concur in results:
¶ 1 Even though I disagree with the majority in some respects," I still concur in the results reached.
¶ 2 In its treatment of Proposition Five, Appellant’s contention that the statement he made to a fellow inmate was not corroborated, the majority ignores the fact that the main thrust of Appellant’s argument goes to the fact there was no corroboration for a portion of the statement. He claims that the State contended from the inmate’s account of the statement that the Appellant stated the murder was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim of his watch and ring. He asserts that the statement was not admissible, because there was no evidence that there was a robbery or that Bridgen even had a watch or a ring. I agree with the majority that there was plenty of evidence to general-
*20ly corroborate the statement and would point out that it is not necessary to corroborate all parts of a statement. See, Fontenot v. State, 1994 OK CR 42, ¶ 30, 881 P.2d 69, 79.
¶ 3 I also disagree with the majority when it finds that Appellant’s membership in a white supremacist group is admissible as evidence in the first stage of the trial. The majority would admit it as relevant to issues of character and to establish a motive for the crime in the first stage of the proceeding. I would remind the majority that issues of character are not admissible in the guiltdnno-cence stage of a trial until a defendant puts his character in issue. 12 O.S.1991 § 2404. Appellant had not done this at the time the evidence was admitted.1 In addition, I fail to see how in this case membership in this organization is relevant to establish motive.2 It is inadmissible, but, in the light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt I would find its admission harmless.
¶ 4 I next disagree with the majority in its approval of the testimony of the victim’s wife as to her opinion of the appropriate punishment. It is my belief that because opinion as to punishment is only authorized by 22 O.S.Supp.1997 § 984 it is not admissible during the second stage of the trial. See my vote in Ledbetter v. State, 1997 OK CR 5, ¶¶ 1-6, 933 P.2d 880 (Lane, J. concur in results). However, I recognize that because of our decision in Ledbetter and other cases the doctrine of stare decisis applies.
¶ 5 Finally, I would not affirm the jury finding of great risk of death to more than one person. The majority relies on Ross v. State, 1986 OK CR 49, 717 P.2d 117. I think our fact situation is closer to Valdez v. State, 1995 OK CR 18, 900 P.2d 363, cert. denied 516 U.S. 967, 116 S.Ct. 425, 133 L.Ed.2d 341 where we held that when the defendant threatened another telling him that he would kill him if he did not cooperate, not to interfere, and to help clean up the blood after the murder was not sufficient to justify this aggravating circumstance. All of Valdez s anger was directed at the person killed and not the person who claimed to have been threatened. The same situation is present here. All of Appellant’s anger was directed at Brig-den and not toward Murphy. The threats to Murphy were only for the purpose of preventing him from interfering with the murder, and he was never in immediate danger of being killed as long as he stayed in his cell.
¶ 6 However, this does not mean that I would reverse the death sentence. When I discount this aggravating circumstance and reweigh the remaining aggravators as authorized by Castro v. State, 1991 OK CR 79, ¶ 5, 814 P.2d 158, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1068, 112 S.Ct. 947, 117 L.Ed.2d 116. I still conclude that beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have returned a death sentence.
. The majority relies upon Robison v. State, 1984 OK CR 21, 677 P.2d 1080, cert. denied 467 U.S. 1246, 104 S.Ct. 3524, 82 L.Ed.2d 831 to justify a finding the evidence is admissible. In Robison there was testimony that the Appellant committed a robbery to obtain funds to build an amphetamine laboratory. This does establish motive. In our current case there is no connection in the record between Appellant's membership and the murder. •
. To be relevant the evidence must have a tendency to make more or less probable a material fact in issue. President v. State, 1979 OK CR 114, 602 P.2d 222.