Therefore, Anderson’s statement, like the sentence fragment from Schoenfeld’s testimony so heavily relied upon by the majority, is merely a conclusion unsupported by any facts and thus is not competent evidence, much less evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s total prohibition of free speech on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic.4
*1036Even if the trial court had not issued a previous, less restrictive injunction that had successfully protected the state’s interests, the preliminary injunction here would violate the First Amendment. As I shall explain, it is substantially broader than the injunction issued in Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. _ [129 L.Ed.2d 593, 114 S.Ct. 2516], or in any other case upholding a buffer zone in front of a clinic.
In Madsen, the United States Supreme Court upheld a 36-foot “buffer zone” around a health clinic that performed abortions insofar as it applied to activities on the public right-of-way in front of the clinic, but the court invalidated the injunction insofar as it included property to the back and the side of the clinic. (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. _-_ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 609-612, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2526-2528].) Here, the trial court ordered that defendants could picket only in one place: the sidewalk across the street from the clinic. Thus, the court did not merely create a buffer in front of the clinic: it prohibited defendants from picketing anywhere except for the one location specified in the injunction. Madsen provides no support for this drastic curtailment of defendants’ First Amendment rights.
In Madsen, the court held that the 36-foot buffer zone was constitutionally permissible for two reasons. First, the trial court in that case had few other options “in view of the failure of the first injunction to protect access.” (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 610, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2527].) Second, the characteristics of the clinic’s site demonstrated that the injunction did not significantly impair the free speech rights of the protesters. On the public right-of-way, the 36-foot buffer zone put the protesters *1037across a narrow, 21-foot wide street, where they were “no greater than 10 to 12 feet from cars approaching and leaving the clinic” and could “still be seen and heard from the clinic parking lots.” (Ibid.)
Unlike the situation in Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. _ [129 L.Ed.2d 593, 114 S.Ct. 2516], the permanent injunction here permits the protesters to picket only in one spot, on the opposite side of the busy four-lane avenue on which the clinic is located. That location is approximately 67 feet (the combined width of the sidewalk and Broadway Avenue) from the edge of the sidewalk in front of the building housing the clinic, 112 feet from the front of the building where the clinic is located, and approximately 172 feet from the entrance to the clinic. (See diagram B.) Thus, the injunction in this case imposes a far greater intrusion on First Amendment rights than the narrow 36-foot buffer in Madsen.
In upholding the permanent injunction in this case, the majority notes that Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. _ [129 L.Ed.2d 593, 114 S.Ct. 2516], “conclusively affirmed” the principle that buffer zones around clinics may be justified. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1020.) I have two observations. First, the permanent injunction in this case did not establish a “buffer zone”: it did not create an area around the clinic in which picketing was restricted and allow picketing everywhere else; instead, it limited the picketing to a specific area and prohibited picketing in all other locations. (Compare diagram A with diagram B.)
Second, although Madsen held that in some circumstances buffer zones are constitutionally permissible, the high court cautioned that any injunction limiting the right of free expression, including those establishing buffer zones, must be “ ‘couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective’ of the injunction.” (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 609, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2526].) Madsen itself, and all other decisions in which courts have upheld the validity of buffer zones, have limited the scope of those buffers to minimize their impact on free expression. This has been accomplished by (1) permitting a small number of protesters within the buffer zone (e.g., Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo (1994) 135 N.J. 126 [638 A.2d 1260, 1273] [“rather than prohibiting all expressional activities on the sidewalk directly in front of the [clinic], the injunction should have allowed a limited, controlled form of expression near the entrance while restraining the troublesome mass of protesters to a location across the street”]; Northeast Women’s Center, Inc. v. McMonagle (3d Cir. 1991) 939 F.2d 57, 63-64 [six picketers permitted within buffer zone]; Fargo Women’s Health v. Lambs of Christ (N.D. 1992) 488 N.W.2d *1038401, 409 [trial court permitted two picketers; case remanded for further fact-finding on whether injunction was overbroad]); or (2) drawing the boundaries of the buffer zone so narrowly that protesters standing outside the clinic could still communicate effectively with persons entering and leaving the clinic (e.g., Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 609-610, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2527-2528] [36-foot zone narrow enough to place protesters 10 to 12 feet from cars approaching and leaving clinic, thereby retaining protesters’ ability to be seen and heard from clinic parking lots]; Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue (W.D.N.Y. 1992) 799 F.Supp. 1417, 1433-1434 [buffer zone extending only 15 feet from clinic entrances]; Planned Parenthood v. Holy Angels Catholic Church (N.D.Cal. 1991) 765 F.Supp. 617, 626 [clear zone of only 25 feet from clinic entrances]; Bering v. Share (1986) 106 Wn.2d 212 [721 P.2d 918, 929-931] [picketing permitted on sidewalk next to, but not in front of, medical facility]). In contrast, here the permanent injunction is not similarly limited to minimize the impact on defendants’ right of free expression; rather, it prohibits any picketing in the entire area around the clinic, permitting picketing only in a small area across a busy, 4-lane avenue that is 67 feet from the edge of the public sidewalk directly in front of the clinic and approximately 172 feet from its entrance.
