(concurring in the result) — I concur in the result reached by the majority. I would, however, reject the "public duty" doctrine embraced by the majority inasmuch as I believe respondents' duty toward appellants rests upon the traditional tort principles of policy and foreseeability rather than the existence of an ill-defined special relationship and reliance upon explicit assurances.
I
While a majority of jurisdictions still adhere to the rule that state and municipal laws generally impose only a duty owed to the public as a whole rather than particular citizens, the recent trend is toward rejection of this rule. Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Iowa 1979); see, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982); Martinez v. Lakewood, 655 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cy., 371 So. 2d 1010, 1016 (Fla. 1979); Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351, 1356-58 (La. 1980); Brennen v. Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 411, 591 P.2d 719 (1979); Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 540, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). The majority's conclusory *291dismissal of these cases is unpersuasive. They do not create duties where none existed before, as the majority claims. Majority, at 288. They simply analyze the duty question by applying traditional tort principles, analogizing where possible to the liability of private parties performing similar functions. See, e.g., Adams, at 241; Ryan, 656 P.2d at 599; Wilson, at 671-72; Brennen, at 406-14; Coffey, at 537-43. By rejecting this approach, the majority's analysis flies in the face of the Legislature's express direction that governmental entities shall be liable in tort "to the same extent as if they were a private person or corporation" (RCW 4.96-.010). This seems to me a rather flagrant exercise of judicial lawmaking in an area where the Legislature has already spoken.
The public duty doctrine is in reality merely a not so subtle and limited form of sovereign immunity. Adams v. State, supra at 241; Note, State Tort Liability for Negligent Fire Inspection, 13 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 303, 338 (1977) (hereinafter Columbia Note); 18 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 53.04(b) (3d ed. 1977) (prefacing discussion of public duty doctrine by the comment that even absent sovereign immunity "the tort liability of a public official is not in all circumstances identical with that of a private individual”). The rationales set forth in defense of the doctrine are (1) excessive governmental liability and (2) the need to prevent hindrance of the governing process. Adams v. State, supra at 242; Columbia Note, at 338, 344-45; see, e.g., Massengill v. Yuma Cy., 104 Ariz. 518, 523, 456 P.2d 376 (1969); Keane v. Chicago, 98 Ill. App. 2d 460, 463, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968); Stranger v. New York Elec. & Gas Corp., 25 A.D.2d 169, 172, 268 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1966). These are precisely the justifications formerly provided for sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 333, 123 P. 450 (1912); Berek v. Metropolitan Dade Cy., 396 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Glassman v. Glassman, 309 N.Y. 436, 440, 131 N.E.2d 721 (1956); Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 463, 467 (1963). They were *292necessarily rejected by the legislative abolition of sovereign immunity and should therefore not be reinstated under the guise of the public duty doctrine.
Instead, governmental tort liability should be limited just as is that of private entities. Indeed, the wording of RCW 4.96.010, which I note above, mandates such an approach. Initially, the tort concept of duty, which turns on foreseeability and pertinent policy considerations, will provide significant protection. See Brennen v. Eugene, supra at 411-13. Secondly, the policy considerations implicit in the concept of proximate cause will reasonably limit liability. See Coffey v. Milwaukee, supra at 540-43. It may be noted that the sufficiency of these limitations is not merely a matter for conjecture since they have been regularly applied by this court in other actions against government entities. See, e.g., Hansen v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 95 Wn.2d 773, 776-77, 632 P.2d 504 (1981) (lack of foreseeability); LaPlante v. State, 85 Wn.2d 154, 160, 531 P.2d 299 (1975) (no "but for" cause); King v. Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 239, 250-51, 525 P.2d 228 (1974) (no proximate cause). Moreover, governmental entities have the same option as private parties of spreading their losses through insurance. Hunter v. North Mason High Sch., 85 Wn.2d 810, 817, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
The decisions of this court cited by the majority in support of the public duty doctrine do not rely upon it and are not inconsistent with my analysis. Baerlein v. State, 92 Wn.2d 229, 595 P.2d 930 (1979) most closely approaches adoption of the public duty doctrine by asserting that it is the "traditional rule" and is "almost universally accepted". Baerlein, at 231. Baerlein, however, turned on the existence of a specific statutory disclaimer (Baerlein, at 232)7 and its broader statements about the public duty doctrine were therefore unnecessary.
Neither do the other decisions cited by the majority *293adopt the public duty doctrine. In Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wn.2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360 (1975), we found no need to, and so did not, address the public duty doctrine because a duty was expressly created by statute. Mason, at 325-26. In Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wn.2d 673, 676, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978), we expressly declined to decide the vitality of the public duty doctrine in this state because the ordinance there at issue evidenced an intent to "identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons." Similarly, in Campbell v. Bellevue, 85 Wn.2d 1, 9, 530 P.2d 234 (1975), we merely stated that ”[w]e have no particular quarrel at this time" with the public duty doctrine and applied the recognized exception relied upon in the instant case by the majority. (Italics mine.) See Campbell, at 10-13.
