(dissenting) — The majority states that "the trial court concluded that the absence of reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot rendered the stop unlawful." The majority goes on to hold that the reasonable suspicion standard is the inappropriate standard to determine the reasonableness of stops such as here. While I agree with the majority that it is incorrect to apply the reasonable suspicion standard, alone, to this case, I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court based its decision to suppress solely upon the reasonable suspicion standard. Instead, I believe the trial court applied the proper "balancing" test when it ruled on the motion to suppress.
Stopping a motor vehicle and detaining its occupants for even a brief time constitutes a "seizure" within the Fourth Amendment.4 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979); State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 611 P.2d 771 (1980). A limited investigatory stop may *869be justified on less than probable cause if the officer can "point to specific and articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable suspicion that there is criminal activity afoot." (Italics mine.) State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 105, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); see Delaware v. Prouse, supra; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
The majority states that "whether a particular stop is reasonable depends not on the presence or absence of 'probable cause' or 'reasonable suspicion,' but rather on a balancing of the competing interests involved in light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances." I agree that the reasonableness test includes a balancing of the competing interests. However, the majority ignores the fact that the reasonableness test requires a certain quantum of evidence before the State's interest on balance overrides that of the individual.5
[T]he key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness — the balancing of competing interests. But if courts and law enforcement officials are to have workable rules, this balancing must in large part be done on a categorical basis — not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.
(Citations omitted.) Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219-20, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979) (White, J., concurring).
Furthermore, a review of the record indicates that the trial court did not apply the "reasonable suspicion" standard per se to test this stop as held by the majority. The trial court also considered whether an emergency situation existed which would also justify the stop. The elements of the emergency rule are:
*870(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property.
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence.
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.
(Italics mine.) State v. Nichols, 20 Wn. App. 462, 465-66, 581 P.2d 1371 (1978). I agree with the trial court's implicit finding that the facts in this case do not indicate there was an emergency at hand that necessitated police assistance for the protection of property. Even though not stated in its findings or conclusions, it is readily apparent from the record that the issue of whether an emergency justified the seizure was well briefed to the trial court by both parties and was decided adversely to the State. This is well supported by the State's assignment of error to the court's failure to find that an emergency situation existed which would justify the stop in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Further, no finding as to a material fact constitutes a negative finding. Lobdell v. Sugar 'N Spice, Inc., 33 Wn. App. 881, 658 P.2d 1267 (1983). Thus, I disagree with the majority that the court applied the "reasonable suspicion" standard per se without balancing the public interest in the stop. From the record, it is obvious that the trial court found neither reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor existence of an emergency. Therefore, the majority's remand for the trial court to resolve factual questions, such as whether the hat was in danger of being lost or presenting a traffic hazard, is simply asking the trial court to do what it has already done.
In my view any exception to the "reasonable suspicion" standard to be applied to noninvestigatory stops should be limited to specific, objective facts which reasonably give rise to an inference that safety or emergency reasons justify the *871stop.6 For " [i]t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967). I believe the trial court applied the proper balancing in this case.
I would affirm.
The "community caretaking functions" referred to by the majority are generally communications between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention amounting to a "seizure," and, therefore, are without the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982).
Implemented in this manner, the reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against "an objective standard," whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test. "In those situations in which the balance of interests precludes insistence upon 'some quantum of individualized suspicion,' other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field. . Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55.
This essentially is the holding of United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 610 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1979), which is cited by the majority. This is not the only case which discusses the validity of noninvestigative stops of motor vehicles to assist their occupants. See People v. Deppert, 83 Ill. App. 3d 375, 403 N.E.2d 1279 (1980); People v. Lilly, 38 Ill. App. 3d 379, 347 N.E.2d 842 (1976). These cases held that the stopping of a motorist in order to see if the motorist is lost, in need of assistance, or having car problems was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.