DISSENTING OPINION OF
ABE, J.As stated by the majority of the court, the issue of this case is whether the legislature may constitutionally regulate the conduct of a person for his own safety. I disagree with the majority opinion and I would hold the provision of HRS § 286-81 (1) (A) requiring appellant, a motorcyclist, to wear a helmet for his own safety unconstitutional.
Courts in other jurisdictions have declared similar laws to be unconstitutional. People v. Fries, 42 Ill.2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969); American Motorcycle Ass’n. v. Davids, 11 Mich. Ct. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1969).
I do not question that our legislature, recognizing the special hazards faced by motorcyclists, enacted the statute to prevent the death and injuries of our people resulting from motorcycle mishaps. Nor do I question the beneficent intent of our legislature in enacting the statute because apparently the legislation was enacted to protect immature and reckless, or careless, or foolhardy youngsters and adults, who are unwilling to protect themselves.
The general law is that a state has inherent authority under its police power to provide for the needs of the public. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524 (1934). No court has and can, I believe, provide a precise definition or standard as to the scope of police power. However, it is the generally recognized doctrine that a state may enact reasonable laws to preserve the public order, safety, health and morals. Nebbia v. New York, supra; Borden Co. v. McCrory, 169 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. La. 1959); Pacific Meat Co. v. Otagaki, 47 Haw. 652, 394 P.2d 618 (1964); State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 125 A.2d 477 (1956).
*525The United States Supreme Court in Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) at page 594 quotes the rule from Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894):
“To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.”
The majority holds that “where the legislature has determined that the conduct of a particular class of people recklessly affects their physical well being and that the consequent physical injury and death is so widespread as to be of grave concern to the public and where the incidence and severity of the physical harm has been statistically demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court, then the conduct of that class of people affects the public interest and is properly within the scope of the police power.” In its decision, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898), Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) are not cited as authority; however, it would appear that the majority of the court is depending on those cases for its proposition.
The cases above cited upheld the constitutionality of statutes fixing maximum hours of labor in certain industries as a reasonable exercise of the police power to preserve public health. I would distinguish those cases from the case before us.
I agree with the majority that the safety helmet requirement is aimed at preventing a further increase in the toll highway accidents have taken of the state’s citizens based on the legislative finding that highway travel presents a special hazard for motorcyclists. However, no matter how beneficent or humane the purpose of the statute, it cannot be upheld unless it is a legitimate exercise of its *526police power for the public order, safety, health, morals or welfare.
I believe our State Constitution specifically recognizes one’s right to be let alone. Article I, § 2 provides:
. “All persons are free-by nature and are equal in their, inherent and inalienable rights. Among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the acquiring and possessing of property. These rights cannot endure unless the people recognize their corresponding obligations and responsibilities.”
There is no question that an individual has a fundamental constitutional right to be let alone — liberty.to do as he pleases — but, of course, subject to reasonable restriction under the police power.
Here, one’s right to be let alone on a public highway is being infringed in that a motorcyclist is required to wear a safety helmet on pain of criminal punishment for his failure to do so. I believe that the statute in question should not be upheld as a reasonable exercise of police power- although the purpose is laudable because the act is essentially a personal safety measure.
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has held that a state may- legislate for miners1 in terms of maximum hours of- work and wearing apparel in the exercise of its police power for the “general welfare” or “best interest.” This concept should not be extended to uphold the constitutionality of HRS § 286-81 (1) (A).
It appears that the majority, in upholding the constitutionality of the statute, is adopting the concept that an individual’s liberty — the right to be let alone — may be abridged or infringed by legislative act' which may be deemed for the “best interest” of that individual. I believe this principle or concept that a state may determine what *527is in one of its citizen’s “best interest” and may compel Mm to follow that course of action under pain of criminal punishment, unreasonably infringes upon one’s fundamental liberty. My opinion is that a state may only legislate where the “general welfare” is affected, that is, where others are harmed or. likely to be harmed.
I believe the right of liberty — the right to be let alone— gives one the right to determine for himself what is for his “best interest,” even though many scholars have argued that there is “. . . a general decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests best, and ... an increased awareness of a great range of factors which diminish the significance to be attached to an apparently free choice or . . . consent.”2
Now, the majority having upheld the statute, it would appear that our legislature along the same reasoning could require drivers and passengers in motor vehicles to wear seat belts and shoulder straps, under pain of criminal punishment for their failure to do so. Also, it could require individuals who may use public streets and highways at nights to wear certain clothing manufactured from materials having reflectory characteristics for their personal safety.
Then why can’t the legislature enact criminal legislation prohibiting the smoking of cigarettes or other tobacco products, or restricting or regulating foods to be consumed, for example, non-fattening food products to prevent obesity?
Are we ready to forfeit our individual liberty to a point where legislative discretion is to be the only bar to the determination as to what one may or may not do under the definition of “best interest”?
I submit that once a step is taken that the protection of an individual from himself is within the legitimate ex*528ercise of the police power, that is no limit to this power and a state can entirely regulate one’s life and his way of living.
As I have stated, the statute is beneficent and humane, without doubt, and even eminently sensible and wise; nonetheless, I believe it is unconstitutional because it attempts to infringe upon and stifle fundamental personal liberties for one’s own safety and is not concerned with the preservation of public order, safety, health and morals, or for the public welfare.
Then, the fact that the general public considers it foolhardy to ride a motorcycle without a safety helmet, that reason alone should not be used as a criterion for defining the non-use of a helmet a criminal offense.
As stated by Justice Barham in his dissent in Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 300, 217 So.2d 400, 405 (1968) :
“Although laws have been validly enacted to protect the legally incompetent from their own acts, some of the persons who disregard the most elementary forms of self-preservation are, unfortunately, not legal incompetents, but only fools; and
‘ * * * a fool must follow his natural bent c (Even as you and I!)’ ”
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
Hart, Law, liberty and Morality, pp. 32-33, 1963 (Reprinted 1965).