To summarize: (1) In Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. _ [129 L.Ed.2d 593, 114 S.Ct. 2516], the United States Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s injunction only to the extent that it barred picketing in the right-of-way immediately in front of the clinic; here, the majority approves an injunction that bans picketing everywhere except for a narrow, specific location far from the entrance to the clinic. (2) In Madsen, the failure of a prior less restrictive injunction demonstrated the need for more restrictive provisions; here, the success of the prior less restrictive injunction shows that more stringent restrictions are unnecessary. (3) In Madsen, the court permitted picketers to come within 10 to 12 feet of cars approaching and leaving the clinic; here, the protesters can exercise their First Amendment rights only on the other side of an avenue 60 feet wide, at a considerable distance from those entering or leaving the clinic. (4) In Madsen, “[protesters standing across the narrow [21 feet wide] street from the clinic [could] still be seen and heard from the clinic parking lots” (512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 611, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2527]); here, the protesters must make their voices heard over the roar of traffic on the busy four-lane avenue separating them from the clinic.
These differences demonstrate that unlike the injunction the high court upheld in Madsen, the permanent injunction here burdens more speech than necessary, thus violating the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. *1039(Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 609-610, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2526].)
Conclusion
Everyone is in favor of free speech. We constantly extol its virtues. But to some people the idea of free speech is that they are free to say what they want but those with different views are not. (Speech to House of Commons by Sir Winston Churchill, Oct. 13, 1943, Winston S. Churchill—His Complete Speeches (James edit. 1974) vol. VII, p. 6861.) The essence of our First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression, however, is the right of anyone to speak out. “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.” (West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624, 642 [87 L.Ed. 1628, 1639, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 147 A.L.R. 674].) To abridge that right is to abridge liberty.
Here, anti-abortion protesters sought to picket on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic. A public sidewalk is the quintessential public forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction limiting to four the number of picketers on the sidewalk. The preliminary injunction remained in effect for 11 months, a period more than sufficient to test its effectiveness in controlling abusive and obstructive conduct by the picketers. There is no evidence in this case that the preliminary injunction was not fully effective in striking a delicate balance between the constitutional right of a woman to obtain an abortion during the early months of pregnancy and the constitutional right of every person to publicly and peacefully express an opinion.
Abortion protesters are not above the law. When they engage in illegal or disruptive conduct, the judicial system should act swiftly to protect the rights of women seeking the services of any clinic at which abortions are performed. Had the picketers resorted to violence or committed serious and willful violations of the preliminary injunction, I would not for a moment hesitate to affirm an order of the trial court excluding them from the sidewalk in front of the clinic. But there is no evidence in the record before this court that after the trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction that the picketing by the protesters was other than peaceful. The protesters were openly engaged in making the public aware of their strongly held belief that the performance of abortions at the clinic was morally wrong. Disturbing as the expressions of protest must have been to the clinic’s staff and patients, *1040the very essence of the First Amendment is freedom to express ideas that others may find profoundly unsettling or offensive. All who seek to protest, no matter what their views, are equally entitled to this protection.5
Based on the record in this case, there simply was no need, practically or legally, to banish the picketers to the opposite side of the busy four-lane avenue, and to bar them from peacefully expressing their views on the public sidewalk directly in front of the clinic. Accordingly, the trial court’s permanent injunction burdened more speech than was necessary to protect the clinic’s staff and patients, and thus violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 609-610, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2526].)
*1041[[Image here]]
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When evaluating the constitutionality of statutes regulating time, place, and manner, the test is whether the statute was “ ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.’ ” (Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 606-607, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2524].)
Immediately after Schoenfeld’s ambiguous statement, the court inquired: “You say they followed the injunction?” Schoenfeld responded: “They followed the injunction, yes since the injunction.”
The majority states: “The court also heard testimony that petitioners had physically followed and surrounded patients, interfered with clinic access, and caused heightened stress and anxiety in clinic patients” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1024), implying that this testimony described incidents occurring after the trial court issued its preliminary injunction. To the contrary, this testimony by Anderson described incidents occurring before the court issued its preliminary injunction.
Although the majority cites no other evidence to support its conclusion that the preliminary injunction was ineffective, it does assert that “one or two pickets could effectively block passage along the sidewalk and impede traffic.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1024.) The record contains absolutely no support for this assertion, which I assume to be derived from the testimony of Jeanette Hammer, an anti-abortion protester. But Hammer testified that sidewalk *1036counseling of motorists entering the parking lot, not picketing, could impede traffic and cause accidents if it were conducted on the sidewalk. The distinction between the two is significant. “Counseling,” as Hammer defined it, requires lengthy conversations, and thus could pose a risk of traffic accidents if the subject of the counseling is a driver or passenger in a car turning from a busy street into the clinic’s parking lot. Picketing, by contrast, requires no such conversations, and thus would not impede traffic or cause accidents; indeed, sidewalk picketing on busy streets by strikers and others protesting a variety of grievances is commonplace in our society. Thus, Hammer’s testimony provides no support for the majority’s claim that the record shows picketing to be an impractical, dangerous activity.
Even if one were to accept the majority’s mischaracterization of Hammer’s testimony, her testimony nonetheless would provide no support for the trial court’s order enjoining all picketing from the sidewalk in front of the clinic. Hammer testified at the hearing held before issuance of the preliminary injunction; she did not, as the majority misleadingly implies (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1024), refer to the period after the preliminary injunction was already in effect. Thus, her testimony provides no support for the trial court’s decision to impose restrictions on picketing greater than those contained in the preliminary injunction.
In any event, even if Hammer’s testimony at the hearing on Planned Parenthood’s request for a preliminary injunction could be construed as referring to picketing on the sidewalk being impractical and posing a risk of traffic accidents, the trial court rejected it, because one week after Hammer’s testimony it increased the number of pickets permitted on the sidewalk in front of the clinic from two to four.
One cannot help but wonder if the majority would as readily have upheld the trial court’s injunction abridging the picketers’ right to free speech had the picketers been striking employees of the clinic instead of anti-abortion protesters.