The time has now come to quarrel with the doctrine directly and end its slow dismemberment by exception. The exceptions we have enunciated simply "reflect the tension which exists between the law abolishing sovereign immunity and the court rule which preserves it." J & B Dev. Co. v. King Cy., 29 Wn. App. 942, 952, 631 P.2d 1002 (1981), aff'd, 100 Wn.2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983). The Legislature's willingness to expose governmental entities to liability, shown by its repeal of the sovereign immunity laws, deprives the majority's framework of its only reason for being.
Just as an individual can be killed by the government's negligent firing of a long-range ballistic missile, he similarly can be killed by a policeman's negligent discharge of a police pistol at point-blank range. Imposition of liability in the latter case and denial of relief in the former, assuming proof of negligence and of actual and proximate cause in both instances, can be rationally explained only by an improper, though perhaps understandable, fear of exposure to potentially greater liability. Legal, moral, or conceptual analyses compel the rejection of such a baseless dichotomy.
(Footnote omitted.) Columbia Note, at 330.
As most recently characterized by this court in J & B Dev. Co. v. King Cy., 100 Wn.2d 299, 669 P.2d 468 (1983), *294the public duty doctrine may have been reduced to a mere restatement as to public entities of the general rule that a duty toward the particular plaintiff must be shown. See J & B Dev. Co. v. King Cy., supra at 309 (Utter, J., concurring). If the doctrine is limited to this restatement, however, it should be eliminated as superfluous and unnecessarily confusing.
II
RCW 36.28.010 gives the county sheriff a general duty to provide necessary police protection. Cf. Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wn. App. 548, 551, 543 P.2d 648 (1975) (such duty imposed on city police department by RCW 35.24.160). This alone does not give rise to a duty toward appellants, however — such a specific duty arose only if the risk of harm which befell appellants was a reasonably foreseeable result of respondents' failure to act. See, e.g., King v. Seattle, supra at 248.
In the instant case the harm was reasonably foreseeable. This was not an instance of a single call which did not indicate the emergency nature of the situation. Rather, appellants made repeated calls and, at least during the later calls, were clearly upset. Under these circumstances, it was reasonably foreseeable that appellants would suffer emotional distress.
The second element of negligence is breach of the duty owed the plaintiff. LaPlante v. State, supra at 159. It is conceded here that respondents failed to respond to appellants' calls — they thus breached their duty toward appellants.
The final element of negligence is that the alleged breach of duty be a proximate cause of resulting injury. LaPlante, at 159. Proximate cause depends both on the existence of cause in fact and "whether, as a policy of law, legal liability should attach". King v. Seattle, supra at 250. In addition, the causal connection between a breach of duty and a plaintiff's injury must not be broken by an intervening event which is not reasonably foreseeable. Maltman v. *295Sauer, 84 Wn.2d 975, 982, 530 P.2d 254 (1975).
In the present case, respondents' failure to act was a cause in fact of appellants' emotional distress. In addition, there appears to be no intervening event sufficient to break that chain of causation. Finally, I find no policy reason why, under the facts as alleged, liability should not attach. Absent a reasonable belief that the police were on their way, appellants' failure to attempt a citizen's arrest might,8 as a policy of law, negate proximate causation. Cf. King v. Seattle, supra at 250-51 (plaintiffs' failure to attempt to avoid damages precluded liability). In light of the assurances respondents gave appellants and appellants' reliance thereon, however, proximate cause of appellants' emotional distress does exist here.
Respondents' failure to act was not, however, a proximate cause of appellants' alleged loss of a cause of action. Appellants conceded at oral argument that the police, had they arrived, would have had no duty to make an arrest. Cf. Walters v. Hampton, supra at 552-53 (police have discretion in use of arrest and criminal process). Yet it was the failure of arrest, not the failure to arrive, that was a cause in fact of appellants' loss of any cause of action. Even had there been a duty to arrest, and hence cause in fact, I would hold that the chain of causation was, as a matter of policy, too attenuated to establish proximate cause. See Walters, at 555-56.
I would reverse in part and affirm in part as has the majority. I would permanently inter the public duty doctrine, however, rather than attack it piecemeal as have our decisions to date.
This distinction was noted by the court in Rogers v. Toppenish, 23 Wn. App. 554, 561, 596 P.2d 1096 (1979).
An important factor in making this determination would be the risk which might be involved in making such an arrest.