concurring in part, dissenting in part.
¶ 25 I would affirm the defendant’s convictions and would adopt the reasoning of the court of appeals. While I agree with the majority that “drug profile courier” evidence should not be admitted to prove a substantive element of the crime charged, I disagree, on the record before us, that the error was prejudicial or harmful to the defendant. I also disagree with the belief stated by our dissenting justice that “drug courier profile” evidence is relevant to the defendant’s knowledge of his own possession and thus should have been considered. In my view, profile evidence bears little or no relationship to defendant’s personal knowledge of his own criminal act. Moreover, the majority has not abandoned harmless error analysis in appropriate cases1 but simply holds, on this record, that admission of the evidence was error and that the error was unduly prejudicial.
¶ 26 Courier profile evidence in drug cases can be relevant to threshold or background questions, not present in the instant case, such as, the legitimacy of an arrest or stop, the suppression of evidence in cases of search and seizure or probable cause, the defendant’s identity, or the jury’s ability to understand modus operandi. Profile evidence serves no purpose, however, where, as here, the defendant’s specific awareness that *548he possesses drugs is the only issue to be resolved. The reason is that the conduct of other persons unconnected with the crime charged, their manner, style, and patterns of behavior, offer nothing persuasive as to this defendant’s personal knowledge of his crime. That a crime was committed was made clear by discovery of the drugs. Linking defendant to the crime depends on independent evidence of the defendant’s own state of mind.
¶ 27 The problem is the invitation to prejudice. “Profile” evidence is inherently prejudicial in a case of this nature because of the potential for including innocent citizens as profiled drug couriers. See United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir.1983).
¶28 On the record before us, I would adhere to the rule followed by the majority, that it was error to admit drug courier profile evidence at trial to prove defendant’s knowledge as a substantive element of the crime charged. In accord with the dissent, however, I would find the error harmless because I believe the independent evidence of defendant’s guilt outweighs whatever prejudice may have been caused by the profile testimony.
¶ 29 Numerous cases from other jurisdictions support the foregoing result. Among them, two federal cases, though admittedly not binding, are persuasive. In United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019 (8th Cir. 1989), drug courier profile evidence was introduced through a narcotics agent. The agent testified of various profile characteristics and tied them to Quigley. Id. at 1028. The court held that to admit such evidence was error because of the potential for prejudice. But there was introduced at trial ample other evidence linking Quigley to the possession of cocaine. This prompted the court to affirm the conviction and hold that the admission of “drug courier profile” characteristics was harmless error.
¶30 Similarly, in United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.1991), cited by the dissent and factually distinguished by the majority, the Ninth Circuit denounced the use of drug courier profile evidence but held, on the facts of the case, that the error was harmless because the independent evidence of defendant’s guilt was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
¶ 31 In both Quigley and Lui substantial independent evidence was introduced linking the defendants to knowing possession of the drugs. Similarly, there is sufficient proof in this record, independent of the “profile,” that defendant was fully aware that he possessed drugs. He was observed, alone, carrying the suitcase containing the drugs into Phoenix Sky Harbor terminal three. When his traveling companion, the ticket purchaser, arrived and went to the ticket counter, defendant, himself, approached the counter, walked to the companion, and placed the suitcase on the luggage stand next to her. The companion bought the tickets and received them along with the baggage claim check. The persuasive evidence of defendant’s knowledge of the suitcase contents was that he physically carried the bag into the terminal, delivered it to the ticket agent, and had sole possession of the key. The defendant alone could access the suitcase, and he alone controlled the contraband which the suitcase contained.
¶ 32 In my mind, these facts overcome any prejudice caused by the profile evidence. I do not believe the error materially affected the verdicts. See United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990). I would hold that the guilty verdicts were sufficiently grounded in evidence independent of the drug courier profile characteristics and that such evidence was adequate to connect defendant to actual possession and knowledge of the drugs beyond a reasonable doubt.
. See the majority's comparison of the facts in United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.1991), with the facts of the instant case on the issue of harmlessness. Majority opinion at ¶ 22.