dissenting:
The issue before us is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in granting a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss based upon plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute an action they commenced some four years earlier.
The decision of a trial judge to dismiss a case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41(b) is a discretionary one which will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Kirkham v. 4.60 Acres of Land, 100 Idaho 781, 605 P.2d 959 (1980); Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993 (1991).
The trial court determined that the most recent (10-month) period of delay following its denial of Washington Water Power’s summary judgment motion was unreasonable in that Gerstners provided no reasonable excuse of explanation for the inactivity. In considering the issue of prejudice, the trial court stated:
The passage of time dims the memories of all those people that the defendant would rely upon to present its defense in this matter. Therefore, this Court finds that the defendant is prejudiced in its defense of this case by delay.
. The majority holds that a Rule 41(b) movant must demonstrate actual prejudice by citing specific instances as to how the movant’s ability to adequately and effectively prepare the case has been hampered, regardless of the length of the delay and regardless of the rationale for the delay. This holding overlooks our prior decisions that prejudice may be presumed to flow from' unexcused and unreasonable delay when, as here, case activity had not been resumed prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss. Systems Associates v. Motorola Com. & Elec., 116 Idaho 615, 778 P.2d 737 (1989); Day v. CIBA Geigy Corp., 115 Idaho 1015, 772 P.2d 222 (1989).
This Court has encouraged trial judges to actively supervise their court calendars to ensure that litigants are not kept waiting for inordinate periods of time to have their cases resolved. To this end the Court has adopted time standards for processing cases and, in 1987, the Court amended I.R.C.P. 40(c) to permit a trial judge to dismiss a case after six months of inactivity rather than a year of inactivity.
It is respectfully submitted that the majority has taken a step backward in the field of case management and has undermined its own policy of discouraging unnecessary delay in civil cases.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals in its approval of the trial court’s dismissal of this action.
BAKES, C.J., concurs.